The International Criminal Court and the Russian Federation: A Legal, Geopolitical, and Institutional Analysis of Proceedings (2022–2025)
1. Introduction
The initiation and subsequent expansion of criminal proceedings by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the leadership of the Russian Federation represent a watershed moment in the history of international criminal law. Beginning with the issuance of arrest warrants for President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova in March 2023, the Court has engaged in a high-stakes effort to apply the Rome Statute to the sitting leadership of a nuclear-armed, permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. This legal offensive broadened significantly in June 2024 with the indictment of senior military commanders Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov for the systematic targeting of civilian energy infrastructure.
By late 2025, the situation had evolved into a complex, multi-front conflict involving not only the courtroom in The Hague but also diplomatic venues in Ulaanbaatar, Rio de Janeiro, and Strasbourg. The period was characterized by acute tensions over the enforcement of warrants, culminating in the precedent-setting non-compliance proceedings against Mongolia and the continued diplomatic isolation of the Russian President. Simultaneously, the institutional integrity of the Court faced severe tests, ranging from the Russian Federation’s retaliatory criminalization of ICC judicial officers to internal investigations regarding the Prosecutor, and the reimposition of sanctions by the United States in early 2025.
This report provides an exhaustive analysis of these developments. It examines the jurisdictional foundations of the Court’s intervention, the evidentiary basis for the charges of deportation and infrastructure targeting, the legal battles over Head of State immunity, and the geopolitical ripple effects of the warrants. Furthermore, it analyzes the parallel establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression in June 2025, a mechanism designed to close the jurisdictional gap left by the Rome Statute.
2. The Jurisdictional Architecture: From Ad Hoc Declarations to Contested Ratification
The jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes committed in Ukraine is a product of a unique procedural evolution, transitioning from ad hoc acceptance under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to full, albeit qualified, state party status. Understanding this transition is essential for comprehending the legal validity of the warrants against Russian nationals and the limitations simultaneously placed on the prosecution of Ukrainian nationals.
2.1 The Era of Ad Hoc Jurisdiction (2014–2024)
Prior to 2025, neither the Russian Federation nor Ukraine were parties to the Rome Statute. The Russian Federation, having signed the Statute in 2000, formally withdrew its signature in 2016 following a preliminary examination report by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) that classified the situation in Crimea as an international armed conflict.1 Consequently, the Court’s jurisdiction could not be grounded in Russian membership.
Ukraine, however, leveraged the mechanism provided by Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which permits a non-party State to accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to a specific crime or situation. This acceptance occurred in two distinct phases:
The First Declaration (April 2014): Following the Euromaidan protests and the subsequent change in government, Ukraine lodged a declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory from November 21, 2013, to February 22, 2014. This declaration was temporally and thematically limited to the events of the "Revolution of Dignity".1
The Second Declaration (September 2015): In a decisive expansion of legal exposure, the Ukrainian government lodged a second declaration on September 8, 2015. Crucially, this declaration accepted jurisdiction "from February 20, 2014, onwards" with no end date. By leaving the temporal scope open-ended, Ukraine effectively granted the ICC prospective jurisdiction over all future acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed on its territory. This legal maneuver ensured that the full-scale invasion launched by Russian forces on February 24, 2022, fell automatically within the Court’s purview.1
This jurisdictional footing was solidified in March 2022 when 43 States Parties submitted a joint referral of the Situation in Ukraine to the Prosecutor. This unprecedented collective action allowed Prosecutor Karim Khan to open a formal investigation immediately, bypassing the requirement under Article 15 for judicial authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber, thereby accelerating the investigative timeline significantly.1
2.2 Ukraine’s Accession and the Article 124 Controversy (2025)
The legal landscape shifted on January 1, 2025, when the Rome Statute officially entered into force for Ukraine, following the deposit of its instrument of ratification on October 25, 2024.3 While this marked Ukraine’s integration into the system of international criminal justice as the 125th State Party, the ratification was accompanied by a controversial limitation.
Upon ratification, Ukraine invoked Article 124 of the Rome Statute. This transitional provision allows a new State Party to declare that, for a period of seven years after the Statute enters into force, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 (War Crimes) when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.4
2.2.1 The Nature of the Exemption
The declaration lodged by Ukraine specifically limits the Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes allegedly committed by Ukrainian nationals. It does not, and legally cannot, limit the Court’s jurisdiction over Russian nationals committing crimes on Ukrainian territory, as jurisdiction over them is established via territoriality (the crime occurred on the territory of a State Party).6
This invocation created a bifurcated jurisdictional reality for the seven-year period (2025–2032):
Russian Forces: Fully liable for War Crimes (Article 8), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 7), and Genocide (Article 6).
Ukrainian Forces: Liable for Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, but exempt from ICC prosecution for War Crimes.6
2.2.2 Strategic Rationale and International Criticism
The decision to invoke Article 124 was driven by intense domestic debate within Ukraine. Military and security officials expressed deep reservations about the ratification, fearing that the ICC could be weaponized to prosecute Ukrainian soldiers defending their homeland against aggression. The Article 124 caveat was viewed as a necessary political compromise to secure the ratification vote in the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) while assuaging the concerns of the armed forces.7
However, this move drew sharp criticism from international legal scholars and human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Critics argued that the exemption created a "double standard" and undermined the moral authority of Ukraine's pursuit of justice. It was noted that Article 124 was originally a compromise inserted in 1998 to encourage ratification by major powers (notably France) and was slated for deletion by an amendment adopted in 2015—an amendment that had not yet entered into force globally.9 By invoking a provision that the Assembly of States Parties had actively sought to delete, Ukraine risked creating a perception of selective justice.7
Despite these criticisms, the practical effect on the proceedings against Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials was nil. The ICC’s jurisdiction over the Russian leadership remained robust, anchored in the territorial principle and unaffected by Ukraine’s self-imposed limitations regarding its own nationals.1
3. The Initial Warrants: The Systemic Deportation of Children
On March 17, 2023, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued the first arrest warrants in the Situation in Ukraine, targeting Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights.12 The selection of these specific charges—unlawful deportation and transfer of population—was a strategic prosecutorial choice, leveraging high evidentiary visibility and profound moral clarity.
3.1 The Charges and Legal Qualification
The warrants allege individual criminal responsibility for two distinct war crimes under the Rome Statute:
Unlawful deportation of population (children) under Article 8(2)(a)(vii).
Unlawful transfer of population (children) under Article 8(2)(b)(viii).
These crimes were allegedly committed in occupied Ukrainian territory from at least February 24, 2022. The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears responsibility both directly (Article 25(3)(a))—for acts committed jointly with others—and via superior responsibility (Article 28(b)), for failing to exercise control over subordinates who committed these acts.3
3.2 Evidentiary Foundation: The "Re-Education" Network
The issuance of the warrants was supported by a wealth of open-source intelligence and investigations by international bodies, most notably the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
3.2.1 The Infrastructure of Deportation
Investigations revealed a sprawling network of facilities used to process and detain Ukrainian children. The Yale HRL identified at least 210 distinct locations involved in the deportation program. These facilities were not limited to the immediate vicinity of the conflict but were dispersed across the vast territory of the Russian Federation, including Siberia and the Far East.14
The network included:
"Summer Camps" and Sanatoriums: Often used as the initial intake points under the guise of rest and recreation.
Cadet Schools and Military Bases: Used for older children, integrating military training into the curriculum.
Medical Facilities: Used for children with disabilities or those requiring care, often leading to long-term institutionalization.14
3.2.2 Indoctrination and Erasure of Identity
Crucially, the investigations demonstrated that the primary purpose of these transfers was not humanitarian evacuation—as claimed by the Russian Federation—but political re-education.
Re-Education Activities: At least 130 of the identified sites (61.9%) engaged in explicit re-education programs designed to instill pro-Russian patriotic sentiment.
Militarization: Organizations such as Yunarmiya (Young Army) and the "Movement of the First" were integral to this process, conducting military training for deported children at multiple facilities. This militarization of youth from an occupied territory is a grave violation of international humanitarian law.14
Belarusian Complicity: The network extended beyond Russia. Yale HRL found that at least 2,422 Ukrainian children were transported to 13 facilities in Belarus, implicating the Lukashenko regime as a co-belligerent in the demographic engineering of the occupied territories.16
3.3 The Role of Maria Lvova-Belova and Coerced Adoption
Maria Lvova-Belova was identified as a central architect of this policy. The warrants highlight her role in streamlining the legal mechanisms for the permanent removal of Ukrainian children from their national group.
Fast-Track Citizenship: Presidential decrees signed by Putin facilitated the expedited granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian orphans and children without parental care. This legal modification was a prerequisite for adoption by Russian families, as Russian law generally prohibits the adoption of foreign nationals.18
Public Admission: Lvova-Belova and other Russian officials publicly engaged in these activities, often showcasing adoptions on state television as acts of benevolence. Lvova-Belova herself publicly adopted a teenager from Mariupol, thanking President Putin for the opportunity. These public admissions provided the OTP with direct evidence of mens rea (intent) and the specific intent to permanently alter the status of the protected persons.18
Coercion and Deception: Reports by the OSCE and Human Rights Watch documented instances where parents in occupied territories were coerced into sending their children to camps for "safety," only to be refused their return. In other cases, Russian officials falsely informed children that their parents had abandoned them.18
While the current charges are limited to war crimes, the systematic nature of the transfers, combined with the efforts to erase the children's Ukrainian identity and impose Russian citizenship, carries the hallmarks of genocide under Article 2(e) of the Genocide Convention ("Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group").20
4. Expanding the Net: Infrastructure Targeting and Command Responsibility (2024)
In June 2024, the ICC dramatically expanded the scope of its prosecution by issuing arrest warrants for the highest echelons of the Russian military command: Sergei Shoigu (former Minister of Defence) and Valery Gerasimov (Chief of the General Staff).3
4.1 The Charges: Targeting the Energy Grid
The warrants relate to the campaign of missile and drone strikes conducted by the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine’s electric infrastructure between October 10, 2022, and March 9, 2023. The charges include:
War Crimes: Directing attacks at civilian objects (Article 8(2)(b)(ii)) and causing excessive incidental harm to civilians (Article 8(2)(b)(iv)).
Crimes Against Humanity: Inhumane acts causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health (Article 7(1)(k)).3
4.2 Legal Analysis: Dual-Use Objects and Proportionality
The indictment of Shoigu and Gerasimov engaged with one of the most complex areas of International Humanitarian Law (IHL): the targeting of "dual-use" objects. Electrical grids are often considered valid military targets because they sustain military communications and logistics. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to issue warrants signifies a rejection of the Russian military's proportionality assessment.
Excessive Harm: The Court found reasonable grounds to believe that the expected incidental harm to civilians—specifically the loss of heat, water, and medical services during the freezing winter months—was clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.22
Inhumane Acts: By classifying the strikes as Crimes Against Humanity, the Court indicated that the attacks were part of a widespread and systematic policy pursuant to a state plan. The pattern of strikes, launched in waves against power plants and substations across the entire country, was interpreted not as a series of tactical military engagements but as a strategic effort to terrorize the civilian population by plunging them into cold and darkness.23
4.3 Command Responsibility vs. Direct Orders
Unlike the Putin warrant, which relied heavily on failure to exercise control, the Shoigu and Gerasimov warrants allege that they ordered the commission of the crimes (Article 25(3)(b)) and committed them jointly (Article 25(3)(a)). This suggests the Prosecutor possesses evidence of direct orders flowing from the Ministry of Defence to the missile units, establishing a direct causal link between the strategic leadership and the impact on the ground.22
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of ICC Warrants in the Situation in Ukraine
Defendant
Date Issued
Primary Charges
Legal Basis (Rome Statute)
Key Evidentiary Focus
Vladimir Putin
Mar 17, 2023
War Crimes (Deportation/Transfer)
Arts. 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii)
Presidential decrees on citizenship; oversight of children's rights office.
Maria Lvova-Belova
Mar 17, 2023
War Crimes (Deportation/Transfer)
Arts. 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii)
Operational management of transfers; placement in Russian families.
Sergei Shoigu
Jun 24, 2024
War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity
Arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv), 7(1)(k)
Orders targeting energy infrastructure; winter campaign 2022-2023.
Valery Gerasimov
Jun 24, 2024
War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity
Arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv), 7(1)(k)
Strategic command of missile forces; implementation of strike policy.
Viktor Sokolov
Mar 5, 2024
War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity
Arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 7(1)(k)
Command of the Black Sea Fleet; missile strikes. 21
Sergey Kobylash
Mar 5, 2024
War Crimes & Crimes Against Humanity
Arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 7(1)(k)
Command of Long-Range Aviation; aerial bombardment. 21
5. The Crisis of Cooperation: Immunity, Non-Compliance, and the "Shrinking World"
The issuance of an arrest warrant for a sitting Head of State of a non-party P5 nation precipitated a profound crisis in the ICC’s system of cooperation. Lacking its own enforcement arm, the Court relies entirely on States Parties to execute warrants. This reliance was tested in a series of high-profile geopolitical events involving South Africa, Mongolia, and Brazil.
5.1 The South Africa Precedent: Avoidance (2023)
In 2023, South Africa hosted the BRICS summit. As a Rome Statute signatory, the country faced a legal obligation to arrest Putin if he attended. The South African government, facing domestic litigation from civil society groups and a clear High Court order mandating arrest, engaged in intense diplomatic maneuvering. Ultimately, a "mutual agreement" was reached whereby Putin did not attend in person, participating instead via video link.25 This episode demonstrated that while the warrant could not force an arrest, it successfully curtailed the Russian President's freedom of movement to a major diplomatic forum.
5.2 The Mongolia Crisis: Defiance and Adjudication (2024–2025)
The fragile norm of avoidance was shattered in September 2024 when Vladimir Putin visited Mongolia, an ICC State Party. Unlike South Africa, Mongolia did not deter the visit; instead, it welcomed Putin with full state honors to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.
5.2.1 The Legal Arguments
Mongolia attempted to justify its non-compliance through filings to the Pre-Trial Chamber.
Article 97 Consultations: Mongolia filed a request for consultations days before the visit, arguing that it was caught between its ICC obligations and its bilateral treaty obligations with Russia.
Article 98 and Immunity: Mongolia argued that under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, the Court could not proceed with a request for surrender that would require the requested state to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person of a third state. They contended that Putin, as a sitting Head of State of a non-party, enjoyed absolute immunity ratione personae.27
Geopolitical Duress: Implicit in Mongolia’s stance was its geographic reality—landlocked between Russia and China—and its heavy dependence on Russian energy.26
5.2.2 The Court’s Findings (October 2024 & March 2025)
On October 24, 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a formal Finding of Non-Compliance under Article 87(7). The Chamber’s reasoning was categorical:
Rejection of Immunity: Citing the Jordan/Al-Bashir Appeals Chamber judgment, the Court reaffirmed that Article 98(1) is a procedural rule and does not recognize any substantive immunity for Heads of State in proceedings before the ICC. The Court held that there is no immunity for international crimes before an international tribunal, and therefore no waiver is required from the non-party state.29
Consultations: The Court dismissed the Article 97 consultation request as an attempt to delay rather than a genuine effort to resolve the issue, noting the request was filed too late to be meaningful.27
Referral: The matter was referred to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP), with the Chamber emphasizing the "seriousness" of the breach given the prior warnings.29
Mongolia attempted to challenge this finding, filing requests for reconsideration and seeking the disqualification of Presiding Judge Rosario Salvatore Aitala and Judge Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez. These efforts were systematically rejected by the Plenary of Judges and the Appeals Chamber. On March 18, 2025, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued a final decision rejecting Mongolia's request for reconsideration, effectively closing the legal file and cementing the finding of non-compliance.28
5.3 The Brazil Dilemma and the G20 (Late 2024–2025)
The Mongolia precedent had immediate reverberations for Brazil, the host of the G20 summit in November 2024 and the BRICS summit in 2025. President Lula da Silva had initially invited Putin, but the rigorous response of the ICC to the Mongolia visit altered the calculus.
G20 (Rio, Nov 2024): Putin publicly announced he would not attend, acknowledging that his presence would "wreck" the summit due to the controversy over the warrant.34
BRICS (Rio, July 2025): Despite Brazil's BRICS partnership, it was confirmed that Putin would attend via video link, with Foreign Minister Lavrov attending in person. The risk of arrest, or at least the massive diplomatic distraction of the warrant, was deemed too high.36
This pattern confirms that while the ICC cannot guarantee arrest, its warrants have effectively "shrunk the world" for the Russian President, making travel to the 125 States Parties diplomatically prohibitive.
6. Asymmetric Warfare: Russian "Lawfare" and Retaliation
The Russian Federation has responded to the ICC’s actions with a coordinated campaign of domestic criminalization, treating the Court’s judicial process as an act of aggression.
6.1 Criminalization of ICC Personnel
Immediately following the March 2023 warrants, the Russian Investigative Committee opened criminal cases against ICC officials. By November 2025, the Russian authorities announced the completion of an investigation into nine ICC officials, charging them in absentia.38
The officials charged include:
Prosecutor: Karim Khan.
ICC President: Piotr Hofmański.
Judges: Tomoko Akane, Rosario Salvatore Aitala, Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez, Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Reine Alapini-Gansou, and others.38
6.2 The Statutes of Retaliation
The charges are based on specific articles of the Russian Criminal Code:
Article 299: "Bringing a knowingly innocent person to criminal liability."
Article 301: "Knowingly illegal detention."
Article 360: "Preparation of an attack on a representative of a foreign state... for the purpose of provoking war or complicating international relations".38
This use of Article 360 is particularly significant, as it reframes the issuance of a judicial warrant as a quasi-military attack on the Russian state, justifying a maximalist response. In November 2024, a Russian court ordered the arrest in absentia of Judge Reine Alapini-Gansou, and placed other judges on the Interior Ministry's wanted list.39 This "counter-warrant" strategy serves to intimidate ICC staff and restrict their own travel to nations friendly to Russia, creating a reciprocal "shrinking world" effect for the prosecutors themselves.
6.3 External Pressure: The Return of U.S. Sanctions
In addition to Russian pressure, the ICC faced renewed hostility from the United States. Reports from early 2025 indicate that a new U.S. administration, led by President Donald Trump, issued an Executive Order in February 2025 imposing sanctions on ICC officials. This marked a return to the policies of 2020, complicating the Court's operational environment and emboldening other detractors.40
7. Parallel Mechanisms: The Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression
A critical limitation of the ICC’s jurisdiction in the Ukraine situation is its inability to prosecute the Crime of Aggression (the act of invading). While the Court can prosecute war crimes committed during the war, it cannot prosecute the decision to start the war because neither Ukraine nor Russia ratified the Kampala Amendments, and Russia is not a State Party. To bridge this "impunity gap," the international community established a separate, complementary mechanism.
7.1 Establishment of the Tribunal (June 2025)
On June 25, 2025, in Strasbourg, the Council of Europe and Ukraine signed the "Agreement on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine".42
Key Features of the Tribunal:
Mandate: Specifically empowered to prosecute persons in a position to effectively exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State—i.e., the "troika" (Head of State, Head of Government, Foreign Minister) and senior military leadership.44
Jurisdiction: Unlike the ICC, which is bound by the Rome Statute's limitations on aggression, this Tribunal derives its authority from a specific agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, supported by a "Core Group" of over 35 states.42
Institutional Support: The Tribunal is supported by the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression (ICPA), based in The Hague at Eurojust, which had been collecting and preserving evidence since July 2023.45
The establishment of this tribunal ensures that the Russian leadership faces accountability not only for how the war is fought (ICC jurisdiction) but also for the very fact that it was fought (Special Tribunal jurisdiction).
8. Institutional Challenges: The Khan Investigation (2025)
Amidst these external battles, the ICC faced a severe internal crisis in 2025 regarding its leadership.
Allegations: Allegations of sexual misconduct surfaced regarding Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan.
Investigation: An external investigation was launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).
Leave of Absence: In May 2025, Karim Khan announced he would take a temporary leave of absence pending the conclusion of the investigation. Deputy prosecutors assumed management of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to ensure the continuity of investigations in Ukraine and other situations.46
This development, while vigorously managed by the Court’s independent oversight mechanisms, provided rhetorical ammunition to the Court’s adversaries in Moscow and elsewhere, who sought to portray the institution as dysfunctional or morally compromised.48
9. Conclusion
By late 2025, the legal confrontation between the International Criminal Court and the Russian Federation had hardened into a permanent feature of the global geopolitical landscape. The arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin, Maria Lvova-Belova, Sergei Shoigu, and Valery Gerasimov have failed to produce physical arrests, but they have succeeded in imposing significant diplomatic costs. The Russian President has effectively been barred from attending major international summits in ICC member states, as evidenced by his absence from gatherings in South Africa and Brazil.
The Court’s firm stance on non-compliance—demonstrated by the rigorous proceedings against Mongolia—has clarified the obligations of States Parties, ruling out "head of state immunity" as a valid defense for inaction. Meanwhile, the establishment of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression has closed the final gap in the accountability architecture.
However, the resilience of the international justice system is under immense strain. The Russian Federation’s aggressive "lawfare" against ICC judges, the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, and internal leadership crises pose ongoing threats to the Court’s efficacy. Yet, the expansion of charges to the very highest levels of military command and the solidification of Ukraine’s status as a State Party signal that the pursuit of accountability for the invasion of Ukraine remains a central, if contested, pillar of the contemporary international order.
Works cited
The ICC and the Russia-Ukraine War - American Society of International Law (ASIL), accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/26/issue/4
Problems of legality of the International Criminal Court (opinion of the International Law Advisory Board under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), accessed on November 24, 2025, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/legal_problems_of_international_cooperation/1949021/
Ukraine - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine
Ukraine becomes the 125th State Party to the ICC Rome Statute, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/ukraine-becomes-125th-ICC-state-party
Eurocentrism in Ukraine's Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/eurocentrism-in-ukraines-ratification-of-the-rome-statute-of-the-international-criminal-court/
'There's life in the old dog yet …,' or: the news of the death of Art. 124 Rome Statute were premature - EJIL: Talk!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/theres-life-in-the-old-dog-yet-or-the-news-of-the-death-of-art-124-rome-statute-were-premature/
Why Is Ukraine Ratifying the Rome Statute With an Article 124 Caveat? - Lawfare, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-is-ukraine-ratifying-the-rome-statute-with-an-article-124-caveat
Ukraine and Article 124 Rome Statute—a Jurisdictional Dilemma Through the Lens of Selectivity in - Brill, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://brill.com/view/journals/icla/aop/article-10.1163-15718123-bja10249/article-10.1163-15718123-bja10249.xml?language=en
Ukraine: Ratifying the Rome Statute a welcome step, but limitations must be addressed, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/08/ukraine-ratifying-the-rome-statute-a-welcome-step-but-limitations-must-be-addressed/
Legal Issues Regarding Ukraine's Potential Art. 124 Declaration - Opinio Juris, accessed on November 24, 2025, http://opiniojuris.org/2024/08/17/legal-issues-regarding-ukraines-potential-art-124-declaration/
Ukraine ratifies Rome Statute but must address concerns over ICC jurisdiction, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-ratifies-rome-statute-but-must-address-concerns-over-icc-jurisdiction/
The ICC Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova – An Outline of Issues - EJIL: Talk!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icc-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-putin-and-maria-lvova-belova-an-outline-of-issues/
Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and
UKRAINE'S STOLEN CHILDREN: INSIDE RUSSIA'S NETWORK OF RE-EDUCATION AND MILITARIZATION - Yale University, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e6294def-3f80-4d71-9cc7-91f6af70a523
Ukraine's Stolen Children: Inside Russia's Network of Re-education and Militarization, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://ysph.yale.edu/news-article/ukraines-stolen-children-inside-russias-network-of-re-education-and-militarization/
Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab finds Belarus complicit in the relocation of Ukrainian children - Yale Daily News, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2023/12/01/yales-humanitarian-research-lab-finds-belarus-complicit-in-the-relocation-of-ukrainian-children/
Publications & Reports < Humanitarian Research Lab - Yale School of Medicine, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://medicine.yale.edu/lab/khoshnood/publications/
Investigation Launches into Forcible Transfer of Children in Ukraine | Human Rights Watch, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/06/investigation-launches-forcible-transfer-children-ukraine
The ICC response to Russia's war gives hope for justice | Chatham House, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/03/icc-response-russias-war-gives-hope-justice
Forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children: Responses and accountability measures - European Parliament, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754442/EXPO_STU(2024)754442_EN.pdf
International Criminal Court arrest warrants for Russian leaders - Wikipedia, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court_arrest_warrants_for_Russian_leaders
Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-kuzhugetovich-shoigu-and
New ICC Warrants Issued for Ukraine Crimes - Human Rights Watch, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/06/26/new-icc-warrants-issued-ukraine-crimes
Russia/Ukraine: ICC arrest warrants for senior Russian officials 'a crucial step towards justice' - Amnesty International, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/06/russia-ukraine-icc-arrest-warrants-for-senior-russian-officials-a-crucial-step-towards-justice/
The ICC Wants Putin. Now What? - CSIS, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/icc-wants-putin-now-what
Putin Uses Mongolia to Mock the ICC - CEPA, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://cepa.org/article/putin-uses-mongolia-to-mock-the-icc/
ICC Finds Mongolia Violated Rome Statute by Failing to Arrest Putin | ASIL, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.asil.org/ILIB/icc-finds-mongolia-violated-rome-statute-failing-arrest-putin
The ICC's Turn to Cynical Solipsism: The PTC II's Finding of Mongolia's Non-compliance in the Case against Putin - EJIL: Talk!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-iccs-turn-to-cynical-solipsism-the-ptc-iis-finding-of-mongolias-non-compliance-in-the-case-against-putin/
English No. ICC-01/22 Date: 24 October 2024 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II Before - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd1809d1971.pdf
Finding Under art. 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Mong. with the request by the Ct. to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and referral to the Assembly of States Parties (Int'l Crim. Ct. Pre-Trial Chamber II) | International Legal Materials - Cambridge Core - Journals & Books Online, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://resolve.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/finding-under-art-877-of-the-rome-statute-on-the-noncompliance-by-mong-with-the-request-by-the-ct-to-cooperate-in-the-arrest-and-surrender-of-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and-referral-to-the-assembly-of-states-parties-intl-crim-ct-pretrial-chamber-ii/29E9A9F0465C3B0EF08079C3A2C93200
English No. ICC-01/22 Date: 18 March 2025 PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER II Before: Judge Rosario - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180b06c5d.pdf
English No.: ICC-01/22 Date: 10 March 2025 THE PLENARY OF JUDGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIM - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180af1e24.pdf
The Conclusion of Mongolia's Proceedings before the International Criminal Court: Implications on Non-Cooperation - EJIL: Talk!, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-conclusion-of-mongolias-proceedings-before-the-international-criminal-court-implications-on-non-cooperation/
Russia's Putin says presence at G20 in Brazil will 'wreck' summit | Politics News - Al Jazeera, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/18/russias-putin-says-presence-at-g20-in-brazil-will-wreck-summit
Putin won't attend G20 summit in Brazil, which would have to arrest him on ICC warrant, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/18/7196548/
Why Putin Will Miss BRICS 2025 Summit in Brazil - YouTube, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kxd399c6Ync
Putin to skip BRICS summit in Brazil due to ICC arrest warrant - The Kyiv Independent, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/putin-to-skip-brics-summit-in-brazil-due-to-icc-arrest-warrant/
A warrant for a warrant. Moscow adds International Criminal Court leadership to wanted list for “illegal prosecution” of Russians and “provoking a war” - Mediazona, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.zona.media/article/2025/11/14/ICC
Russia Arrests ICC Vice President Alapini-Gansou in Absentia - The Moscow Times, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/11/13/russia-arrests-icc-vice-president-alapini-gansou-in-absentia-a87006
Trump's sanctions on ICC prosecutor have halted tribunal's work - AP News, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/icc-trump-sanctions-karim-khan-court-a4b4c02751ab84c09718b1b95cbd5db3
English No.: ICC-02/18 Date: 18 August 2025 THE PRESIDENCY Before: Judge Tomoko Akane, Pr - | International Criminal Court, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd180c5d4a4.pdf
Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine - Wikipedia, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Tribunal_for_the_Crime_of_Aggression_against_Ukraine
Ukraine and Council of Europe Sign Landmark Agreement for Special Tribunal on Crime of Aggression | EEAS, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/council-europe/ukraine-and-council-europe-sign-landmark-agreement-special-tribunal-crime-aggression_en?s=51
Frequently Asked Questions - Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/special-tribunal-for-the-crime-of-aggression-against-ukraine-frequently-asked-questions
Prosecutors and Eurojust prepare for upcoming Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine - European Union, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/prosecutors-and-eurojust-prepare-upcoming-special-tribunal-crime-aggression-against-ukraine
ICC prosecutor to step aside until probe into alleged misconduct ends - Al Jazeera, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/16/icc-prosecutor-to-step-aside-until-probe-into-alleged-misconduct-ends
ICC's chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, to step aside until investigation ends - The Guardian, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2025/may/16/international-criminal-court-chief-prosecutor-karim-khan-to-step-aside-until-investigation-ends
Israel asks ICC to bar prosecutor under investigation from cases against PM, Gallant, accessed on November 24, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-asks-icc-to-bar-prosecutor-under-investigation-from-cases-against-pm-gallant/
