The International Criminal Court and the Situation in the State of Palestine: A Comprehensive Legal and Geopolitical Analysis of the Arrest Warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant


Executive Summary


On 21 November 2024, the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a judicial decision of profound historical and legal magnitude, rejecting the jurisdictional challenges submitted by the State of Israel and issuing warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and Yoav Gallant, the former Minister of Defence.1 This event signifies a paradigm shift in the enforcement of international criminal law, marking the first instance in the Court’s history where the sitting head of government and a senior cabinet minister of a Western-aligned democracy have been formally designated as wanted fugitives.2

The warrants are rooted in the "Situation in the State of Palestine," specifically encompassing conduct alleged to have occurred during the conflict in Gaza that escalated following the events of 7 October 2023.3 The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant bear criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes. These charges notably include the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare—predicated on the denial of objects indispensable to survival such as food, water, and anesthetics—and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts.2 Furthermore, the Chamber found sufficient evidence to charge them as civilian superiors for intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, a charge specifically tethered to two distinct, albeit currently redacted, incidents of kinetic military action.3

Crucially, the Pre-Trial Chamber unanimously dismissed Israel's challenges regarding the Court's jurisdiction. Israel’s primary legal defense posited that the Oslo Accords precluded the State of Palestine from delegating criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals to the Court. The Chamber categorically rejected this interpretation, reaffirming that the Court's jurisdiction is territorial, deriving from the Rome Statute rather than bilateral agreements, and that the Oslo Accords do not function as a bar to the Court's exercise of its judicial powers.1

This report provides an exhaustive, multi-dimensional analysis of this development. It examines the procedural history that established the Court's territorial competence; dissects the specific factual allegations including the evidentiary basis for the "starvation" and "two incidents" charges; explores the complex legal arguments surrounding the Oslo Accords and Article 18 notifications; and assesses the seismic geopolitical and legal implications for state cooperation, diplomatic immunity, and the future of international accountability mechanisms.

1. Introduction: The Paradigm Shift in International Criminal Law


The issuance of arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant is not merely a procedural step in a criminal investigation; it is a structural stress test for the international legal order established by the Rome Statute in 1998. For two decades, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has faced criticism regarding the selectivity of its prosecutions, with detractors often highlighting a perceived bias towards focusing on non-Western states, particularly in Africa. The decision to target the leadership of Israel—a state with robust democratic institutions and deep strategic alliances with the United States and European powers—signals a definitive assertion of the Court's universalist mandate.

The Prosecutor of the ICC, Karim A.A. Khan KC, framed the application for these warrants within the foundational ethos that "the lives of all human beings have equal value".4 This statement serves as the philosophical bedrock for the current proceedings, challenging the long-standing realpolitik assumption that leaders of nations embedded within the Western security architecture are effectively insulated from international judicial scrutiny. The warrants place the Israeli leadership in a legal category previously occupied by figures such as Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Vladimir Putin of Russia, fundamentally altering the diplomatic landscape of the Middle East and the transatlantic alliance.

However, this assertion of jurisdiction has precipitated a collision between the aspirations of international justice and the rigid realities of state sovereignty and geopolitical alliances. The reaction to the warrants has revealed a deep fracture in the international community, pitting the legal obligations of Rome Statute signatories against their diplomatic and strategic interests. As this report will elucidate, the legal reasoning employed by the Pre-Trial Chamber I—particularly regarding the dismissal of the Oslo Accords as a jurisdictional barrier—establishes a precedent that strengthens the Court’s autonomy but simultaneously invites a severe political backlash that threatens its operational viability.

2. Procedural History and Jurisdictional Genesis


To comprehend the legal validity of the November 2024 warrants, one must analyze the procedural trajectory of the "Situation in the State of Palestine." The path to this decision was paved by a decade of contentious legal argumentation regarding statehood, territory, and the admissibility of referrals.


2.1 The Accession and the 2021 Territorial Ruling


The ICC's engagement with the situation formally commenced when the State of Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute in January 2015. This accession was a strategic legal maneuver intended to grant the Court jurisdiction over crimes committed on Palestinian territory. However, because the status of Palestine as a sovereign state remains contested in international law—recognized by the UN General Assembly via Resolution 67/19 but not by Israel or major Western powers—the validity of this accession was immediately challenged.

The pivotal moment arrived on 5 February 2021, when Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a landmark ruling. The Chamber determined that, for the strict and exclusive purposes of the Rome Statute, Palestine qualifies as a "State Party." Consequently, the Chamber ruled by majority that the territorial scope of the Court’s jurisdiction extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967: namely, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.3 This decision was foundational; without it, the Prosecutor would lack the territorial hook necessary to investigate conduct by Israeli nationals, as Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute.

The 2021 ruling was not unanimous, reflecting the complexity of the legal issues. Dissenting opinions, such as that referenced in legal analyses regarding Judge Kovács, highlighted the difficulties of applying treaty law to a non-sovereign entity like the Palestinian Authority under the constraints of the Oslo framework.9 Nevertheless, the majority ruling established the lex loc (law of the place) for the investigation, determining that the Court had competence over events occurring within these geographic boundaries regardless of the perpetrator's nationality.


2.2 The Trigger Mechanisms: Referrals and Escalation


Following the horrific events of 7 October 2023, the dormant investigation was galvanized into urgent action. On 17 November 2023, the Office of the Prosecutor received a referral of the Situation in the State of Palestine from a coalition of states including South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros, and Djibouti.3 This was followed by an additional referral on 18 January 2024 from the Republic of Chile and the United Mexican States.3

These state referrals provided the Prosecutor with enhanced procedural backing, affirming the "Situation" as a priority for the international community. They signaled a collective demand from the Global South for the ICC to exercise its mandate, thereby increasing the pressure on the Office of the Prosecutor to act swiftly.


2.3 The Prosecutor’s Application (May 2024)


On 20 May 2024, ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC filed formal applications for warrants of arrest. The applications were balanced, targeting leadership on both sides of the conflict to reflect the totality of alleged crimes:

  • Hamas Leadership: Yahya Sinwar (Head of Hamas in Gaza), Mohammed Deif (Commander-in-Chief of the Al-Qassam Brigades), and Ismail Haniyeh (Head of Hamas Political Bureau). They were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Israel and Gaza from at least 7 October 2023, including extermination, murder, hostage-taking, rape, and torture.10

  • Israeli Leadership: Benjamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister) and Yoav Gallant (Minister of Defence). They were charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the State of Palestine (specifically the Gaza Strip) from at least 8 October 2023.1

The Prosecutor’s application emphasized that international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to the conflict and that no individual, regardless of rank or political status, is immune from the requirements of the Rome Statute.4 The simultaneous filing was interpreted by legal observers as an attempt to project impartiality, although it drew sharp criticism from Israeli and US officials who rejected the "moral equivalence" implied by the parallel applications.11


2.4 The Issuance of Warrants (November 2024)


Following a six-month deliberation period, Pre-Trial Chamber I—composed of Judge Nicolas Guillou (Presiding), Judge Reine Adélaïde Sophie Alapini-Gansou, and Judge Beti Hohler—issued its decision on 21 November 2024.1 The Chamber unanimously rejected Israel's challenges and issued the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant.

In parallel, the Chamber addressed the status of the Hamas leaders. While proceedings against Ismail Haniyeh were terminated following confirmation of his death, the Chamber issued a warrant for Mohammed Deif. Despite Israeli claims that Deif was killed in an airstrike in July 2024, the Chamber determined it was not in a position to confirm his death definitively due to a lack of conclusive forensic verification, and thus kept the warrant active.13 This rigorous adherence to procedural verification underscores the Court's cautious approach to factual determinations.

3. The Jurisdictional Battleground: The Oslo Accords and Westphalian Sovereignty


A central component of the Pre-Trial Chamber's November 2024 decision was its systematic dismantling of Israel's jurisdictional objections. On 26 September 2024, Israel filed two requests challenging the Court's authority, which represented the most sophisticated legal defense mounted by a non-State Party in the Court's history.1


3.1 The "Oslo Accords" Defense: Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet


Israel's primary legal defense rested on the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995), commonly known as the Oslo II Accord. Israel argued that under Article I and Annex IV of this agreement, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was explicitly stripped of criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals. The agreement establishes that Israel retains sole criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel invoked the legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet ("no one gives what they do not have"). The logic of the argument was as follows:

  1. The ICC's jurisdiction is delegated by its State Parties.

  2. The State of Palestine (as the PA's successor entity in this context) does not possess criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals due to the binding nature of the Oslo Accords.

  3. Therefore, Palestine could not delegate a jurisdiction it does not possess to the ICC.

  4. Consequently, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over Netanyahu and Gallant.14

This argument was supported by various amicus curiae submissions during earlier phases of the proceedings, including initial observations by the United Kingdom (under the previous Conservative government), which had questioned whether the Court could exercise jurisdiction over Israeli nationals given the Oslo constraints.16


3.2 The Chamber's Rejection: The Supremacy of the Statute


The Pre-Trial Chamber I decisively rejected this line of reasoning, establishing a critical precedent regarding the relationship between the Rome Statute and bilateral treaties. The Chamber's analysis rested on three key pillars:

  1. Territorial Jurisdiction is Paramount: The Court reaffirmed that its jurisdiction is defined by the Rome Statute, specifically Article 12(2)(a), which grants jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a State Party. The Chamber cited its 2021 decision, holding that since Palestine is a State Party and its territory comprises Gaza and the West Bank, the Court has jurisdiction over any conduct on that territory. The nationality of the perpetrator is irrelevant under the territoriality principle.1

  2. Statute over Bilateral Agreements: The Chamber held that the limits on the Palestinian Authority's powers contained in bilateral agreements (like Oslo) cannot limit the ICC's jurisdiction. The Court's authority stems from the Rome Statute, a multilateral treaty, and is not constrained by interim political agreements between conflicting parties. The Chamber posited that accepting Israel's argument would allow bilateral agreements to effectively immunize nationals from international scrutiny, violating the object and purpose of the Rome Statute to end impunity.7

  3. Prescriptive vs. Enforcement Jurisdiction: The Chamber engaged in a nuanced distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. It clarified that while the Oslo Accords might limit the enforcement jurisdiction of the PA (i.e., Palestinian police cannot physically arrest an Israeli citizen in Area C), this does not negate the prescriptive jurisdiction (the power to apply law) of the State of Palestine over its territory. The Chamber ruled that the ability to delegate jurisdiction to an international tribunal is an exercise of sovereign prescriptive jurisdiction that is not nullified by the enforcement limitations of the Oslo Accords.7


3.3 Challenges under Article 18 and 19: The Notification Dispute


Israel also sought to halt proceedings by invoking Article 18 of the Rome Statute, which governs preliminary rulings on admissibility and the right of a state to investigate its own nationals (the principle of complementarity). Israel requested a new notification of the investigation, arguing it had not been properly informed of the specific scope covering the current war, as the original investigation began years prior.3

The Chamber rejected this procedural challenge, stating that:

  • Israel had been formally notified of the investigation's commencement in 2021.

  • The "parameters of the investigation" in the Situation in Palestine have remained the same, encompassing all crimes within the Court's jurisdiction on the relevant territory. The escalation of hostilities into a full-scale war did not constitute a "new situation" requiring a fresh Article 18 notification.

  • Israel had previously elected not to pursue a deferral request when originally notified in 2021.

  • Consequently, the judges found no reason to halt the consideration of the arrest warrants.1

This ruling is significant because it prevents states from delaying ICC proceedings by claiming that new phases of an ongoing conflict require a "reset" of the notification protocols.

4. Anatomy of the Charges: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity


The arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant are based on alleged conduct committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, the date the Prosecutor filed the applications.1 The charges are bifurcated into two primary theories of liability: crimes related to the deprivation of essential supplies ("starvation") and crimes related to direct military attacks.


4.1 Starvation as a Method of Warfare


One of the most legally innovative and significant aspects of this warrant is the charge of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute.10 This is one of the first times this specific charge has been applied to a modern, high-intensity urban conflict involving a Western military.


4.1.1 Factual Allegations and "Objects Indispensable to Survival"


The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant "intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival".6 The Court's factual analysis focused on the "total siege" announced on 9 October 2023. The specific objects cited by the Court include:

  • Food and Water: The complete closure of crossings and the cutting of water pipelines from Israel.

  • Medicine and Medical Supplies: The Court specifically highlighted the restriction of anesthetics and anesthesia machines.

  • Fuel and Electricity: Deemed essential for hospital operations, desalination plants, and bakeries.1


4.1.2 Proving the Mens Rea (Intent)


The crime of starvation involves more than just the result of hunger; it requires the specific intent to use starvation as a weapon to destroy or weaken the population. The Chamber relied on a combination of rhetoric and conduct to infer this intent:

  • Public Statements: The decision references explicit declarations by Israeli officials connecting the halt of essential goods to the goals of the war (e.g., "no electricity, no food, no fuel" until hostages are returned). The Chamber viewed these statements as evidence that the deprivation was a calculated lever of pressure rather than a logistical byproduct of war.1

  • Arbitrary Restrictions: The Chamber noted that "no clear military need or other justification under international humanitarian law could be identified" for the severe restrictions placed on humanitarian relief.6

  • Medical System Collapse as Evidence: The specific mention of anesthetics is crucial. The Court noted that doctors were forced to operate on wounded persons and carry out amputations, including on children, without anesthetics. The Chamber found that intentionally limiting these specific medical supplies constituted the crime against humanity of "other inhumane acts" because it inflicted great suffering and serious injury to body and mental health.6


4.2 Crimes Against Humanity: Murder, Persecution, and Inhumane Acts


In addition to war crimes, the warrants include charges for crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Statute. These crimes are committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population."

  • Murder (Article 7(1)(a)): The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that the conditions of life created by the siege—specifically the lack of food, water, and fuel—were calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population, resulting in deaths from malnutrition and dehydration.6

  • Persecution (Article 7(1)(h)): The Court found that the conduct deprived a significant portion of the civilian population in Gaza of their fundamental rights, including the rights to life and health, and that the population was targeted on "political and/or national grounds".18 This charge elevates the denial of aid from a tactical military decision to a discriminatory policy aimed at the Palestinian people as a group.

  • Other Inhumane Acts (Article 7(1)(k)): As noted above, this charge is specifically tethered to the suffering caused by the blockade of medical supplies, resulting in surgeries without anesthesia.6


4.3 Intentionally Directing Attacks Against the Civilian Population


The second major prong of the warrant concerns the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population (Article 8(2)(b)(i) or 8(2)(e)(i)).10 This section of the warrant reveals the Chamber's rigorous evidentiary standards and judicial restraint.


4.3.1 The "Two Incidents" Limitation


While the Prosecutor likely presented evidence regarding the broader aerial bombardment campaign involving thousands of strikes, the Pre-Trial Chamber took a cautious approach. The judges found that the material provided only allowed them to make findings of criminal responsibility regarding two specific incidents.3

  • Redaction and Secrecy: The specific dates, locations, and details of these two incidents remain redacted in the public documents and are classified as "secret".13 The Court stated this secrecy is necessary to protect witnesses and to safeguard the ongoing investigation, suggesting that revealing the specific strikes could compromise sources inside Gaza or the Israeli military apparatus.13

  • Evidentiary Threshold: The limitation to "two incidents" is legally significant. It suggests the Chamber applied a high evidentiary filter, likely dismissing incidents where Israel could plausibly argue "collateral damage" or proportionality. By focusing on only two incidents, the Chamber implies these specific strikes possess overwhelming evidence of direct targeting of civilians—cases where no military target existed, or the target was negligible compared to the civilian harm intended.

  • Superior Responsibility: Netanyahu and Gallant are charged as civilian superiors for these attacks. The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that, despite having measures available to them to prevent these crimes or punish the perpetrators, they failed to do so.3 This relies on the doctrine of Command Responsibility (Article 28), where leaders are criminally liable if they knew or should have known of crimes committed by subordinates and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent them.

5. The Geopolitical Shockwave: Reactions and Implications


The issuance of warrants against the leader of a close US ally has triggered a seismic shift in diplomatic relations and international legal politics. The reactions have not been uniform, revealing a fragmented international order.


5.1 The United States: Hostility and the "Hague Invasion Act"


The United States, which is not a party to the Rome Statute, responded with vehement opposition. The Biden administration criticized the "equivalence" drawn between democratically elected leaders acting in self-defense and Hamas terrorists.11

  • Legislative Threats and Sanctions: The reaction from the US Congress was particularly aggressive. Senators threatened sanctions against ICC officials and their families.20 Public discourse reignited discussions surrounding the American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, colloquially known as the "Hague Invasion Act," which authorizes the US President to use "all means necessary and appropriate" to bring about the release of any US or allied personnel being detained by or on behalf of the ICC.11

  • Diplomatic Stance: The US position remains that the ICC lacks jurisdiction over Israeli nationals because Israel has not ratified the Rome Statute and Palestine is not a sovereign state capable of delegating jurisdiction. This stance aligns with the US view that the ICC should only exercise jurisdiction over non-party states if referred by the UN Security Council.21


5.2 Europe: A Fractured Response and the Immunity Dilemma


The European Union, comprised entirely of Rome Statute signatories, faced a profound dilemma between its legal obligations and its foreign policy alliances.

  • France: The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement that was perceived by legal analysts as "convoluted." While affirming its support for ICC independence, France noted that Netanyahu benefits from immunities as a head of state of a non-party state, and that these immunities would have to be "taken into account" if the ICC requested his arrest.22 This position attempts to straddle the line between the Rome Statute and customary international law on Head of State immunity.

  • United Kingdom: The UK's position shifted with its change in government. While the previous Conservative government had challenged the ICC's jurisdiction (filing an amicus request), the Labour government under Prime Minister Keir Starmer dropped this challenge. Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated that the UK would comply with its legal obligations under the International Criminal Court Act 2001, noting that due process would be followed by UK courts if a warrant subject entered the country.24

  • Hungary: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán openly defied the Court, describing the decision as "cynical" and "outrageously brazen." He publicly invited Netanyahu to visit Hungary and assured him that the warrant would not be enforced, signaling a direct violation of Hungary's obligations under the Rome Statute.2

  • Germany: Germany faced the most acute conflict between its legal duties and its historical responsibility toward Israel (Staatsräson). The government warned that while it respects the ICC, non-compliance with warrants is a violation of treaty obligations that could lead to referrals to the Assembly of States Parties. However, German officials have avoided definitively stating they would arrest Netanyahu, highlighting the potential diplomatic crisis.27


5.3 Israel: Rejection and Delegitimization


Israel's reaction was uniform across the political spectrum. Prime Minister Netanyahu labeled the decision "antisemitic" and "absurd," comparing it to a modern Dreyfus trial.19 The Attorney General of Israel, Gali Baharav-Miara, while engaging with the Court on procedural challenges, maintained that Israel's own judicial system is robust and independent. She argued that the ICC violates the principle of complementarity by intervening before Israel has concluded its own internal investigations into the war's conduct.28


5.4 The Global South and the "Double Standard" Debate


For many in the Global South and international human rights organizations, the warrants vindicated the ICC's claim to universality. Historically criticized for focusing disproportionately on African leaders, the Court's move against Western-aligned officials was seen as a restoration of legitimacy. The Prosecutor emphasized that "the lives of all human beings have equal value," positioning the warrants as a test of the rule of law's impartial application.4 The comparison was often drawn to the Philippines, where the ICC also authorized an investigation into the "War on Drugs" under former President Duterte, reinforcing the Court's willingness to challenge powerful executives.30

6. Operational and Legal Consequences



6.1 Travel Restrictions and Diplomatic Isolation


The most immediate effect of the warrants is the drastic curtailment of Netanyahu and Gallant's freedom of movement. There are 124 States Parties to the Rome Statute. All are under a treaty obligation to execute the arrest warrants if the suspects enter their territory.31

  • Europe: Most of Europe is effectively off-limits, with the possible exception of Hungary.

  • Global Reach: Visits to Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia (Japan, South Korea) are now legally perilous.

  • Safe Harbors: They can travel to the US, China, Russia, and India (non-members). However, even transit through the airspace of member states could theoretically pose a risk if an emergency landing were required.32


6.2 The Question of Immunity (Article 98)


A critical legal battleground will be Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which deals with state cooperation and diplomatic immunity.

  • The Conflict: Article 98(1) states that the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.

  • The Precedent: In the Al-Bashir case (regarding Sudan), the ICC Appeals Chamber ruled that there is no Head of State immunity before international courts. However, Sudan was referred to the Court by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1593), which the Court ruled effectively waived Sudan's immunity.

  • The Palestine Distinction: The Situation in Palestine was not referred by the Security Council; it is a State Party referral. This creates a legal ambiguity. States like France may argue that because Israel is not a party to the Statute and has not waived immunity, and because there is no UNSC resolution stripping that immunity, they cannot arrest a sitting Prime Minister without violating customary international law.28 This remains the most likely legal avenue for Western states to avoid executing the warrants while claiming to uphold the rule of law.


6.3 Future Trajectories: Arrest, Trial, or Stalemate?


The likelihood of Netanyahu or Gallant facing trial in The Hague in the near future remains low due to the lack of independent enforcement mechanisms. The ICC relies entirely on state cooperation. However, the warrants have permanently altered their status. They are now formally accused fugitives in the eyes of international law, a stigma that carries profound diplomatic, political, and historical weight.

Furthermore, the "two incidents" and the "starvation" charges will now become the focal point of a global legal struggle. Civil society organizations will likely use the detailed findings of the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate domestic lawsuits under universal jurisdiction laws in various countries, further tightening the legal net around Israeli officials and military commanders involved in the Gaza campaign.15


Table 1: Comparative Analysis of ICC Warrants in the Situation


Defendant

Position

Charges

Status

Benjamin Netanyahu

Prime Minister of Israel

War Crimes (Starvation, Directing Attacks); Crimes Against Humanity (Murder, Persecution, Other Inhumane Acts)

Warrant Issued (Active)

Yoav Gallant

Former Minister of Defence

War Crimes (Starvation, Directing Attacks); Crimes Against Humanity (Murder, Persecution, Other Inhumane Acts)

Warrant Issued (Active)

Mohammed Deif

Commander, Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas)

War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity (Murder, Extermination, Rape, Torture, Hostage-taking)

Warrant Issued (Active) - Death unconfirmed by Court

Ismail Haniyeh

Head of Hamas Political Bureau

War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity

Proceedings Terminated (Confirmed Deceased)

Yahya Sinwar

Head of Hamas in Gaza

War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity

Application Made (Reported Deceased, status pending)

7. Conclusion


The issuance of arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I is a defining event in the history of international law. By rejecting the "Oslo Accords" defense and finding reasonable grounds for charges of starvation and intentional attacks on civilians, the Court has asserted its jurisdiction over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in definitive terms, regardless of the political fallout.

The decision creates a sharp bifurcation in the international community: between those who view the Court as a necessary instrument of accountability that must apply equally to all nations, and those who view it as overreaching its mandate by targeting the leadership of a non-member democracy fighting an existential war. While the execution of these warrants is fraught with diplomatic complexity and legal contestation—particularly regarding Article 98 immunity—the judicial finding itself stands as a matter of record. It establishes that, in the view of the ICC, the conduct of the war in Gaza, specifically the use of siege tactics and the denial of medical supplies, crossed the threshold from warfare into criminal conduct.

Works cited

  1. Situation in the State of Palestine: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects the State of Israel's challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges

  2. International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Israeli leaders - Wikipedia, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court_arrest_warrants_for_Israeli_leaders

  3. International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants: Pre-Trial Chamber I rejects Israel's challenges to jurisdiction and issues warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant (Non-UN Document) - the United Nations, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icc-arrest-warrant-netanyahu-21nov24/

  4. Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on the issuance of arrest warrants in the Situation in the State of Palestine | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-issuance-arrest-warrants-situation-state-palestine

  5. Netanyahu | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/defendant/netanyahu

  6. The ICC's Unsurprising Decision on Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant, and Deif, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-icc-s-unsurprising-decision-on-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu--gallant--and-deif

  7. English No.: ICC-01-18 Date: 27 June 2025 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180beadda.pdf

  8. The International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction in Palestine and the 'Oslo Accords Issue', accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/97584/israel-palestine-icc-oslo-accords/

  9. No. ICC-01/18 1/44 23 September 2024 - Just Security, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/state-of-israel-on-jurisdiction-article-192-icc-0118-354-anxII-corr.pdf

  10. Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state

  11. Explainer: US Politicians Slam ICC After Netanyahu Arrest Warrant Application - Jurist.org, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.jurist.org/features/2024/05/21/explainer-us-politicians-slam-icc-following-netanyahu-warrant-application-in-latest-episode-of-tensions/

  12. ICC-01/18 Date: 16 July 2025 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180c1587a.pdf

  13. ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant and Hamas commander - UN News, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157286

  14. English No.: ICC-01/18 Date: August 6, 2024 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd18092092a.pdf

  15. The ICC Palestine Case in the Aftermath of the Arrest Warrants Decisions – Part One, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/icc-palestine-case-aftermath-arrest-warrants-decisions-part-one/

  16. English No.: ICC-01/18 Date: 21 May 2025 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180b95512.pdf

  17. Israel-Hamas 2025 Symposium – Conditionality and the ICC's Gallant “Starvation as a Method of Warfare” Charge - Lieber Institute West Point, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/conditionality-iccs-gallant-starvation-method-warfare-charge/

  18. US Response to ICC Netanyahu Warrant Could Deal Death Blow to International Law, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://truthout.org/articles/us-response-to-icc-netanyahu-warrant-could-deal-death-blow-to-international-law/

  19. Warrants put Israeli PM and others in a small group of leaders accused of crimes against humanity | AP News, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-arrest-warrant-international-criminal-court-war-crimes-8668a2683972297c5a22ea30164a1445

  20. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Threatens United States Senators, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-criminal-court-prosecutor-threatens-united-states-senators

  21. Israel and U.S. condemn ICC arrest warrants; other nations vow to enforce, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/21/israel-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/

  22. Israel – International Criminal Court '27.11.24) - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs - France Diplomatie, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestine/news/2024/article/israel-international-criminal-court-27-11-24

  23. France's Convoluted and Contradictory ICC Immunity Position - Lawfare, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/france-s-convoluted-and-contradictory-icc-immunity-position

  24. Britain drops its challenge to ICC arrest warrants for Israeli leaders - The Guardian, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/law/article/2024/jul/26/britain-drops-challenge-icc-arrest-warrants-israeli-leaders-netanyahu-gallant

  25. Israel-Gaza Conflict: Arrest Warrants - Hansard - UK Parliament, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-11-25/debates/03BDA24B-76D7-4486-809A-67C1A021C79B/Israel-GazaConflictArrestWarrants

  26. English No.: ICC-01/18 Date: 13 June 2025 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I Before: Judge Nicolas Guillou, Pr - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180bcf738.pdf

  27. Q&A on the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against Netanyahu and Gallant - ECCHR, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Q_As/ECCHR_QA_arrest_warrant_ICC_Netanjahu_Gallant_042025.pdf

  28. Mapping State Reactions to the ICC Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/105064/arrest-warrants-state-reactions-icc/

  29. Israel asks ICC to withdraw arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-asks-icc-to-withdraw-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu-and-gallant/

  30. Warrant of arrest - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/taxonomy/term/672

  31. What Do ICC Arrest Warrants Mean for Israel and the War in Gaza? - American University, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.american.edu/sis/news/20241125-what-do-icc-arrest-warrants-mean-for-israel-and-the-war-in-gaza.cfm

  32. Top war-crimes court issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu and others in Israel-Hamas fighting | The Associated Press, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/top-war-crimes-court-issues-arrest-warrants-for-netanyahu-and-others-in-israel-hamas-fighting/

Previous
Previous

The Jurisdictional Labyrinth: Sovereignty, Consent, and the Limits of the International Criminal Court

Next
Next

Blog Post Title Four