The End of an Axis: An Analysis of Turkish-Israeli Relations and Ankara's Engagement with Regional Adversaries

Executive Summary

This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the Republic of Türkiye and the State of Israel, charting its dramatic trajectory from a Cold War-era partnership of convenience to a contemporary state of profound geopolitical rivalry. It further dissects Türkiye's complex and often contradictory engagement with Israel's primary regional adversaries: Hamas, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Syria. The analysis spans from Türkiye's historic recognition of Israel in 1949 to the complete rupture of diplomatic and economic ties in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza.

The Turkish-Israeli relationship was founded not on shared values but on the pragmatic alignment of strategic interests. During the Cold War, a mutual perception of threat from Soviet-backed pan-Arab nationalism forged a covert but effective "peripheral alliance." This partnership reached its zenith in the 1990s, a "golden age" defined by overt military-to-military cooperation, extensive defense industry contracts, and deep intelligence sharing. However, this alliance was fundamentally a construct of Türkiye's secular, pro-Western military establishment, rendering it structurally vulnerable to shifts in the country's domestic political landscape.

The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, and subsequently the consolidation of power under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marked a definitive turning point. The AKP's populist-Islamist ideology systematically dismantled the pillars of the old relationship. Foreign policy was repurposed as a tool for domestic mobilization, with the Palestinian cause and a confrontational stance toward Israel serving as low-cost, high-reward strategies to energize the party's conservative-religious base. The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident served as a fatal rupture, institutionalizing a deep-seated mistrust from which the relationship never fully recovered.

Concurrently, Ankara cultivated a multifaceted foreign policy toward Israel's adversaries. Its relationship with Hamas is one of ideological affinity and strategic patronage, providing the group with political legitimacy, a safe haven, and material support, which stands as the single greatest obstacle to any meaningful reconciliation with Israel. In contrast, its engagement with Iran is a masterclass in "managed rivalry"—a geopolitical symbiosis where intense competition in proxy arenas like Syria and Iraq is carefully counterbalanced by shared economic interests in energy and a mutual strategic imperative to contain Kurdish nationalism. The relationship with Syria represents the most dramatic policy reversal, evolving from the "zero problems" bonhomie of the 2000s to a bitter proxy war against the Assad regime, and finally, to a new era of direct Turkish patronage following Assad's fall in late 2024.

The report's central thesis is that the convergence of the AKP's ideology with shifting regional power dynamics has fundamentally and perhaps irrevocably altered Türkiye's strategic posture. The post-October 7 environment, in particular, has accelerated a regional realignment. A shared perception of unchecked Israeli aggression has fostered an unprecedented convergence between Türkiye and its former rivals, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, creating the potential for a new "triangular powerhouse" to counterbalance both Israeli and Iranian influence. While a direct, intentional war between Türkiye and Israel remains unlikely, the risk of an unintended military clash, particularly in the Syrian theater where their strategic interests now directly collide, has reached a critical and dangerous new level.

Part I: The Turkish-Israeli Axis: A History of Strategic Convergence and Ideological Divergence

Chapter 1: The Foundation of a Pragmatic Relationship (1949–1990)

The relationship between Türkiye and Israel was, from its inception, a product of geopolitical calculation rather than ideological kinship. Its foundations were laid not in shared values but in the cold, hard soil of Cold War strategy, where shared threats and a mutual alignment with the Western bloc created a partnership of convenience. This pragmatic origin story is crucial to understanding the relationship's later fragility; lacking a deeper, values-based anchor, it proved exceptionally vulnerable to the seismic shifts in Türkiye's strategic calculus and governing ideology that would come decades later.

Türkiye's Historic Recognition

Ankara's decision in March 1949 to formally recognize the State of Israel was a landmark moment, making Türkiye the first Muslim-majority country to do so.1 However, this act was far from an enthusiastic endorsement of the Zionist project. On the contrary, Türkiye's initial posture had been one of caution and even opposition. Ankara voted against the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine and adopted a "wait and see" policy, remaining strictly neutral during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.2 It even prevented Turkish volunteers from joining Arab forces, limiting its support to a small training team and some supplies for the Palestinians.5 When Israel applied for UN membership, Türkiye abstained from the vote.5

The recognition, coming nearly a year after Israel's declaration of independence, was a calculated geopolitical move. Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak defended the decision by pointing out that Israel was a reality recognized by over thirty other nations and that the Arabs themselves were negotiating with it.5 The primary driver, however, was Türkiye's overarching foreign policy objective: a "safety search" against the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, which inexorably pulled Ankara into the Western orbit and toward its ultimate goal of NATO membership.4 Aligning with the viewpoints of the United States and Europe on Israel was a critical component of this broader pro-Western strategy.4

The Cold War Imperative: The "Peripheral Alliance"

The Turkish-Israeli relationship was fundamentally forged in the crucible of the Cold War. For Israel, isolated in a sea of hostile Arab nations, an alliance with non-Arab states on the periphery of the Middle East was a strategic necessity to break its diplomatic and military encirclement.1 For Türkiye, the partnership was a key element of its Western-aligned security architecture.

This convergence of interests led to the formation of a tacit, informal military partnership based on the identification of common adversaries. Both states viewed the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism in Egypt and the influence of the Ba'ath parties in Syria and Iraq as profound threats, not least because these movements were seen as proxies for Soviet entrenchment in the region.1 This shared threat perception culminated in a secret 1958 meeting between Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, which formalized a strategic pact known as the "Peripheral Alliance" or "peripheral pact".1 This covert agreement included intelligence sharing, military support, and joint public relations campaigns, creating a powerful but quiet axis against the pro-Soviet Arab nationalist bloc.2 The collapse of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq that same year only heightened the sense of urgency for Ankara, making the partnership with Israel an essential bulwark against threats from Syria and the Soviet Union.1

A Cautious and Covert Partnership

Despite this deep strategic alignment, the relationship was deliberately kept low-key and often operated in the shadows. Türkiye, acutely aware of its position in the Muslim world and its desire to maintain relations with Arab states, engaged in a constant balancing act. Diplomatic ties were initially limited to trade and transportation.1 Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which Israel joined Britain and France in attacking Egypt, Ankara recalled its minister from Tel Aviv to placate angry Arab states, initiating a "cool phase" in relations.8

However, this public distancing belied a persistent, if covert, continuity in cooperation. Ankara clarified to Israel that the diplomatic downgrade would not impact commercial ties, which continued, albeit unpublicized.5 Similarly, intelligence cooperation through the Mossad, which had operated a station in Türkiye since the early 1950s, was uninterrupted.5 This pattern of public coolness and private cooperation became a hallmark of the relationship. Türkiye would join Arab condemnations of Israel, such as after the 1967 Six-Day War, but would carefully moderate its position, for instance, by abstaining from votes that labeled Israel an "aggressor state".2 This delicate dance allowed Ankara to navigate the treacherous currents of Middle Eastern politics, maintaining its crucial security partnership with Israel while avoiding a complete rupture with the Arab world. The foundation of the relationship was thus established: one of strategic pragmatism, driven by external threats and devoid of any deeper ideological bond, a characteristic that would define its future vulnerabilities.

Table 1: Timeline of Key Events in Turkish-Israeli Relations (1949–Present)

Year

Event

Significance

Relationship Temperature

1949

Türkiye recognizes the State of Israel.

Türkiye becomes the first Muslim-majority nation to recognize Israel, a key step in its pro-Western alignment. 1

Cool

1958

Secret "Peripheral Pact" is formed.

Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Menderes establish a covert military and intelligence alliance against shared threats (Syria, Nasser's Egypt). 1

Warm (Covert)

1980

Diplomatic missions upgraded to Embassy level.

A sign of slowly warming and normalizing ties after decades of a low-profile relationship. 2

Cool

1996

Landmark military cooperation agreements signed.

The relationship enters a "golden age" with overt agreements on military training, defense industry, and technology transfer. 1

Warm

2002

Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins elections.

The rise of an Islamist-rooted party marks the beginning of a fundamental ideological shift in Turkish foreign policy. 10

Warm

2009

Erdoğan's "one-minute" outburst at Davos.

A public and symbolic turning point, signaling the AKP's new confrontational stance toward Israel. 9

Cool

2010

Mavi Marmara flotilla raid.

Israeli commandos kill ten Turkish activists, causing a complete rupture in relations and institutionalizing deep mistrust. 12

Hostile

2016

Reconciliation agreement reached.

A transactional normalization of ties, driven by regional shifts and economic interests, but failing to resolve underlying ideological rifts. 7

Cool

2018

Ambassadors withdrawn again.

Relations are downgraded following clashes in Gaza and the U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem.

Cold

2022

Full diplomatic relations restored.

A brief period of rapprochement driven by Türkiye's broader effort to mend ties with regional powers. 2

Cool

2023-24

All diplomatic and trade ties severed.

Following the October 7 attacks and Gaza war, Türkiye completely cuts ties, calling Israel a "terrorist state" and backing Hamas. 2

Hostile

Chapter 2: The Golden Age of Strategic Partnership (1991–2002)

The decade following the end of the Cold War witnessed the zenith of the Turkish-Israeli relationship, a period often referred to as its "golden age." With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic rationale for the partnership shifted but did not diminish. The covert alliance of the past transformed into an overt, robust, and deeply institutionalized strategic partnership. This alliance, however, was fundamentally a military-to-military construct, driven and guaranteed by Türkiye's powerful secularist establishment. This very structure, which gave the partnership its strength in the 1990s, also contained the seeds of its destruction, as its survival became contingent on the military's continued dominance over the Turkish political sphere—a dominance that would soon be challenged.

Overt Military and Defense Cooperation

After Türkiye restored full diplomatic relations with Israel in December 1991, the partnership began to flourish openly in the political, military, and economic spheres.1 The relationship's centerpiece was an unprecedented level of military and defense cooperation, formalized through two landmark agreements in 1996. The first, signed in February, focused on military cooperation and training.8 The second, signed in August, established a framework for cooperation in the defense industry, including research, development, and technology transfer.1

These agreements set in motion a dynamic and multifaceted military relationship. Hundreds of Turkish officers received training in Israel, and Israeli officers came to Türkiye.9 The Israeli Air Force gained access to Türkiye's vast airspace for training exercises, a crucial advantage given Israel's limited geography.8 In return, Israel was invited to participate in air force drills alongside NATO members, a significant strategic gain.9 This entente culminated in a formal strategic partnership that included joint military exercises and intelligence sharing, solidifying an axis that was viewed as a critical buffer against regional threats.1

Key Modernization Projects

The defense industry cooperation was particularly significant, involving more than twenty major projects.9 Israel became a key supplier for the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. Notable projects included the comprehensive upgrade of Türkiye's fleets of American-made F-4 Phantom and F-5 fighter jets, as well as its M-60 tanks.1

This collaboration was mutually beneficial. For Türkiye, it provided access to high-quality, advanced military technology that its traditional Western allies, including the United States, were often reluctant to sell due to political considerations.9 This allowed Ankara to maintain a qualitative military edge in a volatile region. For Israel, Türkiye became a lucrative market for its burgeoning defense industry, generating significant revenue.9 More importantly, the partnership provided immense psychological and strategic comfort, breaking Israel's sense of regional isolation by forging a strong bond with a major regional power.9

Intelligence and Operational Synergy

The intelligence partnership, which had been active since 1958, reached a new level of prominence and institutionalization in the early 1990s. Formal agreements were signed between Israel's Mossad and Türkiye's National Intelligence Organization (MİT), creating a deep synergy.7 This cooperation was driven by shared threats, particularly from Syria and Iran, which were known sponsors of terrorist organizations that targeted both countries. Syria, for instance, backed the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Türkiye's primary security concern, while both Syria and Iran sponsored Hamas and Hezbollah.1

Under these agreements, Türkiye reportedly served as a vital operational hub for the Mossad. Israeli intelligence agents were allegedly able to enter and leave the country with their equipment without undergoing standard border and customs procedures, using Türkiye as a safe buffer zone for missions in neighboring countries.7 This deep-seated cooperation underscored the perception of the two nations as the region's primary non-Arab, pro-Western powers, united against common adversaries.

The Military as Guarantor

The ultimate architect and protector of this strategic alliance was the Turkish military. In the 1990s, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) wielded immense political power as the guardian of the country's secular, pro-Western identity. The relationship with Israel was seen as a cornerstone of this identity and a vital component of national security. The military's commitment to the alliance was so absolute that it superseded the authority of the elected civilian government.

This dynamic was starkly illustrated in 1997. When Türkiye's first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, began to explore a rapprochement with Iran, a move that threatened the strategic alignment with Israel, the military intervened. Through a process later dubbed the "post-modern coup," the military forced Erbakan to resign, leading to the formation of a more pro-Western government.1 This event sent an unmistakable message: the strategic connection with Israel was a non-negotiable tenet of Turkish state policy, guaranteed by the armed forces. This reliance on the military, however, created a critical vulnerability. The alliance was not a product of broad political consensus but rather an elite pact enforced by the generals. When a new political force, the AKP, emerged with the goal of establishing civilian supremacy over the military, the very foundation of the Turkish-Israeli golden age was destined to crumble.

Chapter 3: The AKP Shift and the Erosion of Trust (2002–2010)

The election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in November 2002 marked the beginning of a fundamental transformation in Turkish politics and, consequently, its foreign policy. While the initial years of AKP rule were characterized by a continuation of pro-Western policies, a deeper ideological reorientation was underway. This shift, driven by a blend of pan-Islamist ambition and a sophisticated use of foreign policy for domestic populist mobilization, systematically eroded the foundations of the strategic partnership with Israel. The deterioration of relations was not merely a reaction to specific regional events but a structural outcome of the AKP's new political project, which prioritized a different vision of Türkiye's role in the world—one in which a confrontational stance toward Israel became a political asset.

The Evolution of AKP Foreign Policy

The AKP's foreign policy did not emerge fully formed but evolved through distinct phases. The first phase (2002–2007) can be described as one of "liberal internationalism".10 During this period, the party made Türkiye's accession to the European Union a cornerstone of its agenda. This focus on the EU provided a powerful framework for enacting domestic reforms—the "harmonization packages"—that aimed to strengthen democracy, expand human rights, and, crucially, curb the political power of the military establishment.11 By aligning with the EU, the AKP, a party with Islamist roots, successfully presented itself as a modern, "conservative democrat" force, securing its legitimacy both at home and abroad.11

However, as the EU accession process stalled and the AKP consolidated its power domestically, a second phase of "civilizational expansionism" began to take shape around 2008.10 This new orientation, heavily influenced by then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's doctrine of "Strategic Depth," envisioned Türkiye not merely as a junior partner of the West but as a central power in its own right—a regional leader with historical and cultural ties to the Balkans, the Caucasus, and, most importantly, the Middle East.10 This "neo-Ottoman" vision was underpinned by a policy of "zero problems with neighbors," which sought to resolve disputes and build influence through soft power, economic interdependence, and proactive diplomacy.18 While initially aimed at integration, this policy gradually morphed into a more assertive, pan-Islamist, and expansionist foreign policy.10

Foreign Policy as a Tool of Domestic Populism

A defining characteristic of Turkish foreign policy under President Erdoğan is its deep entanglement with domestic politics. More than any previous government, the AKP has subordinated foreign policy to its domestic agenda, deploying it as a powerful tool of populist governance.10 International relations became a theater for mobilizing popular support, tarnishing political opponents as foreign agents, and diverting public attention from economic difficulties or domestic failures.10

This strategy was fueled by potent appeals to both nationalist and religious sentiments among the AKP's core electorate.10 By framing foreign policy decisions as acts of restoring Türkiye's national honor and asserting its rightful place as a leader of the Muslim world, Erdoğan cultivated an image of a strong, defiant leader standing up to external powers.10 This populist framing proved highly effective, particularly as it allowed the government to attribute any setbacks, whether economic or diplomatic, to the machinations of hostile foreign actors, thereby reinforcing a narrative of a proud nation besieged by jealous Western powers.10

The Palestinian Cause as a Centerpiece

Within this new foreign policy framework, the Palestinian issue was elevated from a matter of diplomatic concern to a central, emotive, and ideological cause. This represented a profound departure from the traditionally balanced stance of previous secular governments.22 The AKP government positioned itself as the most vocal and passionate champion of the Palestinian people, a move that resonated deeply with its conservative base and with the broader "Arab street".10

This shift inevitably placed Türkiye on a collision course with Israel. As Ankara moved from the role of a neutral mediator—a role it had played in indirect Syria-Israel talks as recently as 2008—to that of a partisan advocate for the Palestinian cause, the strategic logic that had underpinned the bilateral relationship for decades began to dissolve.15

Early Flashpoints

The simmering ideological divergence erupted into open diplomatic hostility following Israel's Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Türkiye's fierce condemnation of the military operation marked a new, more confrontational tone.7 This new posture was dramatically showcased to the world at the January 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos. During a panel discussion, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan engaged in a heated exchange with Israeli President Shimon Peres over the Gaza operation, famously declaring "one minute" before storming off the stage.9 This act, while shocking to the diplomatic community, was a masterstroke of political theater, cementing Erdoğan's status as a hero in the Muslim world and a powerful leader to his supporters at home.

The Davos incident was a symbolic turning point, after which the deterioration accelerated. In October 2009, Türkiye took the concrete step of barring Israel from participating in the Anatolian Eagle military exercise, a joint drill that had been a cornerstone of the military partnership.7 This decision effectively signaled the end of the "golden age" of military cooperation, demonstrating that the AKP's ideological reorientation was now actively dismantling the core components of the strategic alliance. The trust that had been built over decades was rapidly eroding, setting the stage for a complete rupture.

Chapter 4: The Mavi Marmara Rupture (2010)

If the Davos incident was the symbolic turning point in the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations, the Gaza flotilla raid of May 31, 2010, was the definitive rupture. This single, violent event transformed a relationship of growing political friction into one of open hostility and deep-seated national animosity. The incident, which resulted in the deaths of Turkish citizens at the hands of the Israeli military, transcended the realm of diplomatic dispute. It became a national tragedy for Türkiye and a confirmation of state-sponsored hostility for Israel, creating a psychological and political chasm from which the bilateral relationship has never fully recovered.

The Incident

In the pre-dawn hours of May 31, 2010, commandos from the Israeli Navy's elite Shayetet 13 unit boarded the MV Mavi Marmara in international waters, approximately 70-80 miles off the coast of Gaza.25 The Mavi Marmara was the flagship of a six-vessel "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" carrying some 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and over 700 activists from dozens of countries.25 The flotilla was organized by a coalition of NGOs, with a leading role played by the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), an organization with close ties to the Turkish government and viewed with suspicion by Israeli and Western intelligence for its alleged links to extremist groups.28 The stated goal was to break Israel's naval blockade of the Hamas-run Gaza Strip.12

The Israeli raid was a chaotic and violent affair. Masked commandos rappelled onto the ship's deck from helicopters and boarded from fast-attack boats, using stun grenades and tear gas.25 The ensuing confrontation resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish activists; a tenth activist, who had been in a coma for four years, died in 2014.12 At least 50 other activists and ten Israeli soldiers were wounded.25

Conflicting Narratives

Immediately following the raid, two starkly different narratives emerged, each vehemently defended by its proponents. The Israeli government stated that its commandos were met with brutal, premeditated violence upon boarding. It claimed the soldiers, initially armed with non-lethal paintball guns, were ambushed by activists wielding metal bars, knives, and clubs, and that some activists had even seized handguns from the commandos.25 According to this account, live fire was used only in self-defense after the soldiers' lives were endangered.25

Conversely, activists on board and the Turkish government asserted that Israeli forces had fired on the ship before boarding and used excessive and indiscriminate force against unarmed civilians.25 They described the Israeli actions as a massacre, with passengers being shot at close range, including in the head.26 This narrative was later supported by a UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) report which concluded that the circumstances of at least six of the deaths were "consistent with an extra-legal, arbitrary and summary execution".30 The seizure of all cameras and recording devices by Israeli forces, with only selective footage later released, made independent verification of either account extremely difficult.31

International Reaction and Investigations

The incident triggered a wave of international outrage and widespread condemnation of Israel's actions.12 In response to the global pressure, two major international inquiries were launched. A fact-finding mission by the UNHRC deemed the Israeli raid illegal, disproportionate, and characterized by an "unacceptable level of brutality".30

A separate panel of inquiry appointed by the UN Secretary-General, known as the Palmer Commission, produced a more nuanced report in September 2011. The Palmer Report concluded that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza was legal and that the flotilla organizers had acted recklessly.12 However, it also found that the decision to board the vessels with such substantial force was "excessive and unreasonable," and that the loss of life was unacceptable.12 Israel largely accepted the Palmer Report's findings, while Türkiye furiously rejected it as "null and void," insisting on the illegality of the blockade itself.12 The Israeli government's own Turkel Commission inquiry, unsurprisingly, exonerated the state and military of wrongdoing, blaming the violence on the activists.13

Diplomatic Fallout

The diplomatic consequences were immediate and severe, plunging Turkish-Israeli relations to their lowest point in history. Ankara immediately recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv.12 It suspended all military agreements, effectively ending decades of defense cooperation, and downgraded diplomatic ties to the level of second secretary.7 Türkiye laid down three conditions for normalization: a formal apology from Israel, compensation for the victims' families, and the lifting of the Gaza blockade.7

Israel initially refused to apologize, leading to a prolonged and bitter standoff.12 It was not until March 2013, under heavy pressure from U.S. President Barack Obama, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu telephoned Erdoğan to apologize for the "operational errors" that led to the loss of life.12 While this apology paved the way for compensation talks and an eventual, short-lived normalization agreement in 2016, the damage was irreparable. The Mavi Marmara incident had fundamentally reframed the relationship in the public consciousness of both nations. For the Turkish public and its government, it was a national wound, a symbol of Israeli aggression that cemented a narrative of martyrdom and victimhood. For Israel, it was the ultimate confirmation that AKP-led Türkiye was no longer a strategic partner but an ideologically hostile actor, willing to sanction and support provocative actions that directly challenged Israeli security. The deep-seated mistrust institutionalized by the raid has poisoned the relationship ever since, ensuring that any subsequent attempts at rapprochement would be transactional, fragile, and ultimately fleeting.

Part II: Türkiye and the 'Axis of Resistance': A Complex Web of Rivalry and Rapprochement

While Türkiye's relationship with Israel devolved from partnership to rivalry, its engagement with Israel's primary adversaries—the informal coalition often termed the "Axis of Resistance"—followed a far more complex and situational logic. Ankara's foreign policy in this domain has been anything but monolithic. It has blended ideological affinity with Hamas, a pragmatic and managed rivalry with Iran, and a dramatic cycle of patronage, proxy war, and renewed patronage with Syria. This intricate web of relationships reveals a Turkish foreign policy driven by a desire to project power, balance regional competitors, and secure its own national interests, often leading to actions that are contradictory yet strategically coherent within the AKP's worldview.

Chapter 5: Ankara and Hamas: Ideological Affinity and Strategic Patronage

Türkiye's relationship with Hamas is arguably the most ideologically driven component of its contemporary Middle East policy and the single greatest impediment to any meaningful, long-term reconciliation with Israel. Under the AKP, Ankara has transformed from a neutral party into Hamas's most significant state-level supporter outside the Arab world. This patronage is not merely diplomatic; it is a strategic act of providing political legitimacy, a safe haven, and material support to a group designated as a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States, and the European Union. This policy serves as a primary vehicle for Türkiye to project its influence in the Palestinian arena and to assert its leadership in the broader Muslim world.

Official Stance and Political Support

The Turkish government makes a clear distinction between its view of Hamas and that of the West. Ankara does not classify Hamas as a terrorist organization.29 On the contrary, President Erdoğan has consistently and publicly defended the group's legitimacy. In 2010, he described Hamas as "resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land".32 Following the October 7, 2023, attacks, he doubled down on this position, stating, "Hamas is not a terrorist organization, it is a liberation group, 'mujahideen' waging a battle to protect its lands and people".29

This rhetorical support is backed by high-level diplomatic engagement. The Turkish government first officially met with Hamas leaders in February 2006, following the group's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections.32 Since then, senior Hamas officials, including political chief Ismail Haniyeh (until his assassination in 2024) and former chief Khaled Mashal, have been frequent and welcome visitors to Ankara, often meeting directly with President Erdoğan.32 This open embrace by a major NATO member provides Hamas with a degree of international legitimacy that is invaluable to its efforts to resist diplomatic isolation.

Safe Haven and Operational Hub

Türkiye's support extends beyond the diplomatic realm. Since a 2011 prisoner exchange deal for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, in which Israel agreed to release dozens of Hamas operatives to Türkiye, the country has served as a crucial safe haven and operational hub for the group.28 Senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri, a key figure in organizing operations in the West Bank, established a Hamas branch in Türkiye after leaving Syria.29

According to Israeli intelligence, Hamas has established a command post in Türkiye that it uses to recruit operatives and oversee operations across the Middle East.32 There are also credible reports that Türkiye has furnished Hamas members with Turkish passports and identity cards, facilitating their international travel and operations.29 While Hamas's presence is reportedly regulated by Turkish authorities to avoid overt military planning on its soil, the country provides a secure base for international outreach, fundraising, and coordination.33 This long-term presence has allowed Hamas to embed itself within Türkiye, with many operatives receiving Turkish citizenship.33

Financial and Material Support

Ankara's support has also included direct and indirect financial and material assistance. In 2012, the Turkish government reportedly donated $300 million to Hamas as the group was establishing its presence in the country.29 Beyond direct state funding, Turkish non-governmental and quasi-state entities have been implicated in supporting Hamas. The IHH, the same organization that organized the Mavi Marmara flotilla, has been accused of transferring funds to its branch in Gaza, which are then used by Hamas to finance its activities.29

Furthermore, SADAT, a private Turkish military contractor with close ties to President Erdoğan, is believed by Israeli security officials to be involved in supplying Hamas with weapons and materiel.29 In 2017, the Gaza coordinator for the state-funded Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) was arrested by Israel for allegedly diverting funds to Hamas's military wing.28

Impact on Israel-Türkiye Relations

Türkiye's unwavering support for Hamas is a fundamental and non-negotiable point of conflict with Israel. Israeli officials have repeatedly stated that a normalization of relations is impossible as long as Hamas's military and operational activities continue on Turkish soil.33 The relationship is a direct challenge to Israel's security and its international efforts to isolate the group. Following the October 7 attacks, Erdoğan's vocal support for Hamas and his condemnation of Israel as a "terrorist state" led directly to the final severing of all diplomatic and trade ties, demonstrating that, for the current Turkish government, ideological solidarity with Hamas takes precedence over the strategic and economic benefits of a relationship with Israel.2 By championing Hamas, Ankara is not only pursuing an ideological agenda but also engaging in a strategic power play, seeking to outflank traditional Arab powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia—who view Hamas's parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, as an existential threat—and claim the mantle of leadership on the Palestinian issue.

Chapter 6: Ankara and Tehran: A Geopolitical Symbiosis of Competition and Cooperation

The relationship between Türkiye and Iran is a study in geopolitical pragmatism. It is a deeply dualistic and complex partnership, characterized by intense rivalry in regional proxy arenas, counterbalanced by powerful shared economic interests and an overriding mutual desire to contain Kurdish nationalism. While Israel views Iran as its primary existential threat, Türkiye has cultivated a relationship that can be best described as "managed rivalry." Both regional powers tacitly agree to compartmentalize their competition, engaging in fierce struggles for influence in Syria and Iraq while carefully avoiding direct confrontation. This approach ensures that their shared interests—particularly in energy and security—are not jeopardized, creating a surprisingly resilient, albeit perpetually tense, regional equilibrium.

Economic Interdependence

The bedrock of the Turkish-Iranian relationship is economic interdependence, with energy serving as the primary anchor.34 Iran is a strategic source of energy for Türkiye, ranking as its second-largest supplier of natural gas (behind Russia) and a key provider of crude oil.34 This energy linkage is vital for Türkiye's energy security and diversification efforts. For Iran, which has been crippled by international sanctions, Türkiye is its biggest natural gas customer and an essential economic gateway to European markets, providing a crucial financial lifeline.34

This mutual dependency has fostered a robust trade relationship that both countries aim to expand significantly, with a stated goal of tripling the annual trade volume to $30 billion.35 Even when faced with U.S. sanctions on Iran, the two neighbors have historically found ways to continue trade, demonstrating a shared commitment to preserving their economic ties.38 This strong economic foundation often acts as a powerful brake on geopolitical tensions, incentivizing both sides to manage their disputes rather than allow them to escalate into a full-blown rupture.35

Arenas of Geopolitical Rivalry

Despite their economic partnership, Türkiye and Iran are fierce geopolitical competitors, vying for influence across the Middle East and the Caucasus.

• Syria: This has been the most prominent arena for their proxy conflict. For over a decade, Iran was the principal military and financial backer of the Bashar al-Assad regime, deploying its Revolutionary Guards and proxy militias like Hezbollah to ensure its survival.36 In stark contrast, Türkiye was the main patron of the Sunni opposition forces seeking to overthrow Assad.40 Following the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, this rivalry has entered a new phase, with Türkiye emerging as the dominant external power in Damascus, while Iran's influence has been significantly curtailed.40

• Iraq: Both countries have long competed for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Iran exerts considerable sway through its support for powerful Shia political factions and militias.40 Türkiye, on the other hand, has sought to counterbalance this by backing Sunni and Turkmen groups and maintaining a strong relationship with the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq.39 Turkish military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq are also a point of friction with Iran-aligned militias.40

• The Caucasus: Türkiye's unwavering military and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan, particularly during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, has been viewed with alarm in Tehran.42 Iran perceives the close Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance and Ankara's promotion of "pan-Turkist" ideas as a challenge to its own influence in the region. Türkiye's push for the Zangezur Corridor, a proposed transport route that would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, is seen by Iran as a strategic threat that could cut off its direct land access to Armenia and disrupt its traditional trade routes.42

Strategic Convergence: The Kurdish Issue

The most significant area of strategic convergence, and the strongest glue holding the relationship together, is the shared threat posed by Kurdish nationalism. Both Türkiye and Iran have sizable Kurdish minorities and have long battled separatist movements—the PKK in Türkiye and its Iranian affiliate, PJAK, in Iran. The prospect of an independent Kurdish state on their borders is considered an existential threat by both Ankara and Tehran.34

This shared interest has led to consistent, if often unpublicized, security cooperation. They have a mutual goal of thwarting any attempts to establish a sovereign Kurdish entity in either Iraq or Syria.35 This common cause often forces them to set aside their other rivalries and coordinate their policies, creating a powerful incentive to maintain open channels of communication even when they are on opposing sides of other regional conflicts.

Recent Tensions and Pragmatic Management

The relationship is not without its strains. Türkiye's decision to host a NATO missile defense shield in 2011 caused a major crisis with Iran, which viewed the system as a direct threat.42 More recently, in October 2025, President Erdoğan's sudden decree to freeze the assets of Iranian individuals and entities linked to Tehran's nuclear program, in a symbolic move to align with UN sanctions, provoked shock and sharp criticism across Iranian media.38

Despite these flare-ups, the pattern of managed rivalry holds. The two nations have demonstrated a remarkable ability to engage in fierce competition while simultaneously pursuing cooperation. They participated in the Astana peace process for Syria, a mechanism that allowed them (along with Russia) to manage the conflict and de-escalate tensions even while backing opposing sides on the battlefield.34 This compartmentalization is the defining feature of their relationship: a pragmatic, non-ideological partnership where core national interests consistently override geopolitical disagreements, allowing them to remain both rivals and partners at the same time.

Table 2: Comparison of Turkish-Iranian Relations: Cooperation vs. Competition

Arenas of Cooperation / Convergence

Arenas of Competition / Rivalry

Energy & Economic Ties: Iran is a strategic supplier of natural gas and oil to Türkiye, creating strong economic interdependence. Both sides aim to significantly increase bilateral trade, which serves as a stabilizing factor. 34

Syria: The primary theater of proxy conflict. Iran was the key backer of the Assad regime, while Türkiye was the main patron of the Sunni opposition. The rivalry continues in the post-Assad era over shaping the new order. 36

Containment of Kurdish Separatism: A shared, existential security interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Both countries oppose the PKK and its regional affiliates (PYD/YPG, PJAK). 36

Iraq: Competition for influence over political factions. Iran supports Shia militias and parties, while Türkiye backs Sunni and Turkmen groups and maintains close ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 40

Limiting External Influence: A mutual, though differently motivated, interest in reducing the long-term military and political footprint of the United States in the region. 35

South Caucasus: Türkiye's strong alliance with Azerbaijan and its push for the Zangezur Corridor are viewed by Iran as a strategic threat to its regional influence and trade routes. 42

Pragmatic Diplomacy: A demonstrated ability to compartmentalize disagreements and maintain high-level dialogue (e.g., Astana Process) to manage conflicts and avoid direct confrontation. 34

Regional Leadership: A broader competition for ideological and geopolitical influence across the Middle East, with Türkiye promoting a Sunni-centric model and Iran leading the Shia "Axis of Resistance." 39

Chapter 7: Ankara and Damascus: From 'Zero Problems' to Proxy War and Patronage

The trajectory of Turkish-Syrian relations over the past quarter-century represents one of the most dramatic and complete foreign policy reversals in the modern Middle East. Under the AKP, Ankara transformed its relationship with Damascus from one of its closest regional partnerships into a bitter and protracted proxy war, driven by an ideological commitment to regime change. However, as the Syrian conflict evolved, this ideological goal was subordinated to the overriding security imperative of crushing Kurdish autonomy. The eventual fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, facilitated by Turkish-backed forces, has now ushered in a third, unprecedented phase: one of direct Turkish patronage over the new Syrian state, positioning Ankara as the primary arbiter of Syria's future.

The Rapprochement Era (c. 2002–2011)

For most of the late 20th century, relations between Türkiye and Syria were fraught with tension. The core disputes were longstanding and seemingly intractable: Syria's refusal to recognize Türkiye's 1939 annexation of the Hatay province (which Damascus still shows on its maps as Syrian territory), bitter disagreements over water rights from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and, most critically, Syria's active support for the PKK, which it allowed to train and operate from its territory.47 This last issue brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1998, a crisis that was only averted when Damascus expelled PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.47

The rise of the AKP and its "Zero Problems with Neighbors" doctrine catalyzed a remarkable thaw. Beginning in the early 2000s, Ankara and Damascus embarked on an energetic rapprochement. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a historic first visit to Türkiye in 2004, followed by the signing of a free trade agreement.23 The relationship blossomed rapidly, encompassing the removal of visa requirements, the establishment of a Strategic Cooperation Council, and even joint cabinet meetings.23 The trust between the two governments grew so strong that Türkiye began to act as a mediator in indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel in 2008.23 The partnership extended to the security sphere, with the two armies conducting their first-ever joint military maneuvers in 2009, a move described as a testament to their "ever-expanding cooperation".47

The Syrian Civil War: A Complete Reversal

The Arab Spring uprising that began in Syria in March 2011 shattered this carefully constructed partnership. Initially, President Erdoğan attempted to leverage his close personal relationship with Assad, urging him to enact democratic reforms to quell the protests.23 When Assad responded with a brutal crackdown, Erdoğan felt personally betrayed and politically snubbed. By the summer of 2011, Ankara had completely abandoned its former ally, with Erdoğan developing what was described as a "political obsession" with overthrowing the Syrian president.23

Türkiye swiftly became the primary external supporter of the Syrian opposition. It hosted the formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the main political opposition body, in Istanbul in October 2011.23 It also provided a safe haven, training, and logistical support for the defecting army officers who formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA).41 Ankara's policy was driven by an ideological conviction that the Assad regime was doomed and an opportunity existed to install a friendly, Sunni Islamist government—likely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood—in its place.41 This complete reversal led to the severing of diplomatic relations in March 2012 and the beginning of a long and devastating proxy war.47

Turkish Military Interventions and the Kurdish Imperative

As the Syrian war descended into a complex, multi-sided conflict, Türkiye's strategic objectives evolved. The initial, ideologically-driven goal of overthrowing Assad was gradually superseded by a more pressing, security-driven imperative: preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region along its southern border. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People's Protection Units (YPG)—which Ankara views as a direct extension of the PKK—successfully carved out a large territory known as Rojava with the backing of the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS.23

Ankara came to see this emerging Kurdish entity, or "terror corridor," as a far more immediate and existential threat to its national security than the continued survival of the Assad regime.23 This led to a major shift in Turkish military strategy. Starting in 2016, Türkiye launched a series of direct cross-border military interventions—Operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, and others. These operations were aimed not at Damascus, but at seizing territory from the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and creating a Turkish-controlled "buffer zone" in northern Syria.41 This shift demonstrated the ultimate primacy of the Kurdish issue in Turkish security calculations, even leading Ankara to briefly explore a tactical reconciliation with the Assad regime to jointly counter the SDF.50

The Post-Assad Era (Late 2024–Present)

The final chapter of this saga began in late 2024. A swift offensive by Syrian opposition forces, led by the Turkish-backed group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led to the stunning collapse of the Assad regime.41 Analysts widely agree that this offensive would have been impossible without a green light from Türkiye, which saw the opportunity to finally achieve its long-term goals: dismantling the Kurdish autonomous administration and installing a friendly government in Damascus.50

With Assad's fall, Türkiye has emerged as the most influential external actor in the new Syria.41 Ankara is now playing a central role in shaping the country's future, particularly in the security sector. In August 2025, Türkiye and the new Syrian transitional government signed a significant military cooperation agreement. This pact includes the provision of Turkish weapon systems, joint military training, intelligence sharing, and technical assistance to restructure and professionalize the Syrian Arab Army.53 This new phase of direct patronage aims to create a stable and friendly Syrian state, secure Türkiye's southern border, facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, and, most importantly, ensure that any future Syrian political settlement permanently precludes the possibility of Kurdish autonomy.

Part III: Comparative Regional Foreign Policy and Future Trajectory

Chapter 8: A Comparative Analysis of Regional Balancing Acts

Türkiye's foreign policy toward Israel and its regional adversaries is distinct, shaped by a unique blend of ideology, domestic populism, and neo-Ottoman ambition. When contrasted with the more cautious, security-driven pragmatism of Egypt and the conservative, influence-oriented approach of Saudi Arabia, the volatility of Ankara's position becomes clear. However, the post-October 7 regional landscape has introduced a powerful new dynamic: a growing convergence among these three major Sunni powers, driven by a shared perception of unchecked Israeli aggression. This emerging alignment is beginning to override past ideological rivalries, potentially heralding a significant shift in the Middle East's balance of power.

Türkiye's Approach: Ideology and Confrontation

Ankara's policy under the AKP is characterized by high-profile rhetorical confrontations and an ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause, specifically through its patronage of Hamas.22 President Erdoğan has willingly sacrificed significant economic and diplomatic ties with Israel, leveraging a tough anti-Israel stance to bolster his populist credentials at home and project Turkish leadership across the Muslim world.10 This approach is less about achieving a specific, measurable outcome in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and more about positioning Türkiye as the principal moral and political champion of the cause, thereby challenging the legitimacy of other regional actors.

Egypt's Approach: The Pragmatism of Proximity

Egypt's relationship with Israel is anchored by the 1979 Camp David Accords and is fundamentally security-driven. Cairo maintains a "cold peace," a stable but distant relationship dictated by the strategic imperatives of managing their shared border, ensuring stability in the Sinai Peninsula, and containing the volatile situation in the Gaza Strip.24 Egypt views Hamas with deep suspicion due to its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, which Cairo considers an existential domestic threat.55 Nevertheless, Egypt's geographic proximity and its role as the primary gateway to Gaza force it to engage with Hamas as a necessary interlocutor and a key mediator in cease-fire negotiations, a role it carefully guards.24 Its policy is one of cautious, pragmatic crisis management, avoiding the ideological fervor of Ankara.

Saudi Arabia's Approach: Strategic Calculation and Cautious Leadership

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has traditionally been conservative and pragmatic, using its immense financial power and its status as the custodian of Islam's holiest sites to exert influence.56 Before October 7, Riyadh was moving cautiously toward normalization with Israel, a strategic calculation driven primarily by a shared perception of Iran as the main regional threat.57 The Kingdom's approach to the Palestinian issue has been to support the Palestinian Authority and advocate for a two-state solution based on the Arab Peace Initiative, while keeping groups like Hamas at arm's length. The war in Gaza halted the normalization process and forced Riyadh to adopt a more critical public stance toward Israel, but its actions remain far more measured than Türkiye's, reflecting a desire to preserve its long-term strategic options.56

A New Convergence Against a Shared Threat

The sheer scale and duration of Israel's military campaign in Gaza, coupled with its increasingly assertive actions across the region—including strikes in Syria and Lebanon—have created what one analysis calls an "environment of growing convergence" between Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.22 The perception of an unchecked and aggressive Israel is now seen by all three major Sunni powers as a direct threat to their own strategic objectives and to regional stability.58

This shared threat perception is proving powerful enough to override the deep ideological fault lines that previously defined regional politics, most notably the rivalry between the Türkiye-Qatar axis (supporting political Islam) and the Saudi-UAE-Egypt axis (opposing it).55 This rapprochement is manifesting in tangible ways:

• High-Level Diplomatic Coordination: Ankara, Cairo, and Riyadh are engaged in high-level consultations regarding Gaza and are working on joint Palestinian-focused initiatives.58

• Renewed Military Cooperation: After a 13-year hiatus, Türkiye and Egypt have scheduled joint naval drills, a significant confidence-building measure.58

• Major Defense Deals: Türkiye is cementing its ties with Saudi Arabia through advanced military cooperation, including a potential $6 billion defense deal for warships and drones, and discussions about Egypt and Saudi Arabia joining Türkiye's strategic Kaan stealth fighter jet project.58

This emerging cooperation is aimed at creating a "deterrent bloc against Israel" and establishing a new regional security environment less dependent on external powers.58 The convergence of Türkiye's significant military and defense industrial capabilities with Saudi Arabia's economic and political weight and Egypt's demographic and geopolitical importance has the potential to create a new "triangular powerhouse".58 This strategic realignment, a direct consequence of the Gaza war, is fundamentally altering the Middle East's balance of power, creating a new pole of influence that can collectively balance against both Israel and Iran.

Table 3: Comparative Foreign Policy Stances Toward Israel: Türkiye vs. Egypt & Saudi Arabia

Policy Dimension

Türkiye

Egypt

Saudi Arabia

Primary Policy Driver

Populist / Ideological / Nationalist. Foreign policy is used to mobilize a domestic base and project regional leadership. 10

Security-driven / Pragmatic. Policy is dictated by border security (Gaza/Sinai) and maintaining its role as a key regional mediator. 24

Strategic / Economic. Policy is driven by long-term regional balancing (countering Iran) and economic diversification goals. 56

Official Stance on Hamas

Political Patron / Ally. Views Hamas as a legitimate "liberation movement" and provides a safe haven for its leadership. 29

Hostile but necessary interlocutor. Views Hamas's Muslim Brotherhood ideology as a domestic threat but must engage with it to manage the Gaza border. 24

Cautious / Distant. Officially supports the Palestinian Authority and views Hamas with suspicion, avoiding direct high-level engagement. 56

Nature of Relationship with Israel

Hostile / Confrontational. Currently has no diplomatic or trade ties; characterized by sharp rhetorical attacks and direct opposition. 2

"Cold Peace." Formal diplomatic relations exist based on the 1979 peace treaty, but ties are limited and lack public warmth. 24

No formal relations. Was moving toward normalization pre-October 7, driven by shared concerns about Iran. Process is now frozen. 57

Post-October 7 Trajectory

Escalation and complete rupture. Severed all ties and is actively leading international political and legal campaigns against Israel. 62

Crisis Management. Condemns Israeli actions and warns of regional escalation while intensifying its role as the primary mediator for cease-fires and hostage deals. 24

De-escalation and Recalibration. Halted normalization, increased criticism of Israel, and prioritized regional stability, while keeping channels open. 22

Chapter 9: The Future Trajectory: From Strategic Rivalry to Direct Confrontation?

The relationship between Türkiye and Israel has entered its most perilous phase to date. The "glory days" of the 1990s strategic partnership are a distant memory, and the prospect of a return to that level of cooperation is, for the foreseeable future, highly improbable.22 The current rupture is the deepest in the relationship's history, driven not by temporary disagreements but by fundamental and seemingly irreconcilable clashes of ideology and national security interests. Looking forward, while a direct, premeditated war between the two regional powers remains unlikely, the dynamic has shifted from managed political rivalry to a more dangerous state of direct strategic confrontation. The risk of an unintended military clash, particularly in the volatile theater of post-Assad Syria, has increased dramatically as Ankara's perception of Israel has evolved from that of a rival to a direct national security threat.

Shift in Threat Perception

In the corridors of power in Ankara, Israel is no longer viewed merely as a political adversary or a regional competitor. A strategic reassessment, accelerated by the events since October 7, 2023, has led Turkish leadership to perceive Israel as a direct and active threat to Turkish national security.62 This shift is multifaceted. It is driven by the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, which has fueled domestic pressure and ideological outrage.62 But more critically, it stems from a belief that Israel is pursuing a hegemonic regional agenda that directly undermines core Turkish interests. These include Israel's perceived support for Kurdish autonomous movements in Syria and Iraq, which Ankara sees as an existential threat, and its strategic partnerships with Greece and Cyprus, which aim to exclude Türkiye from the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean.14

Syria as the Primary Flashpoint

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has become the arena where Turkish and Israeli strategic interests most directly and dangerously collide.64 Both nations see themselves as major beneficiaries of Assad's demise and are now competing to shape the future of the Syrian state.64 Türkiye is deeply entrenched as the primary patron of the new transitional government, committed to restructuring its military and extending a security umbrella to ensure a stable, friendly, and non-Kurdish state on its border.53

Israel, conversely, is determined to maintain its freedom of action to strike Iranian-linked targets and prevent the entrenchment of any hostile military presence, Turkish or otherwise, near its northern border.65 This has led to a pattern of proactive and hostile Israeli actions, including preemptive airstrikes on Syrian airfields and potential basing sites that could be used by Turkish forces.65 This creates a classic security dilemma on Syrian soil, where each side's defensive measures are perceived as offensive by the other.

Risk of Unintended Escalation

The most plausible and dangerous scenario for a future conflict is not a planned war but an "unintended clash in Syria".65 As Turkish forces become more deeply involved in training and advising the new Syrian army, and as Israeli airstrikes continue, the potential for a miscalculation grows exponentially. An Israeli strike that inadvertently hits a Turkish position or kills Turkish personnel could trigger an almost unavoidable and rapid cycle of retaliation.65 While military and intelligence back-channels for deconfliction likely exist, the high tempo of operations, the complexity of the Syrian battlespace, and the profound level of mutual mistrust make such an accident an increasingly plausible risk.64 The very fact that scenarios of direct confrontation are now being discussed in strategic circles signals that thresholds once considered unshakable have already eroded.65

Structural Limits on Conflict

Despite these grave risks, several structural factors mitigate against an all-out, sustained war. First, Türkiye is a key member of the NATO alliance. While it is uncertain how the alliance would react to a clash with a non-member like Israel, particularly on Syrian soil, its membership still acts as a significant constraint.65 Second, both nations are acutely aware of the devastating economic and political consequences that a direct conflict would entail. Third, the Turkish military, while formidable and battle-hardened from operations in Syria, Libya, and Iraq, has known vulnerabilities, particularly an aging air force that has been excluded from the F-35 program and faces delays in modernization.65 These realities impose a degree of caution on both sides, reinforcing the preference for confrontation through proxies and in third countries.

The future of Turkish-Israeli relations is thus set on a path of managed confrontation. The underlying ideological and geopolitical conflicts are too deep for a genuine rapprochement in the near term. Any future normalization will be transactional and fragile, contingent on a major shift in the Palestinian issue and a successful de-escalation in Syria.22 In the interim, the two powers will continue to actively undermine each other's strategic goals while relying on a precarious balance of deterrence and back-channel communication to avoid a direct war. It is an inherently unstable equilibrium, where the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation remains dangerously high.

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