The Man with the Hammer
The new vision that governs the lands is a divine vision that knows the future, which is why this already was written in the 22th chapter of the 66th book of the bible ‘Revelations’, titled ‘Eden Restored’. Steve knew this, because he saw and advised people the herb ‘LSD’, other recommend reading books. The bible is the worlds bestseller, but books do not read themselves. This is why ‘the man on the end was predicted that would proclaim himself God in order to restore Paradise, because it had been lost aka ‘Paradise Lost’.
Malacca ‘Signifies’ Wanker
18 times The Netherlands tried to conquer Malaysia as they successfully conquered many countries around the world. Knowing the future is power, which is why I (P(I)eter added Goal Number Zero) to the other 17 Goals from the United Nations and manifested reality around me (zero), just like Jesus 2000 years ago. Nobody ever forgot him, did we? You see, believing creates intelligence. Dutch have a saying to speak is silver, silence is golden as we are known to bless others with our ‘silver gifts’ and cast our spells with our ‘silver tongues’. Officialy I’m St. P(I)eter with the key to the Kingdom of God, but I can change my name whenever I want, so I’m Jesus ‘the first and the last’
Old & New Church
Another Dutch saying ‘who doesn’t honer the little isn’t worth the big. The Jews are know to ‘secretly’ rule the world, but Dutch are known for our tulips. I wrote an e-mail to the church in 2021 (when I lived on church street in the town called New Church, across old church) and received as reply ‘bullshit’ and they were right as I now visualize for everyone to see. Later I moved to Apple Street at Schoonhoven (Beautifully Garden) the silver city, where I worked in the Golden city. After visiting Ukraine I ended up on street Malacca number 13. I’m born in 1989 (Chinese snake) and invite everyone once more to create this world with me in 2025 (Chinese year snake). The ‘secrets’ of The kingdom of heaven are written in Matthew 13.
The Dutch Campaign for the Malay Peninsula: A History of Commercial Conquest and Strategic Consolidation
Introduction: Redefining "Conquest" in the 17th-Century Malay World
The question of how many times the Dutch attempted to conquer Malaysia invites a historical clarification. The modern nation-state of Malaysia did not exist during the era of Dutch colonial expansion in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Malay Peninsula, then known to Europeans as the Golden Khersonese, was a complex mosaic of sovereign sultanates, indigenous polities, and European colonial outposts.1 Consequently, the Dutch objective was never the conquest of a unified "Malaysia." Instead, their ambitions were twofold and sharply focused: first, to violently displace their primary European rival, Portugal, from its strategic fortress at Malacca; and second, to establish an overarching commercial monopoly over the region's immensely lucrative trade, particularly in spices and tin.2
This report argues that the Dutch "conquest" of the Malay Peninsula was not a campaign of broad territorial subjugation but a prolonged, multi-faceted strategy of commercial and maritime dominance. This strategy was characterized by a series of focused military assaults on Portuguese Malacca, a critical but often fraught alliance with the Johor Sultanate, a continuous struggle to enforce trade monopolies against local resistance, and an eventual conclusion dictated not by regional events but by a global geopolitical realignment between European empires.4 The Dutch endeavor in the Malay world was a testament to a new form of colonial enterprise, one driven by corporate profit and strategic control of sea lanes rather than the large-scale acquisition of inland territory.
Chapter 1: The Genesis of Conflict: Dutch Ambitions and the Portuguese Obstacle (c. 1595–1605)
The Global Context of a Commercial War
The roots of the Dutch-Portuguese conflict in Southeast Asia lie in the political turmoil of 16th-century Europe. The Dutch Revolt against Spanish Habsburg rule, which began in the 1560s, escalated into the Eighty Years' War.2 This struggle took on a global dimension in 1580 when a succession crisis led to the Iberian Union, a personal union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal.6 This development transformed the vast Portuguese overseas empire into a legitimate target for Dutch military and commercial aggression. The Spanish, seeking to cripple the rebellious Dutch provinces economically, declared an embargo on all trade, cutting off Dutch merchants from their traditional role as distributors of Portuguese spices in Northern Europe via hubs like Antwerp and Hamburg.2
This embargo, intended to be a punitive measure, instead acted as a powerful catalyst. It motivated Dutch merchants to bypass the Portuguese-controlled supply chain and seek direct access to the source of the spice trade in the East Indies.6 The conflict that ensued, while an extension of the European war, was fundamentally different in its objectives. It served primarily as a vehicle for the Dutch to carve out their own overseas empire and seize control of global trade at Portugal's expense. The immense value of the commodities at stake—pepper, cloves, nutmeg, and cinnamon—led to this global confrontation being aptly nicknamed the "Spice War".2
The VOC: A Corporation with Sovereign Power
The instrument of this Dutch ambition was the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), or Dutch East India Company, established in 1602. The VOC was a revolutionary entity, a fusion of commercial enterprise and state power. Chartered by the Dutch government, it was granted a 21-year monopoly on all Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Strait of Magellan. Crucially, its charter empowered it to act as a sovereign entity in Asia: it could wage war, build fortresses, negotiate and sign treaties with foreign powers, and establish colonies.2 This structure meant that the Dutch "war" in Asia was, in essence, a privatized, corporate-led colonial project, distinct from traditional state-led expansion.
This corporate framework fundamentally shaped Dutch strategy. The VOC's primary obligation was to its shareholders, making the pursuit of profit and the establishment of a commercial monopoly its paramount goals. Unlike the Spanish model of colonization, which often involved extensive territorial conquest and religious conversion, the VOC was inherently averse to the high costs of administering large land-based empires.2 Its weakness, like Portugal's, was a lack of manpower.2 Therefore, its strategy was predicated on controlling the seas, seizing key strategic ports and trading posts, and enforcing its monopoly through naval power. This corporate imperative explains why, even after achieving its military objectives, the VOC's presence on the Malay Peninsula remained focused on a single fortified port rather than expanding into a wider territorial colony.
Malacca: The Thorn in the VOC's Side
For the VOC to realize its monopolistic ambitions in the Malay Archipelago, one obstacle stood preeminent: the Portuguese fortress of Malacca. Captured by Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511, Malacca had been the lynchpin of the Portuguese trading empire in Asia for nearly a century.8 Its strategic location at the narrowest point of the Straits of Malacca gave it control over the main maritime artery connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea.3 As the 16th-century Portuguese writer Tomé Pires famously declared, "Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of Venice".1
For the Dutch, the existence of this powerful Portuguese tollgate, which could interdict shipping and served as a rival trade emporium, was intolerable. The VOC's commercial policies were based on the principle of absolute monopoly, and any center of trade outside its control directly undermined this strategy.3 Therefore, the capture of Malacca was deemed essential.3 To prosecute this objective, the Dutch established their regional headquarters in Batavia (modern Jakarta) in 1619. This location was a strategic masterstroke: it was opportunistically close to Malacca and the vital Sunda Strait, yet safely distant from the main center of Portuguese power in Goa, India, allowing the VOC to project power without leaving its own administrative center vulnerable.2 From this base, the VOC would wage a relentless, decades-long campaign to pry the keys of the archipelago from Portuguese hands.
Chapter 2: The Long War for Malacca: A Chronology of Assaults (1606–1641)
The Dutch campaign to wrest control of Malacca from the Portuguese was not a single event but a protracted war of attrition spanning 35 years. It involved a series of distinct military operations that evolved in strategy from direct, large-scale assaults to a prolonged strategy of economic strangulation, culminating in a final, decisive siege. The following table summarizes the major documented attempts.
Year(s)
Nature of Action
Key Alliances/Forces
Outcome
1606
Full-scale siege and naval battle (Battle of Cape Rachado)
VOC fleet of 11 ships under Admiral Matelief de Jonge; formal alliance with the Sultanate of Johor.
Siege lifted after the arrival of a Portuguese relief fleet from Goa. Dutch tactical defeat, but heavy Portuguese casualties and solidification of the Dutch-Johor alliance.10
1608
Military attempt
Dutch forces.
Unsuccessful attempt to take the city.8
1615
Military attempt
Dutch forces.
Unsuccessful attempt to take the city.8
1623–1627
Intermittent attacks
Dutch forces.
Several fruitless attempts made throughout the 1620s.8
1633
Naval blockade
Dutch fleet.
Blockade proved unsuccessful in forcing the city's surrender but further isolated it economically.8
1640–1641
Final siege
Combined force of ~1,500 Dutch and allied European/Javanese troops and a fleet of 12 large ships, supported by ~1,500 soldiers and 40 vessels from the Sultanate of Johor.8
Successful. The Portuguese garrison, weakened by starvation and disease, surrendered on January 14, 1641, ending 130 years of Portuguese rule.9
The First Alliance and Siege (1606)
The first serious Dutch attempt on Malacca occurred in 1606 and established a strategic template that would ultimately lead to success. In April of that year, the third VOC fleet to visit the archipelago, a force of 11 ships commanded by Admiral Cornelis Matelief de Jonge, arrived off the coast.12 Recognizing the need for local support, Matelief immediately entered into negotiations with the Sultanate of Johor, the successor state to the old Malacca Sultanate that the Portuguese had displaced. In May 1606, a formal pact was concluded. The treaty's terms were clear: the Dutch would undertake the military effort to expel the Portuguese from Malacca, and in return, the Sultan would grant the Dutch control of the city and exclusive trading rights in Johor.12
With this alliance secured, the Dutch laid siege to the city. However, the Portuguese fortress, the famed A Famosa, proved a formidable obstacle. The siege was ultimately broken by the arrival of a powerful Portuguese relief fleet from Goa, commanded by the Viceroy Martim Afonso de Castro.10 The ensuing naval engagement, the Battle of Cape Rachado, resulted in a tactical defeat for the Dutch, who were forced to withdraw. Despite this setback, the battle was a strategic victory in two respects. First, the Portuguese fleet suffered heavier casualties, weakening their long-term naval capacity in the region.10 Second, and more importantly, the joint military action solidified the crucial Dutch-Johor alliance, a partnership born of a shared enemy that would prove decisive in the final campaign.10
A War of Attrition: Intermittent Attacks and Blockades (1608–1630s)
The failure of the 1606 siege demonstrated that a direct assault on a well-supplied Malacca was unlikely to succeed. In response, the VOC shifted its strategy from a single knockout blow to a long-term war of strangulation. The subsequent two decades were characterized by a series of smaller, less-documented, but persistent military actions designed to harass, isolate, and economically weaken the Portuguese colony.
Sources confirm further "vain attempts" to take the city were made in 1608 and 1615.8 Throughout the 1620s, the Dutch launched several more fruitless attacks, details of which are scarce but which collectively maintained military pressure on the Portuguese garrison.8 A more significant escalation occurred in 1633, when the Dutch imposed a major naval blockade on the port.8 While this action also failed to force a surrender, it was part of a broader strategy of maritime dominance. By the mid-1630s, the cumulative effect of these blockades and skirmishes had given the VOC virtual control of the sea lanes in the Strait of Malacca.8 This growing naval supremacy was starkly demonstrated in 1636, when Dutch ships managed to penetrate Malacca's harbor and sink several Portuguese vessels, a clear sign that the fortress's lifeline to Goa and the wider Portuguese empire was being severed.8
The Final Siege and the Fall of Portuguese Malacca (1640–1641)
By 1640, decades of Dutch pressure had left Portuguese Malacca isolated and vulnerable. The VOC judged the time was right for a final, decisive assault. The campaign that began in the summer of 1640 was the culmination of the Dutch-Johor alliance forged 34 years earlier. A formidable Dutch force was assembled, landing on August 3, 1640. It consisted of twelve companies totaling approximately 1,500-2,000 men, including Dutch soldiers, sailors, and allied Javanese, Bandanese, and Mardijker troops.8 This force was critically augmented by their Johor allies, who, true to the 1606 pact, supplied a fleet of 40 ships and another 1,500 soldiers.8
The combined force drove the Portuguese defenders from the city's suburbs into the main fortress and began a grueling siege that would last for over five months.15 The conditions were brutal for both sides. The swampy terrain around the city hampered the attackers, while inside the walls, the defenders suffered from severe food shortages and rampant disease.14 The Portuguese garrison, numbering only a few hundred professional soldiers but supported by thousands of local inhabitants, held out desperately.15 However, by January 1641, their situation was hopeless. With their gunpowder exhausted and their numbers decimated by starvation and sickness, they could resist no longer. On January 14, 1641, Dutch forces breached the defenses and captured the city.9
The fall of Malacca was a watershed moment. It marked the definitive end of the 130-year Portuguese presence and removed the last great bastion of their power in the Malay Archipelago.8 The victory was not simply a European triumph; it was the direct result of a successful integration of European naval power with local political ambition. The Dutch could not have sustained such a long and costly siege without the manpower, ships, and logistical support provided by the Sultanate of Johor. This reliance, however, came with a crucial condition that would shape the entire future of the Dutch presence on the peninsula. The 1606 treaty had stipulated that in exchange for control of Malacca, the Dutch agreed "not to seek territories or wage war with the Malay kingdoms".10 They had traded the right to general conquest for the specific, strategic prize of Malacca, a constraint that would define the limits of their power for the next 150 years.
Chapter 3: The Limits of Hegemony: Dutch Rule and Regional Realities (1641–c. 1795)
The Calculated Decline of Malacca
Following its hard-won capture in 1641, Malacca did not become the new jewel in the VOC's imperial crown. Instead, the Dutch implemented a policy of calculated neglect, deliberately subordinating Malacca's interests to those of their regional headquarters at Batavia. This was a strategic decision rooted in the VOC's core principle of a centralized monopoly. The company had no interest in fostering a rival port, even one under its own control, that could compete with Batavia's dominance over the archipelago's trade.3
As a result, much of the trade that had once flowed through Malacca was deliberately redirected to Batavia.3 Malacca, once the bustling nexus of an intra-Asian trade network, was reduced to the status of a strategic western outpost of the wider Dutch Indonesian empire.3 Its primary functions became administrative and military: to control the strait and to serve as a collection point for regional products, most notably tin from the Malay sultanates.16 While the city yielded some profits from the tin trade in the 17th century, by 1700 its commercial vitality was in steep decline, often failing to meet its tin quotas for Batavia.10
The Elusive Tin Monopoly
With Malacca secured, the VOC's primary economic objective on the peninsula shifted to monopolizing the lucrative tin trade of states like Perak and Kedah.3 This was pursued through a combination of diplomatic and coercive measures. The Dutch signed trading agreements with several states and established fortified trading posts, or
factorijen, such as the one on Pangkor Island (Fort Dindings), to control the collection and export of tin.3 When treaties failed, they resorted to sterner measures, including naval blockades, to force compliance.3
Despite these efforts, a complete monopoly proved "elusive".3 Malay rulers and traders, accustomed to a more open trading environment, consistently resisted Dutch attempts to fix prices and eliminate competition. This friction frequently erupted into open conflict. In a notable incident in 1651, the Dutch factory in Perak was destroyed by the local Malays, precipitating a brief period of hostilities that ended with a new treaty in 1655.3 These events underscore that Dutch economic control was never absolute; it was a contested hegemony that required constant enforcement and was frequently challenged by local actors who refused to be subsumed into the VOC's rigid monopolistic system.18
The Rise of a New Rival: The Bugis
The Dutch colonial strategy inadvertently created the very conditions for its own greatest challenge. By capturing Malacca and then deliberately suppressing its role as a free-trading port, the VOC created a significant power vacuum and an economic opening in the region. This void was filled by a dynamic and formidable new force: the Bugis, a maritime people from Sulawesi (Celebes) who had been displaced by the VOC's own conquests in their homeland.16
In the early 18th century, Bugis warriors and traders established themselves in the Riau archipelago, just south of the Malay Peninsula. They soon seized political control of the Johor Sultanate, which had been weakened by internal disputes.3 Under Bugis leadership, Riau rapidly developed into a major trade emporium that directly challenged Dutch dominance.3 By embracing the principles of free trade that the Dutch had abandoned, Riau successfully attracted merchants from across the region, encroaching upon the VOC's trade networks and effectively isolating Malacca both politically and commercially.3
The rise of the Bugis forced the Dutch into a series of costly conflicts to protect their waning monopoly. The Bugis leader Daeng Kamboja besieged Dutch Malacca from October 1756 to July 1757, a siege that was only broken by the arrival of reinforcements from Batavia.16 The rivalry culminated in a full-scale war from 1782 to 1784, in which the Dutch eventually defeated the Bugis and temporarily asserted control over Riau.3 However, these wars demonstrated that Dutch hegemony in the straits was far from secure. The VOC's attempt to perfect its monopoly through centralization had ironically led to the emergence of a decentralized, resilient rival that it could never fully control. The Dutch were not simply victims of a rising power; their own policies had been a key catalyst for that rise.
Chapter 4: The Final Act: The Anglo-Dutch Treaty and the Cession of Malacca (1795–1824)
The Napoleonic Interlude and the Rise of Britain
The end of the Dutch era on the Malay Peninsula was not brought about by local forces, but by a seismic shift in the global balance of power. The Dutch East India Company, plagued by corruption, smuggling, and the high costs of administration, ran into severe financial difficulties and was formally dissolved in 1799.11 Simultaneously, the French Revolutionary Wars engulfed Europe. In 1795, the Netherlands was overrun by France and reconstituted as the Batavian Republic, a French client state.11
This development posed a direct threat to Great Britain, which feared that Dutch overseas possessions, including Malacca, could fall into the hands of its primary adversary, France. To preempt this, the British occupied Malacca in 1795, holding it "in trust" for the Dutch Prince of Orange, who had fled to England.16 This "temporary" occupation lasted until 1818, long after the Napoleonic Wars had ended.21 During this 23-year interlude, British commercial interests in the Malay Archipelago, which had been growing since the establishment of a base in Penang in 1786, expanded dramatically and became deeply entrenched.16
Singapore and the Point of No Return
The single most decisive event that sealed the fate of Dutch Malacca was the founding of a British trading post on the island of Singapore in 1819 by Sir Stamford Raffles.5 Raffles, an official of the British East India Company, was convinced that Britain needed a strategic base to counter the Dutch trade monopoly in the archipelago. His choice of Singapore, located at the southern tip of the peninsula, was a direct and provocative challenge to the Dutch sphere of influence.23
The Dutch were furious, claiming that Singapore was part of the Johor Sultanate, which they considered to be under their sway.5 However, Singapore's success was immediate and spectacular. Its free-trade policy attracted a flood of regional commerce, and it quickly eclipsed all other ports in the vicinity, including Dutch Malacca. The Dutch soon realized that Singapore's explosive growth could not be curbed and that the escalating rivalry with the more powerful British Empire was untenable and could lead to open war.5 A permanent diplomatic settlement was required.
The Treaty of London (1824): Drawing a Line in the Water
The resolution came in the form of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, also known as the Treaty of London. This landmark agreement was a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding territorial and commercial disputes between the two colonial powers in Southeast Asia.4 Its terms fundamentally and permanently reshaped the political geography of the region.
The core of the treaty was a strategic territorial swap. The Netherlands formally ceded the city and fort of Malacca, along with all its dependencies on the Malay Peninsula, to Great Britain. In return, Britain ceded its colony of Bencoolen (Bengkulu) on the coast of Sumatra to the Netherlands and withdrew its objections to Dutch claims on the island of Billiton.5
More significantly, the treaty established clear and separate spheres of influence. It drew a notional line through the Straits of Malacca and south of Singapore. The Dutch agreed not to open any office or make any treaty with rulers on the Malay Peninsula, while the British made a reciprocal pledge regarding the islands south of the strait, including Sumatra.4 This agreement officially and irrevocably divided the Malay world. The historic Johor-Riau Sultanate, for example, was split in two, with Johor falling under the British sphere and Riau under the Dutch.4 This line would eventually become the modern international border between Malaysia and Indonesia.5
The Dutch "loss" of Malacca was, therefore, not a military defeat but a strategic consolidation. By the 1820s, Malacca was a commercially stagnant asset of limited value, while the British, with their powerful navy and dynamic new base at Singapore, were the ascendant power in the straits. The Dutch made a pragmatic choice: they traded a declining outpost to resolve a costly rivalry and, more importantly, to secure British recognition of their far more vast and valuable colonial empire in the Indonesian archipelago.7 They sacrificed a limb to save the body. The treaty's most profound and lasting legacy was the imposition of a permanent, linear European border upon a fluid, interconnected maritime region, setting the stage for the development of the modern nations of Malaysia and Indonesia.
Conclusion: A Conquest Redefined
The Dutch "attempt to conquer Malaysia" was, in reality, a 140-year project focused on the capture of the strategic port of Malacca and the subsequent domination of regional trade. The military dimension of this project was a multi-decade campaign against the Portuguese, involving at least six major documented attempts—including full-scale sieges, intermittent attacks, and naval blockades—between 1606 and 1641.
The final victory was not a purely European affair. It was achieved only through a vital military and political alliance with the Sultanate of Johor. This pact was foundational, but it also came with inherent limitations, as the Dutch were compelled to agree not to pursue territorial expansion against other Malay kingdoms. Consequently, Dutch rule on the peninsula was never one of total domination. It was a contested hegemony, a constant and not always successful struggle to enforce a commercial monopoly against resilient local political and economic forces, most notably the Bugis, whose rise was an unintended consequence of Dutch policy itself.
Ultimately, the Dutch presence in the Malay Peninsula was rendered obsolete not by local resistance but by the emergence of a more powerful imperial rival, Great Britain. The Dutch did not lose a war in Malaya; they executed a strategic withdrawal as part of a global diplomatic settlement that reflected a new world order. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 saw them trade the declining asset of Malacca to consolidate their hold on the immensely more profitable Dutch East Indies. Their "conquest" was thus a limited, commercially-driven, and ultimately transient chapter in the peninsula's history, whose conclusion was dictated by the very same global power dynamics that had initiated it two centuries earlier.
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