The Allon Plan: Strategic Doctrine, Territorial Compromise, and the Shaping of Israeli Borders (1967–Present)
Part I: The Strategic Vacuum and the Genesis of Doctrine
The Post-War Paradox: Victory and Vulnerability
The conclusion of the Six-Day War in June 1967 fundamentally reordered the geopolitical architecture of the Middle East, leaving the State of Israel in possession of territories more than three times its pre-war size. The lightning victory, which placed the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula under Israeli military administration, generated a profound strategic paradox that would haunt Israeli decision-making for decades. On one hand, the acquisition of these territories provided Israel with unprecedented strategic depth, mitigating the existential anxiety caused by the pre-1967 "narrow waist"—a coastal strip that was a mere 15 kilometers wide at its most vulnerable point near Netanya.1 On the other hand, the occupation brought approximately one million Palestinian Arabs under Israeli rule, creating a demographic dilemma that threatened the Zionist objective of maintaining a state that was both Jewish and democratic.2
In the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire, the Israeli government, a National Unity coalition led by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, found itself paralyzed by internal ideological divisions. There was no pre-existing contingency plan for the administration or disposition of the West Bank. The cabinet was torn between conflicting visions: the maximalist desire to retain the "whole Land of Israel" for historical and religious reasons, championed by emergent nationalist voices, and the pragmatic need to exchange territory for peace treaties with Arab neighbors.3 This paralysis resulted in a policy famously described as the "decision not to decide," a holding pattern intended to keep options open for eventual negotiations while maintaining the status quo.3
Into this vacuum stepped Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labor and a former commander of the elite Palmach strike force. Allon, a stalwart of the Labor Zionist movement, sought to synthesize these competing imperatives into a coherent strategic doctrine. His proposal, presented to Prime Minister Eshkol on July 26, 1967—less than two months after the war ended—was not merely a map of borders but a comprehensive philosophy of national security and demographic engineering.2 The "Allon Plan," as it came to be known, was predicated on a doctrine of "maximum security, maximum land, minimum Arabs," aiming to redraw Israel's frontiers to include strategically vital yet sparsely populated areas while excluding the densely populated Palestinian mountain ridge.2
The Architect: Yigal Allon’s Strategic Mindset
To understand the nuances of the plan, one must understand the architect. Yigal Allon was a product of the secular, socialist kibbutz movement, yet he was deeply pragmatic regarding military security. Unlike the revisionist Zionists who viewed the West Bank primarily through the lens of biblical patrimony, Allon viewed the territory through the lens of topography and defense.3 His primary concern was the vulnerability of Israel's coastal plain, home to the majority of its population and industrial infrastructure, to an armored invasion from the east.
Allon’s strategic assessment posited that the 1949 Armistice Lines (the "Green Line") were defensible only in a state of true peace, which he believed was not forthcoming from the Arab world in the immediate future. He argued that the introduction of modern armored warfare necessitated natural barriers to delay an enemy advance. Consequently, the Jordan Valley—a deep rift valley significantly below sea level, flanked by steep escarpments rising to the West Bank central ridge—presented itself as the only viable "defensible border" against a potential coalition of Jordanian, Iraqi, and Syrian forces (the "Eastern Front").2
However, Allon was equally committed to the demographic preservation of the Jewish state. He explicitly warned that incorporating the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza would lead to a bi-national state, thereby negating the Zionist enterprise, or necessitate an undemocratic regime that would erode Israel’s moral standing.1 This dual imperative—military control without demographic annexation—formed the intellectual bedrock of the Allon Plan.
Part II: The Anatomy of the Plan
The Allon Plan was never a static document; it evolved through various iterations between 1967 and 1970 as Allon refined his concepts in response to diplomatic feedback and internal political pressures. Nevertheless, the core provisions remained consistent, delineating a clear partition of the West Bank between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian entity.
The Eastern Security Zone: The Jordan Valley
The sine qua non of the plan was the annexation of the Jordan Valley. Allon proposed that the Jordan River serve as Israel's permanent political and security border. To give this border strategic depth, Israel would annex a continuous strip of land running along the western bank of the river, from the Beit She'an Valley in the north to the Dead Sea in the south.
The width of this annexed zone was specified as approximately 10 to 15 kilometers (6 to 9 miles). This width was calculated to ensure that Israeli forces controlled not just the valley floor but also the eastern slopes of the mountain ridge—the "back of the mountain." By controlling these slopes, Israel could dominate the valley militarily while remaining geographically separated from the Palestinian population centers concentrated on the western slopes and the ridge crest.2 In 1967, this proposed security zone was sparsely populated, home to only about 20,000 Palestinians out of a total West Bank population of over 600,000, making its annexation demographically palatable to Israeli planners.2
The Topographical Logic of Defense
The military rationale for the Jordan Valley annexation was rooted in topography. The Rift Valley sits hundreds of feet below sea level, while the mountain ridges to the west and the Gilead Heights to the east rise to elevations of over 3,000 feet. Allon viewed this sharp elevation differential as a natural fortification. An invading army crossing the Jordan River would face a steep, arduous ascent up the western slopes, during which they would be vulnerable to Israeli fire from the fortified positions on the "back of the mountain".2
The Jericho Corridor: Connectivity and Sovereignty
A critical and often misunderstood component of the Allon Plan was the "Jericho Corridor." Recognizing that a Palestinian entity completely encircled by Israeli territory would be non-viable and politically unacceptable to Jordan, Allon proposed a land corridor connecting the Arab population centers of the West Bank (such as Ramallah) to the East Bank of the Jordan River via Jericho.2
This corridor was designed to be approximately 4.3 miles wide. It would effectively interrupt the continuity of the Israeli security zone in the Jordan Valley, creating a sovereign or autonomous passage for Palestinians to travel to and from Jordan. The inclusion of this corridor demonstrated Allon’s intention to maintain a geopolitical link between the West Bank and the Hashemite Kingdom, facilitating his preferred political solution: a Jordanian-Palestinian federation.2 However, the status of Jericho itself was a point of contention; while Allon envisioned it as part of the Arab sector, military planners often debated the risks of leaving such a strategic gateway out of Israeli control.2
The Mountain Ridge: Autonomy and Demography
The densely populated areas of the West Bank—the "Arab Sector"—were explicitly excluded from annexation in Allon's maps. This area encompassed the northern Samarian ridge (Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm) and the southern Judean ridge (Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron). Allon proposed two potential futures for this territory:
Reunification with Jordan: The preferred option was to return these areas to Jordanian sovereignty as part of a final peace treaty, creating a demilitarized West Bank under Hashemite civil rule but with Israeli security oversight in the surrounding zones.1
Palestinian Autonomy: If Jordan refused, Allon suggested establishing an autonomous Palestinian administration in these areas, linked economically and culturally to the Arab world but demilitarized.1
The plan delineated the boundary between the Israeli security zone and the Arab sector roughly along the drainage divide of the West Bank water catchment area. This line ensured that Israel controlled the strategic heights overlooking the valley while leaving the Arab population centers on the western slopes intact.2
Greater Jerusalem and the Etzion Bloc
While the mountain ridge was largely slated for return, the Allon Plan made significant exceptions for Jerusalem and its environs. The plan called for the full annexation of East Jerusalem, united with West Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. Furthermore, it proposed a broad "Greater Jerusalem" envelope to ensure the capital’s security and demographic dominance.8
Crucially, the plan advocated for the annexation of the Gush Etzion bloc, a cluster of Jewish settlements south of Jerusalem that had been destroyed by the Arab Legion in 1948. Re-establishing Gush Etzion was viewed as a moral imperative by the Israeli public and a strategic necessity to protect Jerusalem’s southern approaches.9 Similarly, the plan included provisions for a strip of Israeli territory extending from the Judean Desert to the outskirts of Hebron, specifically to include Kiryat Arba, thereby creating a buffer between the southern West Bank population and the Negev.2
Gaza and the Sinai Connection
The Allon Plan’s approach to the Gaza Strip evolved over time. Initially, Allon considered annexing Gaza to Israel with the intention of resettling its extensive refugee population elsewhere. However, acknowledging the sheer demographic weight of the Strip—home to some 350,000 Palestinians in 1967—he revised the plan. The later versions conceived of Gaza as part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit, to be linked to the West Bank via a highway or "safe passage" running through Israeli territory (the northern Negev).1
Regarding the Sinai Peninsula, Allon was prepared to return the vast majority of the territory to Egypt in exchange for peace. However, he insisted on retaining a continuous land strip along the eastern coast of the Sinai, from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh (which Israel developed as the settlement of Ophira). This was intended to guarantee Israeli control over the Straits of Tiran, the closure of which by Egypt in May 1967 had been the casus belli for the war.2
Part III: The Diplomatic Channel – The "Jordanian Option"
The Allon Plan was not designed in a vacuum; it was the primary instrument of Israel's clandestine diplomacy with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Between 1967 and 1977, successive Labor governments operated under the strategic assumption that King Hussein was the only viable partner for a settlement that could relieve Israel of the Palestinian population while securing the eastern front.1
Secret Dialogue in the Arava and London
Despite the official state of war, lines of communication between Israel and Jordan remained open. Allon, along with Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Prime Minister Golda Meir, conducted numerous secret meetings with King Hussein. These encounters often took place in London (at the home of the King's Jewish physician) or in a tent in the Arava desert on the border.13
In September 1967, Allon personally presented his plan to King Hussein. The King’s reaction was categorical rejection. Hussein viewed the proposal as "insulting" and a non-starter. He famously argued that he could not explain to his people or the Arab world why he had regained "the bones" (the resource-poor, populated mountain ridge) while Israel retained "the meat" (the fertile Jordan Valley) and the holy sites of Jerusalem.12 For the Hashemite monarch, sovereignty was indivisible; a peace treaty that formally ceded significant portions of the West Bank and East Jerusalem was political suicide.15
The 1972 Federation Counter-Proposal
The dialogue continued, however, driven by a mutual interest in containing radical Palestinian nationalism. In March 1972, King Hussein publicly proposed his own counter-vision: the United Arab Kingdom plan. This proposal envisioned a federation consisting of two autonomous regions—the East Bank (Jordan) and the West Bank (Palestine)—united under the Hashemite crown, with Amman as the federal capital and Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian region.16
The United Arab Kingdom plan was a direct attempt by Hussein to reclaim the political initiative. It offered the Palestinians autonomy but within a Jordanian framework, effectively sidelining the PLO. However, the plan demanded the full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected the plan immediately in the Knesset, stating that "Israel has not annexed the West Bank, but neither has it returned it," and reiterating the Knesset's resolution that the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel was beyond challenge.17 The rejection highlighted the unbridgeable gap: Israel demanded territorial modifications for security (the Allon Plan), while Jordan demanded full sovereignty with minor reciprocal adjustments.
The Jericho Disengagement Failure (1974)
Following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, diplomacy gained new urgency under the auspices of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In 1974, Allon, then Foreign Minister, attempted to revive the "Jordanian Option" through a "Jericho First" disengagement agreement. He proposed returning the city of Jericho and a corridor to the Jordan River to Jordanian civil administration, effectively implementing the corridor component of his original plan as an interim step.19
Negotiations faltered due to conflicting demands. Israel refused to allow a Jordanian military presence west of the river, insisting on demilitarization, while Hussein demanded a symbolic military foothold to demonstrate sovereignty. The window for the "Jordanian Option" slammed shut in October 1974 at the Arab League Summit in Rabat, which recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," effectively stripping Jordan of its mandate to negotiate for the West Bank.20
Part IV: The American Dimension – Washington’s Ambivalence
The United States' response to the Allon Plan fluctuated with changing administrations, evolving from tacit understanding to active opposition and eventual resignation to the status quo.
The Johnson Administration (1967–1969)
The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson was generally sympathetic to Israel's security dilemmas. Following the war, Johnson articulated "five principles" for peace, which included the right of nations to "secure and recognized boundaries"—a formulation that Israel interpreted as an endorsement of border modifications beyond the vulnerable 1949 lines.22 While never formally endorsing the Allon Plan, US officials acknowledged the strategic logic of the Jordan Valley defense line, provided it did not preclude a final peace settlement.
The Rogers Plan Shock (1969)
The inauguration of Richard Nixon brought a sharp shift in US policy. In December 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers unveiled the "Rogers Plan," which called for an Israeli withdrawal to the international border with Egypt and the 1967 lines with Jordan, with only "insubstantial alterations".24 This proposal was a direct refutation of the Allon doctrine. It viewed security as a product of diplomatic guarantees and demilitarized zones rather than territorial acquisition.
The Israeli government, led by Golda Meir, vehemently rejected the Rogers Plan as an existential threat. Henry Kissinger, serving as National Security Advisor, privately undermined Rogers, advising Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon to "aim at having complete deadlock" to prevent the plan's implementation.25 Kissinger’s realpolitik approach favored a stalemate that would force Arab states to eventually deal with Israel directly, aligning more closely with Israel's preference to hold the territories as bargaining chips.
Kissinger and the Art of Stalling
Throughout the 1970s, Kissinger’s diplomacy focused on interim agreements (with Egypt and Syria) rather than a comprehensive West Bank settlement. He recognized that the gap between the Allon Plan (Israel's minimum requirement) and the 1967 lines (the Arab maximum concession) was unbridgeable. In meetings with Allon, Kissinger often expressed skepticism that Jordan would ever accept the plan but encouraged Israel to maintain it as a negotiating position to ward off pressure for total withdrawal.26 This tacit US acceptance of Israel’s "holding pattern" allowed the Allon Plan to become the de facto reality on the ground.
Part V: Implementation – The Settlement Enterprise (1967–1977)
Perhaps the most significant legacy of the Allon Plan is that, despite never being formally ratified by the cabinet, it served as the operational blueprint for Israel’s settlement enterprise during the first decade of occupation. The Labor-led governments adopted a strategy of settling strictly within the areas designated for annexation under the Allon map—the Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion, and Greater Jerusalem—while largely avoiding the establishment of Jewish communities in the densely populated Arab mountain ridge.3
The Chain of Settlements
To execute this strategy, the government utilized the Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) brigades—military units that combined combat service with agricultural settlement. This allowed the government to frame settlements as security necessities rather than civilian colonial expansion, a distinction aimed at mitigating international legal criticism.9
The implementation began almost immediately. In the Jordan Valley, the settlements of Mehola (February 1968) and Argaman (May 1968) were established to secure the northern approach. By the mid-1970s, a continuous chain of settlements, including Massua (1969), Gilgal (1970), and Mitzpe Shalem (1970), stretched along the valley floor and the eastern slopes.29 These communities were designed to be a permanent human shield against invasion, creating a "security belt" that would function regardless of future political arrangements.
In the south, the re-establishment of Kfar Etzion in September 1967 marked the first civilian return to the West Bank. It was driven by the deep emotional connection of the "children of Etzion," the survivors of the 1948 massacre, but it was sanctioned by the government because it anchored Jerusalem’s southern defense perimeter.9
The Allon Road
To physically delineate the boundary between the proposed Israeli annexation zone and the Arab autonomy zone, the government constructed the "Allon Road" (Route 458/578). Running along the eastern slopes of the mountain ridge, this highway created a formidable physical barrier, separating the Palestinian population centers on the ridge from the Jordan Valley below.32 It remains a defining feature of the West Bank's geography, marking the effective edge of the area Israel intends to retain in almost every strategic map produced since.
Quantitative Analysis of Settlement Growth
While the number of settlers remained relatively low during this period compared to later decades, the strategic footprint was immense.
Period (Labor Govts)
Settlement Region
Key Settlements Established
Strategic Purpose
1967–1969
Jordan Valley (North)
Mehola (1968), Argaman (1968)
Securing the Beit She'an Valley approach.
1967–1969
Gush Etzion
Kfar Etzion (1967), Har Gilo (1968)
Protecting Jerusalem's southern flank; historic return.
1970–1974
Jordan Valley (Central/South)
Massua (1969), Gilgal (1970), Mitzpe Shalem (1970)
Completing the eastern security buffer.
1968–1972
Hebron Periphery
Kiryat Arba (1968/1972)
Exception: Establishing Jewish presence near Hebron (initially military).
1975–1977
Jerusalem Envelope
Ma'ale Adumim (1975)
Securing the road to Jericho; E-1 corridor dominance.
The chart above illustrates the disciplined focus of the Labor governments. With the notable exception of Kiryat Arba—which began as a squatter movement in a Hebron hotel in 1968 and was retroactively approved by the government under pressure—settlement activity was confined to the Allon Plan's security zones. By 1977, there were approximately 4,500 settlers in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), the vast majority living in the Jordan Valley and Gush Etzion.10
Kiryat Arba: The Crack in the Doctrine
The establishment of Kiryat Arba was a pivotal moment that foreshadowed the unraveling of the Allon doctrine. In Passover 1968, a group of religious nationalists led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger rented a hotel in Hebron and refused to leave. Allon, sympathetic to the historical connection to Hebron but wary of settling inside an Arab city, proposed the compromise of building a Jewish town adjacent to Hebron. This effectively sanctioned settlement in the heart of the "Arab Sector" aimed for autonomy. Allon retroactively amended his map to include a corridor connecting Kiryat Arba to the Israeli border, but the precedent was set: ideological pressure could force the government to deviate from its strategic map.3
Part VI: Internal Political Dynamics
The Allon Plan faced as much opposition from within the Israeli government as from without. The Labor Party was not a monolith, and rival ministers championed competing visions for the territories.
The Dayan Alternative: Functional Compromise
Moshe Dayan, the charismatic Defense Minister, opposed Allon's concept of "territorial compromise" (drawing lines). Dayan advocated for "functional compromise," a system where Israel would retain military control over the entire West Bank while allowing the Palestinian population to manage their own civil affairs and maintain Jordanian citizenship.1 Dayan pushed for the "Open Bridges" policy, which kept the Jordan River crossings open for trade and travel, effectively integrating the West Bank economy with both Israel and Jordan. He believed that this economic integration would raise standards of living and pacify the population, making the exact location of borders irrelevant.3
The Galili Document and the Rise of Gush Emunim
As internal pressure mounted, the Labor Party attempted to bridge these gaps. The "Galili Document" of 1973 was a compromise platform that explicitly authorized settlement in the Rafah Salient (Gaza) and the Jordan Valley but remained vague on the mountain ridge.33 However, the post-1973 war trauma galvanized the religious settler movement, Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful"). They rejected the Allon Plan's partition logic entirely, viewing the entire West Bank as a divine trust. Their illegal outpost at Sebastia in 1975 challenged the Rabin government's authority. Although the government eventually removed them to a nearby military base (which became the settlement of Kedumim), the inability of the Labor leadership to enforce the Allon Plan's restrictions against settlement in Samaria signaled the waning of their hegemony.10
Part VII: The 1977 Watershed and Legacy
The victory of Menachem Begin's Likud party in the 1977 elections marked the official end of the Allon Plan as a governing doctrine. Likud rejected the principle of territorial compromise, viewing "Judea and Samaria" as inseparable parts of the Land of Israel.
The Drobles Plan: Filling the Gaps
The Likud government adopted the Drobles Plan (1978), authored by Matityahu Drobles of the World Zionist Organization. This plan was the strategic inverse of Allon's. Whereas Allon sought to avoid settling heavily populated Arab areas to preserve the possibility of separation, Drobles explicitly aimed to settle between Arab population centers to shatter the territorial contiguity of the West Bank and prevent the emergence of a Palestinian state.9 Settlements like Ariel, Beit El, and Shilo were established deep in the Samarian mountains—areas Allon had designated for Arab autonomy.
The Persistence of the Map: From Oslo to Trump
Despite the ideological shift, the geopolitical reality created by the Allon Plan endured. When Israeli and Palestinian negotiators sat down in the 1990s to draft the Oslo Accords, the map they drew bore a striking resemblance to Allon’s 1967 vision.
Area C: Under full Israeli civil and military control, Area C covers approximately 60% of the West Bank, encompassing the Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, and the settlement blocs. This territory is nearly identical to the annexation zones proposed by Allon.34
Areas A and B: Containing the major Palestinian cities and over 90% of the population, these areas correspond to Allon’s "Arab Sector".36
The logic of the Allon Plan resurfaced again in the 21st century. The construction of the Separation Barrier in the early 2000s largely followed the Allon roadmap in the Jerusalem and Etzion areas, effectively annexing the settlement blocs.8 Most recently, the Trump Peace Plan (2020) and Prime Minister Netanyahu's pledges to annex the Jordan Valley are direct descendants of Allon’s doctrine. The Trump map, which envisions Israel retaining the Jordan Valley and corridors to isolated enclaves while granting Palestinians statehood in the remaining territory, has been described by analysts as "the Allon Plan on steroids".37
Conclusion
The Allon Plan was never officially adopted by any Israeli government, yet it became the single most influential document in the history of the Israeli occupation. It carved the physical channels in which the conflict flows today: the separation of the Jordan Valley, the isolation of East Jerusalem, and the cantonization of the Palestinian population. It represented a specific moment in Zionist history—a pragmatic, secular, security-oriented approach that believed land could be divided and demographics could be managed. While the "Jordanian Option" effectively died with King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, the territorial logic of the Allon Plan survives, serving as the silent blueprint for the map of the contemporary Middle East.
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