The Fire in the Prayer Hall: Anti-Clericalism and the Burning of Mosques in the 2025–2026 Iranian Uprising
Executive Summary
The transition from 2025 into 2026 marked a pivotal and violent inflection point in the sociopolitical trajectory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. What commenced on December 28, 2025, as a localized economic grievance—a strike by the merchant class (bazaaris) of Tehran protesting currency devaluation—rapidly metastasized into a nationwide insurrection distinguished by a singular, unprecedented tactical evolution: the systematic and widespread arson of religious infrastructure. Unlike previous cycles of unrest in 2009, 2019, or 2022, where wrath was directed primarily at banks, police stations, or symbols of state security, the 2026 uprising has seen the mosque, the religious seminary (howzeh), and the offices of Friday Prayer Imams become the primary loci of protester violence.
This report provides an exhaustive analysis of this phenomenon, investigating the precise chronology ("when") and the sociological and political drivers ("why") of these attacks. The analysis posits that the burning of mosques is not merely indiscriminate rioting but represents a calculated sociological rupture. It signifies the collapse of the ideological firewall that once shielded the clerical establishment from the raw anger directed at the state. The data suggests that the militarization of mosques by the Basij paramilitary forces has effectively secularized these spaces in the eyes of the opposition, rendering them legitimate military targets. Furthermore, the specific geographic spread of these attacks—penetrating the holy cities of Qom and Mashhad—indicates a crisis of legitimacy that is existential rather than managerial.
This document dissects the economic precursors, the specific timeline of escalation from late December 2025 through mid-January 2026, and the sociological drivers behind the anti-clerical violence. It further examines the regime’s counter-narrative, specifically the attribution of violence to the "Mobarizoun Popular Front" and foreign agents, and situates the domestic unrest within the broader geopolitical context of the "12-Day War" with Israel and renewed U.S. pressure strategies.
Part I: The Prelude to Inferno — Structural Drivers of the Crisis
To comprehend the specific targeting of religious institutions in January 2026, one must first deconstruct the environment that stripped them of their sanctity. The violence did not emerge in a vacuum; it was the combustion of accumulated economic despair, geopolitical humiliation, and the final dissolution of the social contract between the theocracy and its constituency.
1.1 The Economic Precipice: Currency Collapse and Hyperinflation
By the close of 2025, the Iranian economy had effectively entered a terminal phase of dysfunction, characterized by the total erosion of the national currency. The rial, which functions not only as a medium of exchange but as a primary barometer of public confidence in the regime’s survival, suffered a catastrophic devaluation. Following the "12-Day War" with Israel in June 2025, the economy failed to stabilize, burdened by the costs of conflict and the intensification of international isolation.1
By late December 2025, the rial had plummeted to a historic low. On the open market, the exchange rate breached the psychological barrier of 1.45 million rials to the U.S. dollar.1 This collapse was not merely a macroeconomic statistic; it decimated the purchasing power of the average Iranian household overnight. Inflation surged to 42.2% in December alone, with specific sub-sectors experiencing hyperinflationary pressures. Food prices rose by 72% year-on-year, and the cost of meat nearly doubled in the weeks leading up to the protests, pushing essential nutrition out of reach for millions of working-class families.4
The government’s fiscal response exacerbated the crisis rather than alleviating it. In a desperate attempt to manage the widening fiscal deficit, the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian announced the cancellation of the "preferential exchange rate" program.4 This system, which had allowed importers to purchase dollars at a subsidized rate for essential goods like medicine and wheat, was a critical lifeline for the poor. Its removal was effectively a declaration that prices for basic survival goods would skyrocket further. Traders and economists warned immediately that this policy shift would lead to a cost-of-living crisis of unmanageable proportions, yet the government, constrained by a lack of foreign currency reserves, proceeded.
1.2 The Revolt of the Bazaaris: A Class Betrayal
The spark for the 2025–2026 uprising did not come from the student dormitories or the peripheral provinces, but from the Grand Bazaar of Tehran—the traditional economic heart of the capital.1 Historically, the bazaaris have constituted a conservative class, deeply intertwined with the clerical establishment. Their financial support was instrumental in the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and they have generally acted as a stabilizing force in previous decades.
However, on December 28, 2025, this historical alliance fractured publicly. Shopkeepers, unable to price their goods due to the hourly fluctuation of the dollar and facing imminent bankruptcy from the subsidy cuts, shuttered their shops in a collective strike. The strike began at the Alaeddin Shopping Centre and Charsou Mall—modern hubs for electronics and mobile phones—but rapidly spread to the traditional fabric and carpet merchants of the old Bazaar.1 When the bazaaris turned against the state, they signaled to the rest of society that the regime had lost its last pillar of economic competence. The chant "Support, Support" (Hemayat, Hemayat) rang out from the Bazaar, inviting the general public to join the strike, transforming a sectoral economic dispute into a national political plebiscite.1
1.3 The Geopolitical Context: The Shadow of the "12-Day War"
The internal economic collapse cannot be extricated from the external security environment. The protests occurred in the shadow of the "12-Day War" with Israel in June 2025.2 This conflict, while short, had devastating consequences for the regime's image of invincibility.
Military Humiliation: The war reportedly resulted in significant damage to Iranian air defense systems and highlighted the regime's inability to protect its airspace.8 This eroded the narrative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as the supreme protector of the nation.
Proxy Degradation: The conflict, combined with Israeli operations in Lebanon and Syria, severely weakened Iran’s "Axis of Resistance." The degradation of Hezbollah and the pressure on Hamas meant that the regime’s projection of power abroad—often used to justify hardship at home—was failing.6
Diplomatic Isolation: Following the war, the "snapback" mechanism for UN sanctions was triggered, re-imposing international restrictions that had been lifted under previous nuclear agreements. This deepened the economic blockade and signaled to the Iranian public that no diplomatic relief was on the horizon.1
The populace, seeing their national wealth dissipated in foreign wars that ended in humiliation, began to view the clerical establishment's foreign policy not just as expensive, but as an existential threat to the nation itself. The chant "Not Gaza, Not Lebanon, My Life for Iran" 6 became the anthem of this frustration, directly linking the burning of mosques (symbols of the pan-Islamist ideology) to the rejection of the regime's foreign adventurism.
Part II: The Spark and the Flame — Chronology of Escalation
The burning of religious infrastructure was not an immediate occurrence on day one but evolved rapidly as the state unleashed violence and the protesters' tactics hardened. The following timeline reconstructs the escalation of anti-clerical arson from late December 2025 through mid-January 2026.
Phase 1: The Economic Spark (December 28 – 31, 2025)
The initial days of the uprising were characterized by traditional modes of civil disobedience—strikes, marches, and economic slogans.
December 28: Protests begin in Tehran's Grand Bazaar. Shopkeepers close their shutters. The slogans are primarily economic: "Death to high prices," "High prices, inflation, are killing the people".1 There are no reports of arson on religious sites at this stage.
December 29–30: The unrest spreads to universities and provincial capitals. The demographics of the protest shift from older merchants to Generation Z and the working class. Slogans turn political: "Death to the Dictator".1 Confrontations with security forces remain largely restricted to tear gas and baton charges.
December 31: The first confirmed fatalities occur. As security forces use lethal force to disperse crowds, the crowd's tactics harden. The "taboo" of attacking state symbols begins to erode.1 The psychological barrier against violence is breached as the first martyrs are mourned.
Phase 2: The Anti-Clerical Turn (January 1 – 3, 2026)
This period marks the definitive transition to "armed" and arson-based tactics. The burning of seminaries begins in earnest, signaling a shift from protesting policy to attacking the ideology of the state.
January 1 (The Night of Fire):
Tehran: In the northwestern district of Saadat Abad, activists release video footage showing a mosque set on fire amidst chaotic street scenes. Voices in the video chant "Death to the dictator".11
Farsan (Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari): In a pivotal incident, protesters storm and set fire to a Shiite seminary and a Basij base. Video footage confirms the seminary engulfed in flames.12 This incident is crucial because Farsan is a traditional, tribal area, indicating the depth of anti-clerical anger beyond the secular urban centers.
Tehran: Mayor Aliresa Sakani reports that "more than 30 mosques went up in flames" in a single night of unrest, alongside over 50 banks.11
Luristan & Sistan and Baluchistan: Protesters in these regions begin engaging in direct confrontation, lighting fires in the streets and attacking government buildings.1
January 2 (The Spread to Holy Cities):
Qom: Protests erupt in the holy city of Qom, the ideological center of the Islamic Republic. Chants of "Pahlavi will return" are heard near the shrines, a direct and shocking challenge to the clerical hierarchy in their own stronghold.12
Hamadan: In the Sadaf district, protesters attempt to attack a mosque and are seen burning copies of the Quran, an act of extreme defiance against the state's religious ideology.1
Ahvaz: The Imam Mahdi Theological Seminary in the Zargan neighborhood is set on fire. Reports indicate that Basij forces attempted to defend the site but were overwhelmed by the sheer number of protesters.14
January 3 (Reciprocal Violence):
The violence becomes reciprocal. The regime deploys heavy weaponry. In response, protesters in Nourabad burn a security forces armored vehicle.13 The burning of physical infrastructure becomes a primary tactic of resistance.
Phase 3: The "Bloodiest Days" and Total Confrontation (January 6 – 12, 2026)
As the state crackdown intensified, the protesters' targets expanded.
January 6: The Iranian Rial hits a new low of 1.5 million to the dollar. Protests intensify. A top Sunni cleric, Molavi Abdolhamid, condemns the violence, highlighting the sectarian and ethnic dimensions.1
January 7 (The Bloodiest Day): Identified as the bloodiest day of the uprising. Security forces kill at least 13 protesters (some reports claim significantly higher). In retaliation, protesters in Kuhchenar pull down a statue of Qassem Soleimani. In Kashan, a statue of Soleimani is torched.6
January 8 (General Strike): A nationwide general strike is called. Reports confirm that 53 mosques have been burned in total since the start of the unrest.17 This day sees the full mobilization of the Kurdish provinces in a general strike.
January 9:
Mashhad: Protesters set fire to seminaries that were being used as staging grounds and housing for Basij militia units.18
Tehran: A government building in East Tehran is torched.19
Gonabad: A highly symbolic incident occurs where young men are filmed rushing out of a seminary mosque to join the protests, suggesting defections or the takeover of religious sites by protesters.6
By mid-January, the uprising had established a clear pattern: state violence was met with the burning of the state's ideological infrastructure.
Part III: The Geography of Anti-Clericalism
The burning of mosques was not uniform across the country. The geography of the arson reveals distinct regional dynamics, showing how the uprising penetrated both the secular urban centers and the religious periphery.
3.1 Tehran: The Political Center
In the capital, mosque burnings were concentrated in districts like Saadat Abad (wealthy, secular) and the Grand Bazaar area. Here, the attacks were symbolic strikes against the state's power centers. Mayor Aliresa Sakani’s report of 30 mosques burning in one night suggests a coordinated effort to dismantle the neighborhood-level control structures of the Basij.11 The burning of banks often accompanied the burning of mosques, conceptually linking the financial and religious arms of the oppression.
3.2 The Periphery: Kurdistan and Baluchistan
In Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchistan, the conflict assumed the characteristics of a low-intensity civil war.
Zahedan (Baluchistan): The Makki Mosque remains a hub of resistance, but unlike the regime's mosques, it is protected by the people. The violence here involved attacks on state religious centers and police stations.18 The region witnessed the burning of the Imam Mahdi Theological Seminary in Ahvaz, a key center for Shia proselytization in the Arab-majority province.15
Farsan and Lordegan: In these smaller, tribal cities, the burning of seminaries 12 indicates that the rural/provincial base—often assumed to be loyal—has turned. The sheer number of government buildings burned in these areas (banks, seminaries, Basij bases) suggests a total collapse of local authority.
3.3 The Religious Heartland: Qom and Mashhad
The most shocking developments occurred in Qom and Mashhad, cities that owe their existence and economy to their status as pilgrimage sites.
Mashhad: Protesters set fire to seminaries used by the Basij.18 As the burial place of Imam Reza, violence here pierces the heart of the regime's religious legitimacy.
Qom: The burning of the Zainabiyyeh seminary and attacks on Friday Prayer offices 14 in the clerical capital demonstrate that the class war has breached the holy city. Students of religion themselves were seen joining protests in some instances, or at least abandoning the defense of the regime.6
The table below summarizes the geographic spread of confirmed arson attacks on religious sites during the first two weeks of January 2026.
Region
City
Target Type
Date
Significance
Capital
Tehran (Saadat Abad)
Mosque
Jan 1
Symbolic attack in wealthy district; part of "30 mosques" burned in one night.
Southwest
Farsan
Shiite Seminary
Jan 1
Direct attack on clerical education center in a tribal area.
Khuzestan
Ahvaz (Zargan)
Imam Mahdi Seminary
Jan 2
Burning of a major seminary in the Arab-majority province.
Religious Center
Qom
Zainabiyyeh Seminary
Jan 2
Breach of the ideological capital; chants of "Pahlavi will return."
Religious Center
Mashhad
Basij-Housing Seminary
Jan 9
Targeting of religious sites used specifically for paramilitary housing.
West
Hamadan (Sadaf)
Mosque & Quran
Jan 2
Extreme anti-religious symbolism (burning of Quran reported).
Tehran
East Tehran
Government Building
Jan 9
Continued escalation against state infrastructure.
Part IV: The Sociology of Arson — Why Mosques?
The burning of mosques in a theocratic Shiite state is a profound transgression. To explain why this occurred, we must look beyond simple hooliganism to the structural militarization of religion in Iran.
4.1 The Mosque as a "Base of Operations"
The most cited reason for the burning of mosques is their dual use as security outposts. Since the 1980s, the Basij (paramilitary volunteer militia) has been headquartered in local mosques. During times of unrest, these mosques serve as:
Staging Grounds: Where riot police and Basij on motorbikes gather before deploying to crush protests.18
Detention Centers: Protesters arrested in the streets are often dragged into mosque courtyards for temporary holding and initial interrogation before being moved to formal prisons.20
Surveillance Hubs: Basij members use the mosque minarets and roofs to film protesters and identify leaders for later arrest.
Consequently, protesters view the mosque not as a neutral sanctuary but as an active combatant structure. As one Reddit commentator noted during the unrest, "The mosque was used as a base for the protest police... it was the police who were misusing a place of worship".20 In Mashhad, this was explicitly the case, where seminaries housing Basij units were targeted specifically to disrupt the suppression capability of the state.18
4.2 Symbolic Decolonization and Rejection of Ideology
Beyond tactical necessity, the arson carries heavy symbolic weight. Analysts have described these acts as a form of "decolonization" 3, where Iranians are attempting to strip away the imposed identity of the Islamic Republic.
"Not Gaza, Not Lebanon": The chants during these burnings—"My life for Iran"—reject the pan-Islamist foreign policy of the regime. The mosque represents the regime's priority of funding religious proxies (Hezbollah, Hamas) over feeding its own people. Burning it is a rejection of this resource allocation.6
The "Mullah" as the Enemy: The slogan "No to Shah, No to Mullahs" 21 and "Death to the Dictator" 11 indicates that the clergy as a class is held responsible for the nation's misery. The seminary (howzeh) is the factory that produces the ruling class; burning it is an attack on the regime's reproduction mechanism.
4.3 The Collapse of the "Reformist" Buffer
In previous cycles (1999, 2009), there was a belief that the system could be reformed, or that there were "good clerics" vs. "bad clerics." The 2025–2026 uprising demonstrates the erasure of this distinction. The silence or complicity of the clerical establishment in the violent crackdowns of 2019 and 2022 has left them with no social capital. Even in Qom, the center of religious learning, protesters chanted pro-monarchy slogans, signaling a total loss of faith in theocratic governance.12
Part V: The State's Narrative — "Mobarizoun," ISIS, and Foreign Plots
The Iranian state, acknowledging the burning of mosques, has refused to interpret it as domestic dissent. Instead, it has constructed a narrative of foreign invasion and terrorism to justify a military-grade response.
5.1 The "Mobarizoun Popular Front" (MPF)
A key element of the regime's 2026 narrative is the emergence of the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF). The regime and its affiliated media claim that this group, a coalition of Baloch separatists, has "infiltrated" the protests to turn them into an armed insurgency.22
Regime Claim: The MPF is accused of killing security officers and coordinating the burning of mosques to incite sectarian war (Sunni vs. Shia). The regime alleges that the MPF brings together veteran militant groups like Jaish al-Adl under a new banner to dismantle the state.22
Reality Check: While Baloch militant groups exist, analysts suggest the MPF narrative is being amplified by the regime as a "boogeyman" to categorize all violent resistance as terrorism. The "Mobarizoun Shock" narrative allows the IRGC to deploy heavy ground forces to provinces like Kermanshah and Kurdistan, treating protesters as "ISIS-style" combatants rather than civilians.17
5.2 The "ISIS-Style" Framing
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi explicitly compared the protesters' tactics to ISIS (Daesh), citing the burning of mosques and the alleged killing of wounded people in ambulances.17 By framing the unrest as an "attack on Islam" (burning Qurans and mosques), the regime attempts to:
Rally the Religious Base: Mobilize conservative Iranians who might be suffering economically but would never support "sacrilege."
Justify Extreme Violence: If the enemy is "ISIS," then the use of live ammunition, artillery, and execution is justified.
Discredit the Opposition: Paint the secular, democratic opposition as barbarians destroying cultural heritage.
5.3 The "12-Day War" Context
The regime argues that the protests are a "continuation" of the 12-Day War by other means. Officials claim that Israel and the U.S., having failed to destroy Iran militarily, have activated "sleeper cells" to burn mosques and destabilize the country from within.17 This externalization of the crisis is a standard survival strategy for the Islamic Republic, allowing them to frame the burning of domestic institutions as acts of foreign aggression.
Part VI: International Repercussions — The World Watches the Fire
The internal burning of mosques has generated a complex international response, complicating the regime's ability to suppress the uprising.
6.1 The "Trump Factor" and U.S. Intervention
The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has fundamentally altered the calculus. Trump's explicit threat to "shoot at Iran" if protesters are killed 26 has emboldened the street but also panicked the regime.
Regime Paranoia: The burning of mosques is cited by the regime as proof that protesters are "American foot soldiers" paving the way for invasion. This narrative is used to rally nationalist sentiment against a "Syria-style" civil war scenario.
Protester Calculation: Some analysts suggest that the extreme violence (burning mosques) is intended to provoke the very crackdown that would trigger U.S. intervention.2 By crossing red lines, protesters may be forcing the international community's hand.
6.2 The Weakened Axis of Resistance
The chants of "Not Gaza, Not Lebanon" while mosques burn highlight the collapse of Iran's soft power. The "12-Day War" and the degradation of Hezbollah have left the Iranian regime appearing weak. The domestic population, seeing this weakness, has attacked the symbols of the regime's ideology (the mosque) precisely because the regime can no longer project invincibility abroad.1
6.3 The European Response
The European Union has reacted with threats of new sanctions, specifically targeting the IRGC. Germany and other EU nations have condemned the violence as a "sign of weakness" and are looking into expanding the anti-terror sanctions regime to include those responsible for the crackdown.29 The burning of mosques has not alienated Western support for the protesters; rather, it has been interpreted by Western governments as a symptom of the regime's loss of legitimacy.
Part VII: Conclusion & Outlook
The burning of over 50 mosques and seminaries in January 2026 is a watershed moment in Iranian history. It signifies that the Islamic Republic has lost the "Islamic" protection that once shielded it from the rawest forms of public anger.
Why did it happen?
Militarization: Mosques were converted into Basij bases, making them legitimate military targets in the eyes of protesters.
Delegitimization: The economic collapse broke the social contract; the clergy were seen as the architects of poverty, stripping their institutions of sacredness.
Mobilization: The "ISIS" narrative allowed the regime to unify its security core, while the "Mobarizoun" narrative justified the use of heavy weapons.
When did it happen?
The arson campaign escalated rapidly between January 1 and January 9, 2026, coinciding with the Rial's freefall and the "Bloodiest Day" of state repression on January 7.
The fires in the prayer halls of Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad have reduced the conflict to its most elemental form: a struggle for survival between a militarized theocracy and a population that has lost everything, including its fear of God's self-appointed representatives. The trajectory of the conflict points toward increased polarization. As the "taboo" of attacking religious sites has been broken, future unrest will likely see even more direct assaults on clerical infrastructure. The regime, cornered and viewing the protests as a foreign-backed "hybrid war" involving the MPF, is likely to rely increasingly on the IRGC Ground Forces rather than the police, transitioning from riot control to counter-insurgency operations. The burning of the mosques was not the end of the crisis, but the signal of a new, darker phase in the Iranian struggle.
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