Historical Visibility of Russian Influence in Ukrainian Politics
For decades, Russian influence over Ukrainian politics has been both pronounced and multifaceted, manifesting through military, disinformation, cultural, religious, and economic tactics designed to shape Ukraine’s political course to align with Moscow’s interests. One of the earliest visible examples was Russia’s overt support for pro-Kremlin candidates, most notably in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election when Russian backing for Viktor Yanukovych became highly public. This overt interference triggered mass protests known as the Orange Revolution, which arose from widespread perceptions of corruption and voter fraud linked to Yanukovych's close ties to the Kremlin. Russia has also consistently leveraged state-sponsored media, such as RT and other channels, to spread narratives depicting Ukraine as a failed state, rampant with corruption or under the control of extremists, often branding Ukrainian authorities and civil society activists as fascists, Nazis, or Western puppets.
Visible interference has included the deployment of Russian troops and proxies during the 2014 annexation of Crimea and in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where military and paramilitary involvement was often justified with manipulated claims of protecting ethnic Russians or combating aggression from Kyiv. Complementing this, Russian disinformation campaigns have systematically worked to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and national identity, for example by disseminating narratives that question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian language, history, and statehood. State-controlled Russian media amplified these stories domestically and internationally, targeting both ethnic Russians in Ukraine and the broader public to promote divisions and cast doubt on the legitimacy of pro-Western leaders.
Religious and cultural instruments have also been visible, especially through the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has portrayed Ukrainian moves towards ecclesiastical independence as illegitimate, insisting on the indivisibility of Russian and Ukrainian spiritual and cultural unity. Additionally, the systematic exploitation of economic ties and manipulation through energy supplies has reinforced Moscow’s pressure on Ukrainian political decisions.
Mechanisms Making Russian Influence Visible in Ukraine
Russia’s influence campaigns in Ukraine have become highly visible through a combination of military actions, media saturation, cyber operations, and the activation of local collaborators or sympathetic networks. For example, Russian cyberattacks compromised Ukraine’s Central Election Commission in 2014, and attempts at similar intrusions persisted in subsequent elections, albeit with greater Ukrainian and international vigilance limiting their impact in later years. The persistent presence and messaging of Russian state-affiliated outlets contributed to the spread of divisive narratives, which were not only blatant in content but also adapted to local contexts, for instance tailoring anti-Western, anti-EU, or anti-NATO rhetoric to regions or social groups receptive to such messages.
Among the most visible signals of Russian information warfare has been the widespread branding of Ukrainian opposition as “Nazi” or “fascist,” a tactic designed to resonate emotionally with Russian-leaning populations given the deeply ingrained collective memory of World War II. The promotion of conspiracy theories, manipulation of historical memory, and coordinated campaigns on social media platforms have made these efforts all the more apparent, with investigations and digital forensics by Ukrainian and international organizations routinely exposing the scale and coordination of such influence activities.
Global Russian Interference Under Putin: Visible and Invisible Tactics
With the ascent of Vladimir Putin, Russian interference expanded beyond the post-Soviet sphere to become a truly global phenomenon, marked by both visible (overt) and invisible (covert) methods targeting numerous countries. Visible methods include direct cyberattacks (hack-and-leak operations), public support for populist or anti-establishment candidates, the spread of disinformation through state media, and digital campaigns using troll farms and bot networks.
Invisible tactics are more insidious and can include covert funding of sympathetic parties, infiltration of social or ethnic minority networks, clandestine influence via business and corruption, and cyber espionage intended to steal sensitive political or electoral information. Russian intelligence agencies (SVR, FSB, GRU) orchestrate these activities, sometimes using front organizations, local allies, or so-called “useful idiots” to obscure the Kremlin’s direct involvement.
The overarching goal of these operations is to weaken Western alliances such as NATO and the EU, destabilize democratic institutions, and promote isolationism, nationalism, or authoritarianism in the target states, thereby reducing resistance to Russian interests on the global stage. Strategic aims often include lifting sanctions, undermining pro-Western policies, or simply creating chaos and confusion.
Countries Targeted by Russian Interference Around 2017
Around 2017, the global scope of Russian political interference became undeniable, with major cases documented in the United States, Europe, and beyond. Below is a non-exhaustive list of countries where Russian election meddling was identified, particularly using a combination of hack-and-leak, cyber, and disinformation operations similar to those deployed in the United States:
United States Hack-and-leak (DNC, Podesta), social media disinfo 2016 presidential election (Trump v. Clinton)
United Kingdom Disinformation, voter registration hacks, Brexit Brexit referendum, fake news campaigns
France Hacking, support for Marine Le Pen, Macron campaign 2017 presidential election hacks/leaks
Germany Cyberattacks, anti-immigration/social media trolling Parliamentary hacks, anti-Merkel campaigns, AfD boost
Italy Cyber, social media disinformation General elections, connections to far-right parties
Netherlands Cyber sabotage, disinformation General elections, disruptions of voting sites
Spain Disinformation, cyber Catalonia independence referendum attacks
Poland Cyberattacks Electoral commission website hack
Finland Fake parliamentary accounts, disinformation Parliamentary elections interference
Sweden Cyberattacks, fake sites, disinformation General elections, impersonation incidents
Scotland Social media disinformation Independence referendum, fake voter fraud claims
Macedonia/Bulgaria State/social media disinformation Referenda, support for pro-Russian parties
Ukraine Multipronged hybrid warfare, election interference 2014–17 persistent political/military intervention
These operations were typically orchestrated to support candidates or parties sympathetic to Russia or to generally destabilize or delegitimize the electoral process and democratic institutions.
The Case of the USA: FBI’s 2019 Report and Russian Tactics
The 2016 U.S. presidential election stands as the most widely reported example of Russian interference, documented in the 2019 Mueller report, FBI indictments, and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s bipartisan findings. These sources detail that Russian military intelligence (GRU) hacked into Democratic National Committee networks and senior campaign staff, exfiltrating sensitive data and coordinating the public release of this information to strategically damage Hillary Clinton’s campaign. Parallel to these efforts, Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) waged sustained social media campaigns posing as Americans, amplifying divisive issues, and promoting then-candidate Donald Trump while disparaging Clinton. The disinformation targeted both the political left and right, focusing on wedge issues like race, immigration, gun rights, and law enforcement to undermine voter trust and discourage opposition turnout.
The tactics of identity theft, infiltration of digital communities, and impersonation of candidates or organizations have since become a hallmark of Russian interference worldwide. Importantly, the U.S. intelligence community established that Vladimir Putin personally directed this influence campaign.
Replication of U.S.-Style Interference in Other Countries
Russia has adapted the digital playbook developed for the U.S. election and repurposed it in other countries, using coordinated cyber operations, digital forgeries, hack-and-distribution of confidential materials, and expansive disinformation to manipulate public opinion and electoral outcomes. In France, the 2017 campaign of Emmanuel Macron saw a major hack-and-leak operation and massive online disinformation campaigns, many of which leveled charges strikingly similar to those aimed at Clinton in the U.S.. In Germany, state-sponsored outlets and bots amplified anti-immigration sentiment, and cyberattacks targeted parliamentary email systems. Similar strategies—tailored to local issues—were applied to the UK’s Brexit vote, Spain’s Catalonia referendum, the Italian, Dutch, and Swedish elections, often involving bots, trolls, infiltration of extremist networks, and the creation of fake or cloned websites.
The list in the preceding section demonstrates that Russian cyber and information operations were actively deployed in numerous democracies around 2017, particularly in highly politicized or closely contested electoral contests.
Favoritism Toward Putin-Aligned Candidates: The Political Logic
Russian interference always aims to support candidates or platforms that weaken Western institutions, promote inward-looking nationalist or populist movements, foster social polarization, or otherwise align with the Kremlin’s strategic interests. Such candidates tend to espouse Euro-skeptic, anti-liberal, nationalist, or authoritarian rhetoric, often undermining democratic norms, the rule of law, or the legitimacy of supranational organizations like the EU and NATO. Whether through overt support—such as financial assistance, media amplification, or digital astroturfing—or more subtle forms of endorsement, Russia’s preference is clear: empower robust, charismatic figures or parties who will challenge the liberal, rules-based international order and offer Moscow negotiating room or sanctions relief.
Trumpism and Its Alignment with Putin’s Regime
Trumpism, the ideological movement associated with Donald Trump, is characterized by right-wing populism, nationalism, anti-globalism, isolationism, a strong-man leadership style, skepticism toward established international alliances, and an emphasis on “America First”. These features are deeply resonant with Putinism, which similarly stresses national sovereignty, centralized authority, cultural conservatism, and opposition to Western liberal norms. Both ideologies pursue transactional foreign policy, resist supranational constraints, and employ emotionally engaging rhetoric that disparages critics as traitors, “globalists,” or enemies of the nation.
In foreign policy, both Trumpism and Putinism advocate for the reassertion of national dominance, rejection of globalism, and negotiation from a position of strength or even confrontation. The political movements connected to both leaders use divisive language, appeals to grievance or victimhood, and a personalized, even cult-like approach to leadership and loyalty. Trump’s challenge to NATO, skepticism of the EU, and public admiration for authoritarian leaders strongly paralleled the priorities and style of Putin’s own domestic and international agenda.
Russia’s strategic support for Trump and other Trump-aligned figures or movements in the U.S. and abroad reflects this ideological alignment. By boosting candidates who share an affinity for authoritarian nationalism, skepticism of institutional checks and balances, and hostility to liberal democratic values, Russian interference reinforces the global rise of illiberal politics and undermines the unity of Western democracies—a geopolitical win for Putin’s regime.
Conclusion
The historical and contemporary record clearly demonstrates that Russian influence in Ukrainian politics, as well as global interference under Putin’s leadership, has been both visible and impactful, facilitated by a well-honed blend of military, digital, informational, and covert means. The methods perfected in Ukraine and adapted in the United States have been exported to elections around the globe, always favoring candidates who champion ideologies that either align with or mimic Putin’s vision for strongman rule, state-centric nationalism, and opposition to the Western liberal order. The ideological overlap between Trumpism and Putinism—manifest in nationalist, anti-globalist, and authoritarian rhetoric—explains why the Kremlin’s interference campaigns so often advance the fortunes of Trump-adjacent or similarly aligned political actors around the world.
