The Jurisdictional Labyrinth: Sovereignty, Consent, and the Limits of the International Criminal Court

Introduction: The Tension Between Sovereignty and Justice

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 marked a watershed moment in the history of international relations, representing a decisive shift from the impunity of the Westphalian state system toward a model of accountability for the gravest crimes known to humanity. However, the Court’s creation was not an abandonment of state sovereignty, but rather a carefully negotiated compromise between the ideals of universal justice and the realities of geopolitical power. Understanding the International Criminal Court requires dispensing with the notion that it functions as a supranational supreme court with unlimited reach. It does not. It is, fundamentally, a creature of treaty law, bound by the consent of nations and the specific legal architecture of the Rome Statute.

The user’s query touches upon the central nervous system of the Court’s operations: the mechanisms by which it asserts authority and the strict boundaries that limit that authority. The widespread misconception that the ICC can intervene anywhere, at any time, often leads to public disillusionment when the Court fails to act in high-profile conflicts. In reality, the ICC is a court of "delegated jurisdiction." It possesses only the power that states have voluntarily surrendered to it, or that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has imposed under its mandate to maintain international peace and security.

This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the legal and political framework governing the ICC’s jurisdiction. It explores the statutory preconditions for action, the critical legal distinction between signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, and the intricate exceptions that allow the Court to reach into the territory of non-member states. Furthermore, it offers a contemporary assessment of the Court's membership as of 2025, detailing the historic accession of Ukraine, the contentious withdrawal of Hungary, and the ongoing standoff with major non-party powers such as the United States, Russia, and China.

Part I: The Statutory Framework of Jurisdiction

To comprehend why the ICC can act in some theaters of conflict but not others, one must examine the "Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction" codified in Part 2 of the Rome Statute. These articles constitute the legal gatekeeping mechanisms that prevent the Court from functioning as a universal policeman. The Court was designed not to replace national legal systems, but to complement them—a principle known as complementarity.

1.1 The Rejection of Universal Jurisdiction

During the diplomatic conference in Rome in June and July of 1998, a coalition of states, led notably by Germany, advocated for the ICC to possess "universal jurisdiction." Under this model, the Court would have been empowered to prosecute the core crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression—regardless of where they were committed or the nationality of the perpetrator. This proposal was predicated on the idea that these crimes are hostis humani generis (enemies of all mankind) and thus universally punishable.1

However, this ambitious proposal met fierce resistance from the United States, China, and other major powers who feared politically motivated prosecutions of their military personnel deployed abroad. To save the conference and ensure the Court’s creation, a compromise was struck. The resulting Article 12 of the Rome Statute tethered the Court’s jurisdiction firmly to the territory and nationality of the states that agreed to join the treaty. Consequently, the ICC generally lacks the inherent power to intervene in the internal affairs of non-member states, creating what critics call a "two-tiered" system of justice where crimes in member states are punished, while identical crimes in non-member states often go unaddressed.2

1.2 Article 12: The Twin Pillars of Authority

Article 12 is the cornerstone of the ICC’s jurisdictional regime. It establishes that, in the absence of a UN Security Council referral, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction if one of the following two states is a Party to the Statute or has accepted the Court’s authority on an ad hoc basis 4:

1. Territorial Jurisdiction (Ratione Loci): The Court has jurisdiction if the crime was committed on the territory of a State Party. This extends to crimes committed on board a vessel or aircraft registered to that State. This is the most expansive basis for jurisdiction because it applies regardless of the perpetrator's nationality. If a national of a non-member state (e.g., a US soldier or a Russian mercenary) commits a war crime on the territory of a member state (e.g., Afghanistan or Ukraine), the ICC has jurisdiction over that individual. This "territorial trap" for non-members has been a primary source of friction between the ICC and great powers.4

2. Active Personality Jurisdiction (Ratione Personae): The Court has jurisdiction if the person accused of the crime is a national of a State Party. If a national of a member state commits a crime anywhere in the world—even in the territory of a non-member state that opposes the Court—the ICC retains the power to prosecute its own national.3

Crucially, the drafters of the Rome Statute explicitly excluded passive personality jurisdiction (based on the nationality of the victim) and custodial jurisdiction (based on which state holds the suspect). This means that if a non-member national kills a member-state national in a non-member state, the ICC generally has no recourse.2

1.3 Article 13: Triggers for Investigation

While Article 12 sets the preconditions (the "where" and "who"), Article 13 establishes the triggers (the "how"). The Court cannot simply initiate cases based on news reports; a specific legal mechanism must activate its dormant jurisdiction. There are three exclusive triggers 4:

• State Party Referral (Article 13(a)): A State Party may refer a "situation" (not specific cases) to the Prosecutor. This mechanism has been used frequently by African states (Uganda, DRC, CAR, Mali) to self-refer conflicts occurring within their own borders, effectively inviting the ICC's intervention.8

• UN Security Council Referral (Article 13(b)): Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can refer a situation to the Prosecutor. This is the "nuclear option" of international justice, as it bypasses the consent requirements of Article 12. Through this mechanism, the ICC can obtain jurisdiction over a non-member state (as seen in Sudan and Libya). However, this trigger is subject to the veto power of the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK, US), making it highly politicized and rarely used.1

• Proprio Motu Investigation (Article 13(c)): The Prosecutor may initiate an investigation on their own motion, provided they obtain authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber. This power was highly controversial during the drafting of the Statute, as states feared an "unaccountable prosecutor." To use this trigger, the Article 12 preconditions (territory or nationality) must still be met.7

1.4 The Temporal Limitation (Ratione Temporis)

The ICC is strictly non-retroactive. Article 11 states that the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of the Statute (July 1, 2002). For states that join after this date, the Court generally only has jurisdiction from the date of that state's accession forward, unless the state explicitly accepts jurisdiction for an earlier period via a declaration (though never prior to July 1, 2002). This temporal limitation prevents the Court from adjudicating historical atrocities such as the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, or the crimes of the Khmer Rouge.4

Part II: The Mechanics of Adherence — Signing vs. Ratification

A critical aspect of the user’s query involves the distinction between signing the Rome Statute and becoming a full member. In the lexicon of international diplomacy, these two acts carry vastly different legal weights and imply different sets of obligations. The confusion between them often leads to misunderstandings about which countries are actually bound by the Court’s rules.

2.1 The Signature: A Statement of Intent

Signing a treaty is a preliminary diplomatic act. It serves to authenticate the text of the agreement and signals a state's political intention to proceed to ratification. However, signature alone does not make a state a party to the Rome Statute, nor does it subject the state to the automatic jurisdiction of the Court.

• The Legal Obligation: While a signatory is not bound by the treaty's specific provisions, it is not entirely free of obligation. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), a state that has signed a treaty is obliged to refrain from acts that would "defeat the object and purpose" of that treaty until it has made its intention clear not to become a party. This "interim obligation" is what prevents signatories from actively undermining the ICC.10

• The Signature Period: The Rome Statute was open for signature from July 17, 1998, until December 31, 2000. States that signed during this window are referred to as "signatories." States that wish to join now, decades later, do not "sign" the treaty; they "accede" to it.11

2.2 Ratification and Accession: The Binding Commitment

To become a "State Party" (a full member), a state must execute a formal act of consent to be bound.

• Ratification: For states that signed the treaty before the 2000 deadline, the next step is ratification. This usually requires domestic legislative approval (e.g., a vote in parliament or senate). Once the domestic requirements are met, the state deposits an "Instrument of Ratification" with the UN Secretary-General.2

• Accession: For states that never signed the treaty (because they opposed it in 1998 or didn't exist), the process is "accession." Accession has the exact same legal effect as ratification—it is a one-step process of becoming a member.

• Consequences of Membership: Upon ratification or accession, a state accepts the automatic jurisdiction of the Court over the crimes listed in Article 5. It also incurs the obligation to cooperate with investigations (Article 86), pay assessed contributions to the Court's budget, and gains the right to vote in the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).12

2.3 The Phenomenon of "Unsigning"

Because Article 18 of the Vienna Convention creates a lingering obligation for signatories not to undermine the treaty, states that decided to actively oppose the ICC found it necessary to formally "withdraw" their signatures. This rare diplomatic maneuver, colloquially known as "unsigning," involves sending a formal notification to the UN Secretary-General that the state has no intention of becoming a party to the treaty, thereby terminating its Article 18 obligations.10

The timeline of "unsigning" reveals the geopolitical friction the Court has generated:

• United States (May 6, 2002): The Clinton administration signed the Statute on December 31, 2000, just hours before the deadline, to maintain US influence over the drafting of the Elements of Crimes. However, the incoming Bush administration, deeply hostile to the Court, formally notified the UN in 2002 that it would not ratify and recognized no obligations. This was the prelude to the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA), often called the "Hague Invasion Act," which authorized the use of force to liberate any American held by the Court.6

• Sudan (August 26, 2008): Following the ICC Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against President Omar Al-Bashir for genocide in Darfur, Sudan notified the UN that it was withdrawing its signature, asserting it had no legal duty to cooperate.15

• Israel (August 28, 2002): Like the US, Israel signed in 2000 but withdrew its signature in 2002, citing concerns that the Court would be politicized and used to target Israeli officials regarding the conflict with Palestine.15

• Russian Federation (November 30, 2016): Russia signed in 2000 but never ratified. In 2016, after the ICC Prosecutor issued a preliminary examination report classifying the situation in Crimea as an international armed conflict and occupation, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree withdrawing Russia’s signature. This was a preemptive move to reject ICC jurisdiction over the Ukraine conflict.15

Part III: The Member States (The "In" Group)

As of January 2, 2025, the International Criminal Court consists of 125 States Parties. This membership is a "coalition of the willing" that spans the globe, though it is notably devoid of the world's largest military and economic powers. The composition of the Court is heavily weighted toward Africa, Europe, and Latin America, with significant gaps in Asia and the Middle East.19

3.1 Regional Distribution of Membership

The Assembly of States Parties groups members into five regional blocs. Understanding these blocs is essential for analyzing the Court’s political support base.

A. African States (33 Members)

Africa is the largest regional bloc, representing over a quarter of the Court’s membership. While early relations were cooperative (with multiple self-referrals), the relationship soured in the 2010s following the indictments of sitting heads of state in Sudan and Kenya. The African Union (AU) has frequently accused the Court of exclusively targeting African nations. Despite threats of a mass exodus, only Burundi has successfully withdrawn.

Region: Africa

Select Members

West Africa

Senegal (First global ratifier, 1999), Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Niger, Sierra Leone.

East Africa

Kenya (Remains a member despite past Uhuru Kenyatta case), Tanzania, Uganda, Djibouti, Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar.

Southern Africa

South Africa (Attempted withdrawal 2016, rescinded 2017), Botswana (Staunch ICC defender), Lesotho, Namibia, Zambia, Malawi.

Central Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Congo, Chad.

(Note: Tunisia is the sole North African member state.) 11

B. Asia-Pacific States (20 Members)

This region is the "Achilles' heel" of the Court’s universality. Major population centers (China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia) are absent. However, the bloc includes significant supporters and new strategic members.

Region: Asia-Pacific

Select Members

East Asia

Japan (Largest budget contributor), Republic of Korea (South Korea), Mongolia.

South/Central Asia

Afghanistan (Member since 2003), Bangladesh (Crucial for Rohingya jurisdiction), Tajikistan, Maldives.

Pacific

Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Samoa, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati.

Middle East

Jordan (Historically significant Arab member), State of Palestine (Joined 2015), Cyprus.

Caucasus

Armenia (Joined Feb 2024).

(Note: The Philippines withdrew in 2019.) 11

C. Eastern European States (20 Members)

Once a quiet bloc, Eastern Europe has become the focal point of ICC activity due to the war in Ukraine. The accession of Ukraine and Armenia represents a significant geopolitical realignment toward international justice mechanisms in the post-Soviet space.

Region: Eastern Europe

Select Members

Newest Members

Ukraine (Ratified Oct 2024; Entry into Force Jan 1, 2025).

Baltics

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (Active referral states regarding Belarus/Russia).

Balkans

Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Slovenia.

Central Europe

Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of Moldova.

Withdrawing

Hungary (Notified withdrawal June 2025; Effective June 2026).

11

D. Latin American and Caribbean States (28 Members)

This bloc has been one of the most consistent supporters of the Court, viewing international law as a shield against interventionism and impunity.

Region: GRULAC

Select Members

South America

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia (Had long preliminary exam), Peru, Venezuela (Under investigation), Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guyana, Suriname.

Central America

Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador.

Caribbean

Trinidad and Tobago (Founding role), Dominican Republic, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, etc.

11

E. Western European and Other States (25 Members)

The "WEOG" bloc provides the majority of the Court’s funding and political backing. It includes all of Western Europe plus Canada.

Region: WEOG

Select Members

Europe

UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands (Host State), Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Iceland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra.

North America

Canada. (The United States is not a member).

11

Part IV: The Exceptions — Piercing the Veil of Sovereignty

While the general rule limits the ICC to its 125 member states, the user must understand the specific legal exceptions that allow the Court to reach into the territory of non-members. These exceptions are the source of the most intense diplomatic conflicts involving the Court.

4.1 The UNSC Referral (The "Chapter VII" Exception)

Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the UN Security Council can refer any situation to the ICC, effectively imposing jurisdiction on a non-member state. This power is derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression"), which is binding on all UN members regardless of their ICC status.

• Sudan (Resolution 1593, 2005): Sudan is not a State Party. However, in response to the atrocities in Darfur, the UNSC referred the situation to the ICC. This was the first time the Council used this power. It led to the issuance of arrest warrants for President Omar Al-Bashir for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Notably, the US abstained rather than vetoed, allowing the resolution to pass.9

• Libya (Resolution 1970, 2011): During the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, the UNSC unanimously referred the situation in Libya (a non-member) to the Court. This granted the ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed from February 15, 2011, onwards.9

4.2 The Article 12(3) "Ad Hoc" Declaration

Article 12(3) allows a non-member state to accept the Court’s jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. This is often a prelude to full membership or a strategic move by a government facing internal insurgency or external aggression.

• Ukraine (The Long Road to Ratification): Before becoming a full member in 2025, Ukraine utilized Article 12(3) twice.

• First Declaration (April 2014): Accepted jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory from November 21, 2013, to February 22, 2014 (the Maidan protests).

• Second Declaration (September 2015): Accepted jurisdiction from February 20, 2014, onwards indefinitely. This legal maneuver allowed the ICC to open a full investigation into the Russian invasion and issue arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova in 2023, two years before Ukraine ratified the Statute.24

• Palestine (The Statehood Debate):

• 2009 Declaration: Following the Gaza War, the Palestinian National Authority lodged a declaration. The Prosecutor declined to accept it in 2012, arguing that it was unclear if Palestine qualified as a "state" under international law.

• 2015 Declaration: After the UN General Assembly upgraded Palestine to "non-member observer state" status in 2012, the ICC Prosecutor accepted a new Article 12(3) declaration in January 2015. This accepted jurisdiction retroactively to June 13, 2014, covering the 2014 Gaza conflict. Palestine formally acceded to the treaty shortly thereafter.26

• Côte d'Ivoire (2003): The Ivorian government lodged a declaration in 2003 to involve the ICC in its civil conflict, a decade before it ratified the treaty in 2013.24

4.3 The "Effects Doctrine" and Transboundary Crimes

The most jurisprudentially innovative exception involves crimes that cross borders.

• Bangladesh/Myanmar (The Rohingya Crisis): Myanmar is not a State Party and rejects ICC jurisdiction. However, in 2018 and 2019, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers ruled that the Court has jurisdiction over the crime of deportation. The reasoning was that deportation is a crime with two elements: displacement from one location and entry into another. Since the victims were forced into Bangladesh (a State Party), one legal element of the crime was "completed" on the territory of a member state. This "objective territoriality" approach allowed the Prosecutor to open an investigation into crimes against the Rohingya, despite Myanmar's non-membership.30

4.4 Jurisdiction Over Nationals of Non-Party States

As stipulated in Article 12(2)(a), the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a member state, regardless of the perpetrator's nationality.

• Afghanistan (US Nationals): The US is not a member. However, the ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation into the Situation in Afghanistan (a member since 2003). This investigation included alleged crimes (torture, rape) committed by US military and CIA personnel on Afghan territory and at secret detention facilities ("black sites") in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania (all member states). The US government vehemently opposed this, citing a theory of "exclusive jurisdiction" over its own forces, but the ICC Appeals Chamber authorized the investigation in 2020. This led the Trump administration to impose sanctions on the ICC Prosecutor (Executive Order 13928), which were later revoked by the Biden administration.34

Part V: The Withdrawal Crisis (2025 Update)

Membership in the ICC is not irrevocable. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides a mechanism for states to leave. The process requires a written notification to the UN Secretary-General, and the withdrawal takes effect one year after the date of receipt. Crucially, withdrawal does not discharge the state from obligations arising while it was a party, nor does it halt ongoing investigations.38

5.1 The Hungary Withdrawal (2025-2026)

In a major blow to European unity on international justice, Hungary initiated the withdrawal process in 2025.

• The Catalyst: The withdrawal was precipitated by the ICC’s issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in late 2024. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán denounced the warrants as a "political witch hunt" and affirmed his alignment with Israel.39

• The Timeline:

• Notification: On June 2, 2025, Hungary formally notified the UN Secretary-General of its withdrawal pursuant to Article 127.40

• Effective Date: Under the one-year rule, Hungary will officially cease to be a State Party on June 2, 2026.40

• Legal Status: Between June 2025 and June 2026, Hungary remains a full member of the Court. It is legally obligated to execute arrest warrants and pay its dues. The Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties issued a statement regretting the decision and urging Hungary to reconsider, highlighting that withdrawal does not erase past obligations.41

5.2 Historical Precedents for Withdrawal

• Burundi (2017): Burundi became the first nation to leave the ICC. It notified the UN in October 2016, and the withdrawal took effect in October 2017. The ICC authorized an investigation into crimes in Burundi two days before the withdrawal took effect, maintaining jurisdiction over the period of membership.16

• Philippines (2019): President Rodrigo Duterte withdrew the Philippines following the Prosecutor’s preliminary examination into the "War on Drugs." The withdrawal took effect in March 2019. The investigation continues into crimes committed between 2011 and 2019.43

• The Failed Exodus (2016): South Africa and The Gambia also notified withdrawal in late 2016. However, The Gambia rescinded its notification after the election of Adama Barrow. South Africa’s notice was ruled unconstitutional by its own High Court because the executive branch had bypassed parliament, forcing the government to revoke the notification.16

Part VI: The Non-Member States

A significant portion of the world's geopolitical weight lies outside the Rome Statute system. These states fall into two categories: those who signed but never ratified, and those who never signed at all.

6.1 Signatories Without Ratification

These states signed the treaty between 1998 and 2000, signaling initial support, but failed to ratify it due to domestic opposition or changing political winds. Unless they formally "unsign," they remain bound by the Vienna Convention not to defeat the treaty's object and purpose.

• Middle East: Egypt (Signed Dec 2000), Iran (Signed Dec 2000), Syria (Signed Nov 2000), United Arab Emirates (Signed Nov 2000), Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Yemen.

• Africa: Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, Zimbabwe.

• Asia: Thailand (Signed Oct 2000).

• Others: Jamaica, Bahamas, Haiti, Saint Lucia.45

6.2 Non-Signatories

These states generally reject the ICC’s jurisdiction entirely.

• China: A Permanent Member of the UNSC, China opposes the Court’s jurisdiction over non-party nationals and the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers, viewing them as violations of sovereignty.

• India: India abstained from the 1998 vote and never signed, arguing that the Statute gives too much power to the UNSC (where it has no veto) and that the definition of crimes is too broad.

• Turkey: Never signed.

• Saudi Arabia: Never signed.

• Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Ethiopia: Major regional powers that remain outside the system.46

Summary Table: ICC Membership Status (2025)

Status

Count

Description

Key Examples

States Parties

125

Fully ratified members bound by the Statute.

UK, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, Ukraine, Canada, South Africa.

Withdrawing

1

Notified withdrawal; currently in 1-year waiting period.

Hungary (Effective June 2026).

Withdrawn

2

Former members who successfully left.

Burundi (2017), Philippines (2019).

"Unsigned"

4

Signed but formally withdrew signature.

USA, Russia, Israel, Sudan.

Signatories

~30

Signed (1998-2000) but never ratified.

Egypt, Iran, Syria, Thailand.

Non-Signatories

~40

Never signed the Rome Statute.

China, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia.

Conclusion: A Court of Consent and Consequence

The International Criminal Court is a paradox of modern international law. It is strictly limited by the principle of state consent—it "can only act" if a state joins the club. Yet, through the mechanisms of UN Security Council referrals and the territorial application of jurisdiction to visiting nationals, its reach extends deeply into the sphere of non-members.

The answer to the user’s inquiry is therefore nuanced:

1. Generally, Yes: The Court requires states to sign and ratify the Rome Statute to exercise jurisdiction over their territory and nationals.

2. Specifically, No: The Court possesses powerful exceptions (UNSC referrals, ad hoc declarations, and territorial effects) that allow it to prosecute crimes involving non-member states like Russia, Myanmar, and Sudan.

As of 2025, the ICC stands at a crossroads. It has achieved a significant victory with the accession of Ukraine, bringing a major European war fully under its treaty jurisdiction. Yet, it faces a fracturing of European unity with the withdrawal of Hungary, and persistent hostility from great powers like the US and Russia. The Court remains a "giant without limbs"—it possesses the legal judgment to condemn, but relies entirely on its member states to provide the enforcement power to arrest. Its future depends not just on the letter of the Rome Statute, but on the continued political will of the 125 nations that have chosen to bind themselves to its rules.

Works cited

1. Jurisdictional Links: International Criminal Court (ICC) - Oxford Public International Law, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e3227.013.3227/law-mpeipro-e3227

2. The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional Loopholes in the Rome Statute - Duke Law Scholarship Repository, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=dlj

3. Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Over Non-party States: Legitimate or Ultra Vires? - JURIST - Commentary, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/05/utkarsh-dubey-icc-jurisdiction-over-nonparty-states/

4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court | OHCHR, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-international-criminal-court

5. Commentary Rome Statute: Part 2, Articles 11-21 - Case Matrix Network, accessed on November 24, 2025, http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/icc-commentary-clicc/commentary-rome-statute/commentary-rome-statute-part-2-articles-11-21

6. The United States Should Ratify the Rome Statute - Lieber Institute West Point, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/united-states-should-ratify-rome-statute/

7. The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals - Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=vjtl

8. Situations under investigation - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations-under-investigations

9. Libya - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/libya

10. What is the difference between signing, ratification and accession of UN treaties? - Ask DAG!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://ask.un.org/faq/14594

11. States Parties - Chronological list - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties/states-parties-chronological-list

12. Joining the International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Joining-Rome-Statute-Matters.pdf

13. 79 States Parties in support of the ICC - Building Trust, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://buildingtrust.si/79-states-parties-in-support-of-the-icc/

14. US unsigning of ICC Treaty threatens grave consequences for international law | ICJ, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icj.org/us-unsigning-of-icc-treaty-threatens-grave-consequences-for-international-law/

15. Rome Statute - Wikipedia, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rome_Statute

16. 10. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en

17. Russia's Withdrawal of Signature from the Rome Statute Would not Shield its Nationals from Potential Prosecution at the ICC - EJIL: Talk!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/russias-withdrawal-of-signature-from-the-rome-statute-would-not-shield-its-nationals-from-potential-prosecution-at-the-icc/

18. Problems of legality of the International Criminal Court (opinion of the International Law Advisory Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), accessed on November 24, 2025, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/legal_problems_of_international_cooperation/1949021/

19. States Parties to the Rome Statute - Parliamentarians for Global Action, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/states-parties.html

20. The States Parties to the Rome Statute - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/states-parties

21. ICC welcomes Ukraine as a new State Party - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-welcomes-ukraine-new-state-party

22. Ukraine becomes the 125th State Party to the ICC Rome Statute, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/ukraine-becomes-125th-ICC-state-party

23. Sudan | Coalition for the International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/country/sudan

24. Ukraine - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine

25. ICC Prosecutor extends preliminary examination of the situation in Ukraine following second article 12(3) declaration | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-extends-preliminary-examination-situation-ukraine-following-second-article-123

26. Non-state entity's 'Ability to lodge' a Declaration - QIL QDI, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.qil-qdi.org/non-state-entitys-ability-to-lodge-a-declaration-pursuant-to-article-123-of-the-icc-statute/

27. Palestine and the Rome Statute - Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - Parliamentarians for Global Action, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/palestine.html

28. State of Palestine | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine

29. Patterns of Noncompliance in Article 12(3) Cases at the ICC - Opinio Juris, accessed on November 24, 2025, http://opiniojuris.org/2024/02/02/patterns-of-noncompliance-in-article-123-cases-at-the-icc/

30. ICC – Situation of Bangladesh/Myanmar, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://iimm.un.org/en/icc-situation-bangladeshmyanmar

31. Bangladesh/Myanmar - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/bangladesh-myanmar

32. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rules that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rules-court-may-exercise-jurisdiction-over-alleged-deportation

33. Understanding the Jurisdiction of the ICC over the Deportation of Rohingya into Bangladesh, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/international_law/resources/international-law-news/2025-special-issue/understanding-jurisdiction-icc-deportation-rohingya-bangladesh/

34. Afghanistan - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan

35. Testing the boundaries of the ICC's territorial jurisdiction in the Afghanistan situation Monique Cormier* 1. Introduction T - QIL QDI, accessed on November 24, 2025, http://www.qil-qdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/04_ICC-Territorial-Jurisdiction_CORMIER_FIN.pdf

36. The ICC's Probe Into Atrocities in Afghanistan: What to Know | Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/iccs-probe-atrocities-afghanistan-what-know

37. The United States, the International Criminal Court, and the Situation in Afghanistan - NDLScholarship, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=ndlr_online

38. Africa and Withdrawal from the ICC | Peace Palace Library, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://peacepalacelibrary.nl/blog/2016/africa-and-withdrawal-icc

39. Hungary Announces Withdrawal from International Criminal Court | ASIL, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.asil.org/ILIB/hungary-announces-withdrawal-international-criminal-court

40. C.N.225.2025.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification) ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ROME, 17 JU, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2025/CN.225.2025-Eng.pdf

41. President of the Assembly of States Parties regrets withdrawal from the Rome Statute by Hungary | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/president-assembly-states-parties-regrets-withdrawal-rome-statute-hungary

42. Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties responds to announcement of withdrawal from the Rome Statute by Hungary | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/presidency-assembly-states-parties-responds-announcement-withdrawal-rome-statute-hungary

43. Hungary: Orbán Government Withdraws from ICC | Human Rights Watch, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/16/hungary-orban-government-withdraws-from-icc

44. Victims lose out as Hungary withdraws from the ICC Rome Statute: A major blow to fight against impunity | Coalition for the International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://coalitionfortheicc.org/news/hungary-withdraws-icc-rome-statute

45. Signatories Which Have Not Ratified The Rome Statute - Parliamentarians for Global Action, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-statute/signed-but-not-ratified.html

46. The Role of the ICC | Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-icc

47. States parties to the Rome Statute - Wikipedia, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/States_parties_to_the_Rome_Statute