The 1967 Six-Day War: A Comprehensive Geopolitical and Military Analysis
1. Introduction: The Geopolitical Cauldron of the Middle East
The Six-Day War, fought between June 5 and June 10, 1967, represents a singular inflection point in the modern history of the Middle East. It was a conflict of high-intensity kinetic warfare that fundamentally redrew the map of the region, dismantled the pan-Arab nationalist project led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and established Israel as the undisputed regional military hegemon.1 While the active hostilities were confined to less than a week, the war’s consequences—territorial, demographic, and diplomatic—remain the primary determinants of the Arab-Israeli conflict nearly six decades later.
To understand the war, one must look beyond the immediate catalyst of the Tiran blockade and examine the structural instability of the Middle East in the mid-1960s. The region was a theater of the Cold War, with the Soviet Union aggressively courting radical Arab regimes in Egypt and Syria to counterbalance American influence in the conservative monarchies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.3 This superpower rivalry intersected with an internal "Arab Cold War" between Nasser’s revolutionary republicanism and the traditionalist monarchies, creating a volatile environment where local disputes rapidly escalated into existential crises.4
By 1967, the precarious stability established after the 1956 Suez Crisis—maintained by the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai and the guarantee of free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba—had eroded. The rise of a radical Ba'athist regime in Syria, which sponsored Fatah guerrilla raids into Israel, and the intensifying water disputes over the Jordan River, created a friction that the fragile armistice lines could no longer contain.5 This report provides an exhaustive analysis of the conflict's origins, the operational details of the military campaigns, and the enduring geopolitical legacy that emerged from the smoke of the battlefield.
2. Origins and Escalation: The Crisis of May 1967
The path to war was paved by a convergence of Soviet disinformation, Arab brinkmanship, and Israeli existential anxiety. The crisis did not begin with a singular decision to fight, but rather a cascading series of miscalculations that trapped the key actors in a spiral of escalation from which none could retreat without suffering catastrophic political damage.
2.1 The Soviet "False Flag" Intelligence
The immediate precipitant of the crisis was a deliberate act of disinformation orchestrated by the Soviet Union. In early May 1967, Soviet intelligence agencies informed the Egyptian and Syrian governments that Israel was massing a significant invasion force—estimated at 10 to 12 brigades—along the Syrian border.5 The ostensible goal of this alleged concentration was an invasion to topple the radical Ba'athist regime in Damascus, a key Soviet client state.6
On May 13, a Soviet intelligence report confirming these troop concentrations was formally delivered by Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny to Egyptian Vice President Anwar Sadat.5 This intelligence was demonstrably false. United Nations observers on the ground (UNTSO) reported no such buildup, and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol even invited the Soviet Ambassador to Israel to tour the border and verify the absence of troops—an offer the ambassador declined.5
Historical analysis suggests complex motives for this Soviet maneuver. Geopolitically, Moscow sought to solidify the Egypt-Syria defense pact signed in November 1966.7 The Soviets likely believed that a show of force by Egypt would deter Israel from retaliating against Syrian-sponsored guerrilla attacks, thereby saving the shaky Syrian regime without sparking a full-scale war.3 However, this assessment proved to be a disastrous miscalculation of both Nasser’s psychology and Israel’s strategic threshold.
2.2 The Collapse of the Status Quo
Nasser’s response to the Soviet warning was swift and escalated the situation far beyond what Moscow seemingly intended. Seeking to reclaim his leadership of the Pan-Arab movement and deflect criticism from Jordan and Saudi Arabia regarding his passivity in the face of Israeli strikes on Syria, Nasser engaged in a high-stakes game of brinkmanship.5
Phase I: The Remilitarization of Sinai (May 14)
On May 14, Nasser placed the Egyptian armed forces on full alert and began moving armored divisions into the Sinai Peninsula.5 This movement was conducted openly, with troops marching through Cairo streets to the cheers of crowds, signaling that this was as much a political demonstration as a military deployment.
Phase II: The Expulsion of UNEF (May 16)
On May 16, Nasser escalated the crisis by demanding the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had acted as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces since 1957.5 In a move that surprised both the Egyptians and the Western powers, UN Secretary-General U Thant complied almost immediately, arguing that the force could not function without the host nation's consent.9 The removal of UNEF eliminated the "tripwire" that had separated the combatants and effectively dismantled the international security guarantees Israel had relied upon.
Phase III: The Blockade (May 22)
The decisive casus belli came on May 22, when Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. This act cut off Israel’s southern port of Eilat, its only outlet to the Red Sea and the entry point for 90% of its oil imports (which came from Iran).5 In 1957, following the Suez withdrawal, Israel had explicitly declared to the United Nations that any reimposition of a blockade on the Straits would be considered an act of war—a position supported by the maritime powers.11
Nasser’s rhetoric during this period became increasingly bellicose. On May 28, he declared at a press conference: "The existence of Israel is in itself an aggression... We intend to open a general assault on Israel. This will be total war".9 This shift from defensive posturing to offensive threats fundamentally altered the Israeli assessment of the threat.
2.3 The "Waiting Period" and Political Paralysis
In Israel, the three weeks preceding the war, known as the "Waiting Period" (Tkufat HaHamtana), were characterized by acute public anxiety and political paralysis. The Israeli public, many of whom were Holocaust survivors, feared a "second Holocaust" as Arab rhetoric turned genocidal.9 Civil preparations included digging trenches in public parks and stockpiling coffins, reflecting the grim expectations of the civilian population.
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol hesitated to strike immediately, opting instead to exhaust all diplomatic avenues. He dispatched Foreign Minister Abba Eban to Western capitals to seek support. The response was lukewarm; French President Charles de Gaulle, formerly Israel's closest ally, warned Israel not to fire the first shot and imposed an arms embargo.13 The United States, bogged down in Vietnam, proposed a "Red Sea Regatta" to break the blockade but failed to garner international support for the initiative.13
The perception of Eshkol’s indecisiveness led to a crisis of confidence within the Israeli military establishment and the public. On June 1, under immense pressure, Eshkol formed a National Unity Government. He relinquished the Defense portfolio to Moshe Dayan, the hero of the 1956 war, and brought opposition leader Menachem Begin into the cabinet.14 Dayan’s appointment was the signal the IDF general staff had been waiting for; the policy of containment was over. On June 4, the Israeli cabinet voted to launch a preemptive strike.14
2.4 The Military Balance on the Eve of War
To understand the magnitude of the Israeli decision to strike, one must appreciate the sheer numerical asymmetry on the ground. Israel faced a coalition of Arab states that had mobilized their full strength on three frontiers.
As the visual data indicates, Israel was outnumbered in every category of conventional military power. Egypt alone had deployed approximately 100,000 troops and 900-950 tanks in the Sinai.14 When combined with Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi expeditionary forces, the Arab coalition fielded over 465,000 troops, 2,500 tanks, and 800 combat aircraft against Israel's 264,000 troops (mostly reservists), 800 tanks, and roughly 250 combat aircraft.14 This disparity underscored the Israeli doctrine that a long war of attrition would be unwinnable; victory depended on a rapid, decisive preemptive blow.
3. Operation Focus: The Decisive Air Campaign
On the morning of June 5, 1967, at 07:45 Israeli time, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched Operation Focus (Mivtza Moked). This operation serves as the textbook case study for air superiority campaigns and arguably decided the outcome of the entire war within its first three hours.14
3.1 Strategic Surprise and Timing
The operation was predicated on achieving total surprise. The IAF commander, Major General Moti Hod, chose the specific time of 07:45 AM for tactical reasons: Egyptian dawn patrols typically returned to base around 07:00, and by 07:45, the pilots were eating breakfast while the commanders were often stuck in Cairo’s morning traffic.15 Furthermore, Egyptian radar crews worked shifts that changed at 08:00, meaning vigilance was at its lowest point during the shift transition.
The attack profile was incredibly risky. Israel committed nearly its entire combat fleet (approx. 200 aircraft) to the attack, leaving only 12 interceptors to defend the entirety of Israeli airspace.16 The strike packages flew at extremely low altitudes (under 100 feet) over the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, maintaining absolute radio silence to avoid Egyptian radar detection until the last possible moment.16
3.2 Technical Mastery: The Anti-Runway Strategy
The primary objective of the first wave was not immediately to destroy aircraft, but to trap them. The IAF utilized a specialized weapon developed by the French and Israelis: the "concrete-piercing" or "dibber" bomb. These were rocket-assisted, parachute-retarded munitions designed to penetrate the concrete runway before exploding, creating deep craters that were impossible to repair quickly.16
Once the runways were disabled, the Egyptian aircraft—fully fueled and armed for their own planned strikes—were trapped on the tarmac. Israeli pilots then performed strafing runs with cannons, destroying the Egyptian MiG-21s, Tu-16 bombers, and Su-7 fighter-bombers where they sat. This method allowed the IAF to destroy the enemy air force without engaging in risky air-to-air dogfights.16
3.3 The Turnaround Miracle
While the initial strike was devastating, the sustained intensity of the campaign was made possible by ground crew efficiency. In modern air warfare, the "sortie generation rate" is a critical metric. The Israeli ground crews had optimized refueling and rearming procedures to an unprecedented level. While standard doctrine (and Arab air force capability) dictated a turnaround time of over an hour, IAF crews achieved turnaround times of 8 to 10 minutes.17
This operational efficiency allowed each Israeli pilot to fly up to four or five sorties per day, effectively quadrupling the presence of the IAF in the sky. It created the illusion for the Egyptians that they were being attacked by an air force several times larger than Israel actually possessed.16
3.4 The Outcome of the Air War
By noon on June 5, the Egyptian Air Force was effectively nonexistent. Of Egypt's 420 combat aircraft, 286 were destroyed, the vast majority on the ground.18 The destruction of the Tu-16 bombers removed the threat of heavy bombing against Israeli cities.
Following the success in Egypt, the IAF turned its attention to the other fronts. When Syria and Jordan entered the war with artillery shelling and air raids, the IAF launched immediate counter-strikes. By the evening of June 5, the Royal Jordanian Air Force had been wiped out (losing all 22 of its Hunter fighters), and the Syrian Air Force had lost two-thirds of its strength (over 60 aircraft).14 Israel had achieved absolute air superiority over the entire Middle East theatre within the first 10 hours of the war.
4. The Sinai Campaign: A Masterclass in Maneuver Warfare
With the skies cleared, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched its ground offensive into the Sinai Peninsula. The campaign plan, known as the "Red Sheet" (Sadin Adom), was designed to destroy the Egyptian army rather than merely capture territory. The Egyptian Army, structured on Soviet doctrine, had deployed seven divisions in deep defensive lines, focusing on holding key road junctions.14
The IDF attacked with three divisional task forces (Ugdot), each commanded by a general who would become legendary in Israeli military history: Israel Tal, Avraham Yoffe, and Ariel Sharon.
4.1 The Northern Axis: General Israel Tal
General Tal’s division, the strongest armored formation, was tasked with the northern coastal route through Rafah and El Arish. This sector was heavily defended by the Egyptian 7th Infantry Division. Tal’s strategy disregarded the conventional wisdom of securing flanks before advancing. Instead, he utilized the "blitzkrieg" principle of momentum.
The battle for the Rafah Junction and the Jiradi Pass was brutal. Israeli Centurion and Patton tanks punched through Egyptian lines in head-on assaults. At Jiradi, a narrow pass heavily defended by Egyptian anti-tank guns, Israeli forces bypassed and then stormed the position, often leaving pockets of resistance behind to be mopped up by reserve forces while the spearhead continued racing toward El Arish.14 By the end of June 5, Tal’s forces had captured El Arish, unhinging the northern anchor of the Egyptian defense.
4.2 The Central Axis: General Avraham Yoffe
General Yoffe’s division executed one of the most surprising maneuvers of the war. Operating between Tal in the north and Sharon in the south, Yoffe’s forces traversed an area of sand dunes that the Egyptians had considered impassable to armor. Consequently, the area was lightly defended. By pushing his tanks and modified half-tracks through the dunes, Yoffe achieved complete surprise, emerging deep in the Egyptian rear near Bir Lahfan to interdict Egyptian reinforcements attempting to move north to support the battle at Rafah.20
4.3 The Southern Axis: Ariel Sharon and Abu Ageila
The battle for Abu Ageila (Umm Qatef) is widely regarded as the most complex and brilliantly executed operation of the war. The Egyptian position was a fortress: a system of three parallel trench lines dug into the dunes, reinforced by concrete bunkers, surrounded by minefields, and backed by a brigade of artillery.19
Sharon’s plan was a masterpiece of combined arms warfare and concentric coordination. He realized that a frontal assault against such fortifications would be suicidal without neutralizing the supporting fires. Spatially, the operation unrolled on multiple simultaneous vectors:
The Artillery Barrage: Sharon massed six battalions of artillery (105mm and 155mm howitzers) to deliver a "creeping barrage" that saturated the trench lines immediately ahead of the advancing infantry.20
The Heliborne Assault: A force of paratroopers was transported by helicopter into the deep rear of the Egyptian position. They landed behind the enemy lines and assaulted the Egyptian artillery batteries, silencing the guns just as the main Israeli attack began.20
The Flanking Maneuver: Israeli tank battalions moved north and south of the position to cut off the retreat toward the west and to attack the fortress from the rear.21
The Trench Assault: Under the cover of darkness and the artillery barrage, Israeli infantry assaulted the trenches from the front. To prevent friendly fire in the confusing night battle, soldiers used colored flashlights to signal their positions as they cleared the trenches bunker by bunker.21
By the morning of June 6, the Abu Ageila complex had fallen, and the road to the central Sinai was open.
4.4 The Egyptian Collapse and the "Turkey Shoot"
The breakthrough of the Israeli divisions caused a total collapse of the Egyptian command and control structure. Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, reportedly in a state of panic after witnessing the destruction of the air force and the breaching of the front lines, issued a disastrous order on June 6 for a general retreat of all forces to the west bank of the Suez Canal.14
This order turned a tactical defeat into a strategic rout. Egyptian units abandoned their fortified positions and equipment, fleeing westward in disarray. The retreat funneled thousands of vehicles into the narrow confines of the Mitla and Gidi Passes. The IAF, controlling the skies completely, relentlessly attacked these bottlenecks. The result was a "highway of death"—miles of burning trucks, tanks, and personnel carriers. By June 8, the Israeli army had reached the banks of the Suez Canal, and the entire Sinai Peninsula was under Israeli occupation.14
5. The Jordanian Front: The Unwanted War
Israel had initially hoped to keep Jordan out of the conflict. On the morning of June 5, Prime Minister Eshkol sent a message to King Hussein via General Odd Bull of the UNTSO, promising that if Jordan refrained from attacking, Israel would not initiate hostilities against the West Bank.22
However, King Hussein was caught in a trap of alliance politics and misinformation. Having signed a defense pact with Nasser on May 30, he placed his army under the command of an Egyptian general, Abdel Moneim Riad. Furthermore, Nasser deceived Hussein in a phone call (intercepted by Israeli intelligence) claiming that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv and had achieved massive victories.5 Believing the Arab victory was imminent and fearing internal unrest if he sat out the "liberation," Hussein ordered his forces to open fire.
5.1 The Battle for Jerusalem
Jordanian artillery began shelling West Jerusalem and the suburbs of Tel Aviv on the morning of June 5.9 In response, Israel activated its Central Command under General Uzi Narkiss. The battle for Jerusalem became a fierce infantry struggle in built-up areas.
Ammunition Hill (Givat HaTahmoshet): One of the bloodiest battles of the entire war occurred at Ammunition Hill, a fortified Jordanian police academy north of the Old City. The Israeli 55th Paratroopers Brigade, tasked with linking up with the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus, had to take this position. The fighting took place in narrow, winding trenches where air support and tanks were ineffective. It was a brutal hand-to-hand combat engagement that lasted for hours. The battle resulted in 36 Israeli deaths and 71 Jordanian deaths, but the capture of the hill secured the northern flank of Jerusalem.11
5.2 The Capture of the Old City
By June 7, Israeli forces had encircled the Old City of Jerusalem. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan authorized the entry into the walled city but issued strict orders: "No armor in the Old City" and heavy restrictions on artillery to prevent damage to the holy sites.23
Israeli paratroopers, led by Colonel Mordechai Gur, breached the Lions' Gate on the morning of June 7. Gur’s famous radio transmission, "The Temple Mount is in our hands" (Har HaBayit BeYadeinu), signaled the end of the battle. For the first time since 1948, Jews had access to the Western Wall and the Temple Mount.
Simultaneously, Israeli armored columns pushed the Jordanian Army (the Arab Legion) out of the entire West Bank. Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron fell with varying degrees of resistance. By the evening of June 7, the Jordanian army had retreated across the Jordan River, and the ceasefire left Israel in control of the entire West Bank.22
6. The Syrian Front: The Battle for the Golan Heights
Syria was the last front to be fully engaged. For the first four days of the war, the Syrian army shelled Israeli settlements in the Hula Valley from the commanding heights of the Golan Plateau but made only minor ground probes.1
6.1 The Decision to Attack
A fierce debate raged in the Israeli cabinet regarding the Golan. Moshe Dayan initially opposed opening a third front, fearing that an attack on Syria—a close Soviet client—might trigger direct Soviet military intervention.14 However, after the collapse of Egypt and Jordan, the pressure from the northern kibbutzim (who had suffered years of shelling) became overwhelming. Additionally, intelligence indicated the Syrian army was beginning to withdraw. On the morning of June 9, Dayan bypassed the cabinet and directly ordered the Northern Command to attack.14
6.2 The Assault on the Plateau
The battle for the Golan was an engineering and infantry challenge. The terrain consisted of steep basalt escarpments rising 500 meters above the valley, heavily fortified with bunkers and anti-tank guns. Israeli bulldozers had to lead the way, clearing paths for tanks under direct fire.
The Battle of Tel Faher: This engagement epitomized the chaotic bravery of the Golan campaign. An Israeli battalion from the Golani Brigade was tasked with taking the fortified outpost of Tel Faher. Due to navigation errors and the difficulty of the terrain, the force attacked the position frontally rather than from the planned rear flank. The result was a desperate close-quarters battle. With their half-tracks disabled, Israeli officers and soldiers charged the Syrian trenches on foot. The position was taken after heavy casualties, breaking the Syrian defensive line.24
By June 10, Israeli forces had captured the plateau and the strategic town of Quneitra on the road to Damascus. At this point, the Soviet Union threatened direct intervention, and the United States pressured Israel to accept a ceasefire. The guns fell silent at 18:30 on June 10, ending the war.1
7. The Naval Dimension: The USS Liberty Incident
While the naval war was secondary to the air and ground campaigns, it produced one of the most controversial and tragic incidents in U.S.-Israeli relations: the attack on the USS Liberty.
7.1 The Incident Timeline
On June 8, 1967, the USS Liberty, a U.S. Navy technical research ship (SIGINT), was patrolling in international waters off the Sinai coast, monitoring communications in the war zone.
14:00: The ship was attacked by Israeli Mirage and Super Mystère fighter jets. The aircraft strafed the deck with cannons and dropped napalm canisters, destroying antennas and causing heavy casualties topside.25
14:35: Following the air attack, three Israeli torpedo boats approached the burning vessel. They launched five torpedoes; one struck the hull on the starboard side, killing 25 crew members instantly in the intelligence spaces.26
Casualties: A total of 34 American sailors were killed and 171 were wounded.25
7.2 The Controversy: Mistake or Intent?
The incident remains a subject of intense historical dispute:
The Israeli Position: Israel officially claimed the attack was a tragic case of mistaken identity. The Israeli Navy argued that the Liberty was misidentified as the Egyptian vessel El Quseir because it was moving at high speed (roughly 30 knots, though the Liberty’s max speed was far lower) and was not flying a visible flag due to the lack of wind.27 Israel apologized and paid substantial compensation to the victims' families. Several official inquiries (including by the US Navy) concluded the attack was an accident caused by a chain of communication failures and pilot errors.27
The Survivor/Dissident Position: Many survivors of the Liberty and some senior US officials (including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Admiral Thomas Moorer) rejected the accident theory. They argued that the ship was clearly marked, was flying a large American flag (which was replaced when shot down), and had been visually identified by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft multiple times earlier that morning. Theories for a motive include preventing the US from detecting the upcoming Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights or preventing the interception of communications regarding the execution of prisoners in the Sinai, though no definitive documentary evidence has ever surfaced to substantiate these claims.25
8. Strategic Aftermath: A Transformed Middle East
The six days of fighting fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The war's outcome created a new reality that continues to define the region.
8.1 Territorial and Demographic Shift
Israel tripling the size of the territory under its control was the most immediate outcome.
Sinai Peninsula & Gaza Strip: Taken from Egypt.
West Bank & East Jerusalem: Taken from Jordan.
Golan Heights: Taken from Syria.
This expansion brought over one million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli military administration.28 Israel transformed overnight from a state with a small Arab minority to an occupying power responsible for a large, hostile population.
8.2 The "Open Bridges" Policy
In the immediate aftermath, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan implemented the "Open Bridges" policy (Gesharim Ptuhim) in the West Bank. This policy allowed the movement of people and goods to continue between the West Bank and Jordan across the Jordan River bridges.
Dayan’s strategic logic was pragmatic: he sought to prevent the total economic collapse of the territories (which were dependent on Jordanian markets) and to maintain a "safety valve" for the population.28 By allowing Palestinians to maintain their economic and family ties with the Arab world, Dayan hoped to normalize the occupation and reduce the friction between the occupier and the occupied. This policy created a unique situation where technically warring nations (Israel and Jordan) allowed the flow of commerce across their front lines.29
8.3 Casualties and Losses
The war was a catastrophe for the Arab militaries, effectively demilitarizing the confrontation states for years.
Belligerent
Killed/Missing
Wounded
Tanks Lost
Aircraft Lost
Egypt
11,000+
High
~700
286+
Jordan
~700
6,000
~179
All operational
Syria
~2,500
5,000
~118
~60
Israel
776-983
4,517
~400
46
1
8.4 Diplomatic Entrenchment: 242 and Khartoum
The diplomatic fallout solidified the parameters of the conflict for decades to come.
The Khartoum Resolution (September 1, 1967):
Humiliated by the defeat, the Arab League convened in Khartoum, Sudan. The summit marked a reconciliation between Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (ending their proxy war in Yemen), but politically it hardened the Arab stance. The resolution is famous for the "Three No's": No peace with Israel, No recognition of Israel, No negotiations with it.30 This signaled a rejection of converting the military defeat into a diplomatic compromise, ensuring that the conflict would continue.
UN Security Council Resolution 242 (November 22, 1967):
In response to the war, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242. This document enshrined the "Land for Peace" formula. However, a critical ambiguity was inserted into the English text, drafted by Lord Caradon of the UK. It called for Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the recent conflict" (omitting the definite article "the" or the word "all").
Israel's Interpretation: The omission means withdrawal is not required from all territories, allowing for border adjustments to create "secure and recognized boundaries".31
Arab/Palestinian Interpretation: The French text (which includes the definite article) and the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war imply a full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines.31
This linguistic ambiguity remains the central dispute in all subsequent peace negotiations.
8.5 The End of Pan-Arabism and Rise of Palestinian Nationalism
The "Setback" (an-Naksah) dealt a fatal blow to Nasserism. The ideology of secular Pan-Arab nationalism, which promised unity and strength, was exposed as hollow. Nasser attempted to resign on June 9 but remained in power due to popular demand; however, his prestige never recovered.2
The vacuum left by the failure of the Arab states was filled by the rise of independent Palestinian nationalism. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), under Yasser Arafat, concluded that Arab governments could not liberate Palestine and that they must rely on "armed struggle" themselves. This led to the PLO's takeover of the Palestinian national movement and the escalation of terrorism in the late 1960s and 70s.2
9. Conclusion
The Six-Day War was a military masterclass in preemptive strike and maneuver warfare, but a geopolitical earthquake with unfinished aftershocks. For Israel, it provided strategic depth and the unification of Jerusalem, yet it entangled the state in a protracted occupation that continues to define its domestic politics and international standing. For the Arab world, the trauma of 1967 shattered the promise of Nasserism and set the stage for the vengeance-seeking War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Ultimately, the war ended the existential phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict—the question of if Israel would exist—and inaugurated the territorial phase—the struggle over where Israel’s borders lie—a struggle that remains unresolved to this day.
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